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Abstract 
 
Facilitated by the effects of globalisation, crime in the 21st century is increasingly 
transnational in nature and presents a significant challenge to a law enforcement apparatus 
which is traditionally geared towards operating within the confines of the nation-state. Crime 
has transcended state borders and has prompted an expansion of international law 
enforcement cooperation in an attempt to counter cross-border criminality. In doing so, 
traditional law enforcement actors have increasing collaborated with non-state, and non-law 
enforcement, bodies. International cooperation and multi-agency working has been 
especially enacted to combat crimes against children. 
 
This thesis aims to examine the dynamics of multi-agency arrangements in different cultural 
and legal contexts with a view to assessing how different cultural and organisation factors 
affect multi-agency cooperation. This will be done with particular reference to those multi-
agency arrangements that have a child protection focus, which operate in, and across 
multiple jurisdictions and are composed of a diverse range of state and non-state actors.  In 
order to achieve this aim, the thesis will begin with an analysis of globalisation in order to 
identify specific elements which have aided transnational criminality but also the response to 
this criminality has been found in the multi-agency arrangement. To further this point, various 
methods and models of multi-agency working will be examined, each with their distinctive 
benefits and challenges.  
 
A set of key factors and requirements of multi-agency working – both in a single country 
context and internationally – will be presented to the reader. These factors will then be 
identified and analysed in series of international multi-agency arrangements with a child 
protection remit.  This sets the scene for a case study analysis of the Child Exploitation and 
Online Protection Centre and the International Child Protection Network – two multi-agency 
arrangements established to combat crimes against children. 
 
Through these case studies, the complexity and challenge of international working will be 
identified to the reader. However,  the thesis will demonstrate that, if actors are willing to 
work together to overcome these challenges, multi-agency arrangements can be effective in 
compensating for the limitations of state-orientated policing and can bring significant 
operational benefits and positive outcomes.  
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Introduction 
 
Multi-agency working: a concept 
The idea and implementation of multi-agency working has been steadily increasing over 
recent times as more organisations have identified the benefits of formalising their inter-
agency interactions. Engaging in this type of work allows for actors to share information and 
resources with greater ease. This method of working has been adopted in many sectors, but 
it is the criminal justice sector which has seen the greatest proliferation of multi-agency 
arrangements and these have predominantly been seen in the child protection environment.   
 
It is not difficult to see the appeal of multi-agency working in the child protection environment 
given the vast numbers of actors and agencies involved in this field. Elements of law 
enforcement, social services, local government and non-governmental organisations all have 
an involvement in protecting children, and often many different and distinct agencies can be 
involve in the protection of the same child. This can potentially lead to overlap and 
duplication of effort. As a result, the multi-agency method can be an effective way for 
different agencies to effectively share information and coordinate their efforts with best 
effect. One example of this, in the UK, are Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
which bring together stakeholders – including probation service, prison service and police – 
in order to better manage sex offenders. Given the separate and distinctive professional 
practices and cultures of these stakeholders, there is the potential for relevant information to 
missed or not shared effectively without a multi-agency arrangement. This is especially 
pertinent in a time of financial austerity where resources are limited.  
 
This thesis will explore the benefits and challenges of multi-agency working, as seen in two 
case studies, and examine the dynamics and relationships between the actors involved. This 
research will also seek to examine how the international dimension affects the manner in 
which a multi-agency arrangement operates. Academic literature is rich and extensive when 
considering multi-agency working in a single country (read: domestic), however there has 
been limited academic or practitioner research carried out on the emerging proliferation of 
multi-agency arrangements which operate across different, and multiple, jurisdictional 
boundaries. Operating internationally presents distinctive benefits and challenges, which 
compound those already introduced by engaging in multi-agency working; actors 
implementing an international multi-agency arrangement must consider how cultural, social, 
and political variations in jurisdiction – not present in a single country arrangement – will 
affect its operation.  
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The thesis will firstly consider how globalisation has led to great changes in the way society 
operates, and how a more globalised environment has led to a reduction in state power as 
individuals are able to operate across national borders with greater ease. This has led to 
many international multi-agency arrangements being established in response to this and in 
order to share information across borders. This is especially relevant in the criminal justice 
environment whereby, to be discussed, offenders and victims may no longer be resident in 
the same jurisdiction or subject to the same laws. In the child protection environment, it will 
be demonstrated that certain jurisdictions are more appealing to offenders and those with a 
sexual interest in children will travel out with their own country to commit crimes. In order to 
combat this, international working and information sharing is required. 
 
This international dimension presents its own challenges, distinct from those associated to 
multi-agency working, and these international factors must be additionally considered by 
those attempting to work in a multi-agency manner. This thesis will seek to examine how this 
international dimension affects the challenges, dynamics and relationships between actors 
engaged in international multi-agency arrangements.    
 
Aims and Objectives 
The aim of the research project is: 
To examine the dynamics of multi-agency arrangements in different cultural and legal 
contexts 
 
In order to achieve this aim, the following research questions have been devised:  
 What multi-agency approaches exist in the International Law Enforcement 
environment and how do they differ? 
 What are the potential benefits of multi-agency approaches in Law Enforcement? 
 How do organisational and cultural variations affect the formation and operation of 
multi-agency arrangements?  
 What are the challenges to multi-agency Law Enforcement and can they be 
overcome?  
 Are multi-agency approaches effective in different jurisdictions? 
 
These research questions will be considered through a literature review of several multi-
agency arrangements operating in the law enforcement/child protection environment and will 
utilise a data collection strategy to examine two examples of multi-agency arrangements with 
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a child protection remit. The first, the UK’s Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) 
centre, is representative of an arrangement operating in a single jurisdiction. This will then 
be contrasted with the CEOP own international multi-agency arrangement, the International 
Child Protection Network (ICPN); the ICPN will be used to identify and explore how the 
international dimension affects the implementation and operation of the multi-agency ideal.    
 
Introducing the Child Exploitation and Online Protection centre (CEOP) 
CEOP was established in 2006 as a result of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 
2005.The Centre took over the work of the Paedophile Online Investigation Team of the 
National Crime Squad (NCS) and the Serious Sex Offender Unit of the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service (NCIS), when both the NCS and NCIS were merged into the newly 
created Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). 
 
CEOP is made up of 3 faculties: Intelligence, Harm Reduction, and Operations. The 
Intelligence faculty is responsible for developing and disseminating intelligence on child sex 
offenders to appropriate police forces, both nationally and internationally. The faculty is also 
tasked with tracking registered sex offenders who have failed to comply with their notification 
requirements under the Sexual Offences Act 20031. The Harm Reduction faculty consists of 
profession development, education and international teams who liaise with partners in both 
the public and private sector to share best practice and identify new trends. The professional 
development team deliver training to a wide range of professions who come into contact with 
children; the provision of training to external stakeholders generates income for CEOP 
which, in 2011, was estimated to be £950,000 (CEOP, 2010c: 39). The education team 
deliver training and education resources to children and teachers in order to raise awareness 
of the dangers, and benefits, of technology and the internet; branded as the ‘ThinkUKnow’2 
programme, CEOP has delivered training to over 7 million children in the UK3.  The 
Operations faculty more closely resembles traditional UK policing by providing specialist 
capabilities such as computer forensics and covert investigations. CEOP also operates the 
UK’s victim identification programme and image database4.  
 
                                                          
1 http://www.ceop.police.uk/About-Us/How-we-do-it/ (accessed 21/03/11) 
2
 http://www.thinkuknow.co.uk (accessed 21/03/11) 
3
 http://www.thinkuknow.co.uk/teachers (accessed 21/03/11)  
4
 http://www.ceop.police.uk/About-Us/How-we-do-it/ (accessed 21/03/11) 
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CEOP is affiliated to SOCA but has full operational independence and its own identity; 
however the Centre is accountable to the SOCA Board for accounting purposes (CEOP, 
2006: 10). For the year 2010-2011 CEOP had a budget of £8.2 million, from which £1.7 
million came from the private sector and self-generation (CEOP, 2010c: 39).The provision of 
private sector funding is indicative of CEOP’s unique operating model. 
 
This unique operating model is shown by the way CEOP interacts with other agencies and 
the private sector. Many of those working for CEOP are seconded from other agencies, 
including police forces, the UK Border Agency and there are also embedded social workers 
from the NSPCC and local authorities. There are also many embedded private sector 
partners including Detica and Serco, with many more, such as Google, Microsoft and Visa 
Europe, providing technical and financial support (CEOP, 2010c: 46). CEOP employs, 
including seconded staff from both public and private sector bodies, around 123 members of 
staff (CEOP, 2010c: 38). 
 
Reproducing multi-agency working in the International environment: the CEOP 
International Child Protection Network (ICPN) 
Following the establishment of CEOP as a multi-agency Centre in the UK, several countries 
were identified as being key destinations of UK child sex offenders (to be discussed in 
Chapter 1); these hotspot countries were initially identified as Cambodia, Romania, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. Having identified these countries as being favoured by offenders and thus the 
high risk of harm faced by children living in these countries, the CEOP Harm Reduction 
faculty began an initiative aimed at tackling this problem, and the issues faced by these 
countries. This initiative sought to replicate the CEOP collaborative model and many of the 
successes, both strategic and operational, that close cooperation and multi-agency working 
can bring to those working in the field of child protection.    
 
As a result, the International Child Protection network model was created; aimed at bringing 
‘together experts from all walks of life, from all sectors and from both public and private 
organisations with the vision of sharing expertise, building knowledge and limiting offender 
opportunity5’. It was identified that any multi-agency model for use in developing countries 
would have to be mindful for the socio-economic conditions and therefore be low-cost, but 
still deliver high impact results.  
                                                          
5
 http://www.ceop.police.uk/icpn (accessed 31/03/11) 
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Similar to the membership of CEOP, this initiative sought to include representatives from 
police, government, private sector and NGOs; in these target countries, it was identified that 
NGOs play an important role in compensating for weak law enforcement structures. The 
initiative sought to replicate many of the networking, communication and capacity building 
advantages associated with multi-agency arrangements; prior to the creation of the ICPN 
many of the different sectors had limited interaction with each other. Each ICPN Advisory 
Panel follows the same blueprint and was designed to have a Chairperson and Vice-
Chairperson, elected by members of the arrangement, and convening on a regular basis. 
Members of the ICPN are encouraged to maintain communication with each other between 
meetings, this can also been seen in ICPN Advisory Panels as a means to sustain the 
arrangements between meetings. This regular communication was intended to replicate the 
networking and knowledge building benefits experienced by CEOP through its multi-agency 
model. Whilst the Panel would meet on a regular basis, CEOP has limited physical presence 
(due to geographic distance from the UK), but maintains support via e-mail.  
 
The ICPN Advisory Panel model also includes a code of practice and each Panel utilises the 
same code of practice (see Appendix 3). This sets out which is expected of each member, 
and every member, when joining the panel, is asked to sign this document. This code of 
practice was created in consultation with potential members prior to the creation of the ICPN. 
Individuals are invited to join the ICPN Advisory Panel in their country at the discretion of 
CEOP; often using the ICPN initiative to formalise previous and long-standing personal 
contacts made by CEOP Officers.  
 
Whilst each panel arrangement followed the same design structure and code of practice, the 
operation and interaction between members from different sectors (e.g. police and NGOs) 
varies in each country. This has the potential to impact on the dynamics and effectiveness of 
the multi-agency arrangement and the ability to achieve its aims and objectives. One aim of 
this project is to examine each of the existing ICPN Advisory Panels and observe, and 
account for, the variations between them; and to establish to what extent these variations 
are based on socio-economic and cultural factors.  
 
Chapter outline 
In order to achieve the aims of examining the dynamics of international multi-agency 
arrangements, this thesis will take the following format. 
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Chapter 1 will introduce the concept of globalisation and explore specific resultant factors 
which have contributed to the rise in transnationalism and transnational crime. This has 
created an environment whereby international multi-agency arrangements and organisations 
can act as a means to combat crimes, through intelligence and information-sharing, 
previously limited to traditional state boundaries. This chapter will demonstrate that, through 
globalisation and changes in society, crime is not contained by state borders and innovative 
solutions are required to tackle the issue.  
 
Having introduced the concept, Chapter 2 will examine the different models and methods of 
multi-agency working, identifying the rationale and structural/operational differences between 
each method. This chapter will explore key factors which are relevant to their effective 
operation in a general sense, before considering how the international dimension introduces 
its own factors which must be considered when designed an arrangement aimed at 
operating across borders. The factors identified in this chapter will provide a framework 
enabling the effective examination of several multi-agency arrangements in this thesis, 
demonstrating the extent to which international factors affect multi-agency working practices. 
 
Chapter 3 will explore several existing international multi-agency arrangements which 
possess a child protection remit, examining them with reference to the different models and 
key factors discussed in the previous chapter. This will provide the reader with an 
understanding of how these considerations translate into the real-world. This will be done by 
aligning each example to the corresponding model of multi-agency working they represent, 
and identifying the rationale behind its selection. This chapter will also assess each example 
against the key factors associated with multi-agency working identified in the previous 
chapter. This will demonstrate to the reader the extent to which arrangements can be 
enabled and constrained by these factors, whilst examining the various means to overcome 
difficulties. 
 
Chapter 4 will outline the research methodology utilised in order to collect data on the two 
case studies considered in this thesis. This will examine the range of data collection tools 
employed and reasoning behind their selection. A discussion of how each tool was 
implemented and data collected will also be undertaken. Following the examination of the 
data collection tools, the ethical considerations which were present, and how they were 
mitigated, will also be discussed. Finally the limitations of the study will be examined. The 
length of this chapter and complexity of the research methodology can be seen as reflective 
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of the complexity of international multi-agency working as demonstrated in the previous 
chapters. 
 
Chapter 5 will present the findings of the data collection exercise for the CEOP case study. 
These findings will be presented with a view to examining how CEOP implements its 
selected model of multi-agency working and the reasons behind it. These findings will also 
examine CEOP’s consideration of each of the key factors identified in Chapter 2. The data 
presented in this chapter was collected through the unique access given to the researcher, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, and represents a rare insight into the Centre and its 
operation from an insider position. This chapter will demonstrate the effectiveness and 
appeal of a multi-agency working model which has the potential to be replicated in other 
jurisdictions. It will also consider the challenges which were encountered and the manner in 
which they were overcome. 
 
Chapter 6 will present the findings from the second case study, the ICPN, in a similar format 
to that of CEOP. However, as the ICPN represents an international multi-agency 
arrangement, additional consideration will be given to the international factors of multi-
agency working, identified in Chapter 2, and how these exist in the ICPN.  Drawing on data 
collected from 4 different contexts and using a mixed method approach, this chapter will 
demonstrate the extent to which each jurisdiction presents its own considerations and 
responses to the factors. This chapter will highlight to the reader the extent to which the 
international elements, identified in Chapter 2, have an impact on all aspects of a multi-
agency operation.   
 
Chapter 7 will analyse the findings of the two data collection exercises in the context of the 
stated research questions with a view to answering the central aims and objectives of these 
thesis. Each research question will be considered in turn before a comprehensive summary. 
Drawing on previous chapters, the analysis will carefully consider the existence of those 
international multi-agency arrangements with a specific law enforcement remit and the 
potential benefits, and challenges, they bring to effective cross-border/cross sector working. 
When considering the benefits and challenges, the impact of social, political, and cultural 
factors, and the responses to these factors by ICPN members, will be examined. Through 
the experiences of the ICPN members, the reader will be shown examples of ‘what works’ 
and where improvements could be made.   
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Chapter 8 will conclude the thesis by reviewing the key messages of each chapters and their 
contribution to the research questions and aim of this thesis. The chapter will then conclude 
with final remarks to complete the fulfilment of the aims and objectives of this thesis. By the 
conclusion of the thesis, it will be clear that multi-agency arrangements offer an attractive 
method of improving inter-agency data sharing and cooperation. It will be apparent that there 
are a wide range of forms that multi-agency working can take, as well as the additional 
challenges and considerations that must be accounted for when implementing an 
arrangement on an international scale.  Through the case studies and data collected from 
CEOP and ICPN participants, it will be demonstrated that there are challenges and 
considerations in a real world environment.  
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Chapter 1: The Globalisation of Crime: Beyond the Nation-State 
 
This chapter will examine, through literature review, the changing nature of crime and the 
rise of transnational crime in the globalised age in order to provide context to the 
environment in which CEOP and the ICPN operate. This will be done firstly by examining the 
manner in which globalisation has contributed to the rise in transnational crimes by reducing 
many of the state-orientated barriers. This will be followed by a more in-depth discussion of 
the major factors of globalisation which have contributed most to the changing nature of 
criminality. Finally this chapter will consider the response to transnational and globalised 
crime by law enforcement and international bodies, introducing the concept of multi-agency 
working to be further explored in this thesis. 
 
Introduction 
The nature of crime has changed over recent decades with many factors contributing to an 
increase in crime that is transnational in nature. Advances in technology and international 
transportation, amongst others, has enabled crime, and criminals, to expand beyond the 
state in which they reside to virtually any country in the world. Criminal acts can now be 
carried out in, and across, multiple jurisdictions by nationals resident in other countries.  
 
“Organised crime is a phenomenon that has emerged in different cultures, societies 
and countries all over the world. It has become global in scale and is no longer 
exclusive to certain geographical areas, to singular ethnic groups or to particular social 
systems. Organised crime is ubiquitous” (Schloenhardt, 1999: 3). 
 
Crime has also expanded beyond the territorial level to the virtual world; no longer do 
criminal acts have to be committed in the physical world. Crime committed via the Internet – 
‘virtual crime’ – transcends the traditional boundaries and can occur anywhere to anyone; 
“Globalisation and technology have, it has been argued, created spaces outside the 
territorial states which remain uncontrolled” (Sornarajah, 1999: 409). As individuals conduct 
an increased amount of their lives in the online world, opportunities for online crime have 
increased through spam, phishing and viruses. The Internet has also provided criminals with 
a new method of communication, allowing contact across borders and connecting criminals, 
and criminal groups, with each other in ways previously unseen.   
 
The rise of transnational crime has posed a major problem to the traditional territorial-based 
policing model (Harfield, 2006: 758), as criminal acts and their perpetrators can be spread 
across multiple countries and outside the jurisdiction of the investigating police force; 
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“groups are able to exploit new technology in non-physical spaces beyond state frontiers and 
thereby pose a threat to the existing system of territorial states” (Sornarajah, 1999: 410). As 
a result, many innovative pro-active and re-active solutions have been devised; many of 
these are law enforcement based, such as Interpol and Europol, whist others follow a more 
multi-agency approach recognising that the traditional police model no longer applies 
(Kemshall and Maguire, 2001: 243), and partnerships with the private and non-governmental 
sectors are required to ‘police’ a sphere where the police are limited in their effectiveness.  
 
The fight against child exploitation and abuse has perhaps seen the greatest number of 
multi-agency arrangements and non-traditional detection and disruption techniques, and 
these will be discussed throughout this thesis. The main focus of this thesis will be the Child 
Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) and its International Child Protection 
Network (ICPN) initiative. CEOP is a multi-agency centre devised of police officers and 
social workers, with private sector sponsorship from companies such as Visa and Microsoft, 
amongst others. 
 
The rise of technology 
Technological advancements in recent years have changed the way individuals live their 
lives and, in the most part, these advancements have been of great benefit. The Internet has 
enabled families spread across borders to communicate with each other through e-mail, 
social networking sites (SNS), and Voice-Over-IP telephony (VOIP), achieving greater 
efficiency than the traditional methods of the postal mail. These new communication 
methods have proved immensely popular; according to a leading web monitoring group, 
there were over 107 trillion e-mails were sent in 20106 (though 89% was spam!), 600 million 
users of Facebook7 and over 500 million Skype users (of which 25 million were 
simultaneously online8).Similarly the Internet has provided an unparalleled education and 
leisure resource, allowing both adults and children to increase their knowledge and learning 
through access to educational websites and forums (Plasencia, 2000: 16). At the same time, 
through the development of web forums and groups, those with unique interests can find 
other like-minded individuals to share their hobbies and pastimes. It is widely been accepted 
that the development of the Internet has had a beneficial impact on society as a whole. That 
said, like in any environment, there are others who can use these advancements for criminal 
and deviant methods.  
                                                          
6 http://royal.pingdom.com/2011/01/12/internet-2010-in-numbers/ (accessed 01/12/11) 
7
 http://royal.pingdom.com/2011/01/12/internet-2010-in-numbers/ (accessed 01/02/11) 
8
 http://www.skype.com/intl/en-gb/home (accessed 01/02/11) 
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The information and communication benefits that the Internet brings families, friends, and 
those with unique interests, together have also been used to bring together criminal 
elements, including those with a sexual interest in children (Doyle, 1999: 119). The Internet 
has enabled those with such an interest to identify each other and establish networks with 
ease (Esposito, 1998: 541). Prior to the internet it was much more difficult for those with an 
interest in children to identify each other if they were not part of an established network 
(Doyle, 1999: 122), individuals could not simply put a message in their local classified 
newspaper or ask their friends if they had similar interests (though there was some cases 
where this did happen) as this could quickly lead to their identification; it was an 
‘underground industry’ (Esposito, 1998: 541). Following the expansion of the Internet, these 
same individuals can now simply post a message on an online group or messageboard in an 
attempt to meet likeminded individuals. The anonymity that the internet provides allows 
those with such interests to be much more open about them; ‘people can inquire and venture 
into areas of cyberspace where they may not actually explore in reality’ (Doyle, 1999: 121). 
 
Internet forums and groups, such as Yahoo! Groups and Google Groups, provide the 
opportunity for individuals to share information and seek the assistance of others. At the time 
of writing, Yahoo! Groups and Google groups, representing the largest providers of these 
services had nearly 170000009 and 500000010 user-created groups respectively. Whilst 
there are many benefits of these groups, and the more basic messageboard, others have 
used this technology for deviant purposes. Those individuals with a deviant sexual interest in 
children use this technology to make contact with other like-minded individuals and share 
child abuse images (Doyle, 1999: 120). As with the majority of criminal groups that use the 
Internet, they are often technologically aware and generally do not discuss illegal matters 
directly on these legal groups, thus hiding their deviant motivations but utilise these public 
groups to establish contacts with further communication carried out using the private 
messaging (PM) functions on these groups. The use of the PM function serves to hide their 
communication from the public and allows for those with a deviant interest to share more 
private, and explicit, information; “Criminal organisations protect themselves by using 
modern telecommunications and computing technologies for transnational financial 
transactions and electronic data and information exchange within and among organisations” 
(Schloenhardt, 1999: 9). 
 
                                                          
9
 http://dir.groups.yahoo.com/dir/ (accessed 18/12/10) 
10
 http://groups.google.com/groups/dir (accessed 18/12/10) 
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In addition to the PM function, offenders, once connections have been made, utilise e-mail to 
share information and images. Typically offenders will use one of the many free e-mail 
account provider such as Hotmail, Yahoo Mail, or Google Mail as these require little personal 
information, which could be used to identify an offender, and do not require the verification of 
the information provided. This method provides the offender with e-mail accounts that can be 
created and subsequently disposed of with ease. 
 
Prior to the advent of the Internet, an individual with a deviant sexual interest in children had 
less opportunities to gain access to children (Quayle and Taylor, 2002: 868); these were 
largely limited to the physical spaces where children inhabit, for example school grounds, 
open spaces, and within the family environment (Plasencia, 2000: 25). Initial contact with a 
child in a public place poses several difficulties for such an individual, as they would appear 
out of place and would likely by questioned/noticed by other adults and children in the area. 
Additionally a child would be less likely, though not unseen, to go of his or her own free will 
with a stranger. As a result, in order to gain access to children the offender would have to 
either integrate themselves into an environment which would put them in regular contact with 
children, such as becoming a school teacher, youth group leader or faith leader (Sullivan 
and Beech, 2002: 153), or engage in opportunism. Offenders have also been identified as 
starting relationships with vulnerable single parents in order to gain access to their children. 
With the introduction of the Internet, and the anonymity that it brings, offenders are able to 
utilise chat rooms to meet and ‘groom’ children. Only in the virtual world could an offender 
find a room of children wanted to talk with them, the wide ‘selection’ of potential child targets 
allows the offender to be specific and target a child with the greatest similarity to their 
deviant interest; without the Internet the offenders “would never have met the children” 
(Plasencia, 2000: 19). In order to do this, offenders disguise their identity; reinventing and 
replacing their own with one more appealing to the child they have targeted (Quayle and 
Taylor, 2002: 868); for example they reinvent themselves as a pre-teen or teenage individual 
with hobbies and interests common to that age, such as football, music, shopping etc.  
 
As the child cannot physically see the person they are talking to, unless they are using a 
webcam (though this usually occurs later in the grooming process), they are forced to take 
what the offender is ‘saying’ (read: typing) on trust. It has been seen that offenders will, after 
building a relationship or ‘grooming’ the child, ask for pictures of the child. These pictures are 
often of a sexual nature, often taken in the belief that the person with whom they are talking 
is of the opposite sex and similar age (it should be noted however that there are cases 
where seasoned offenders have been upfront about their true age and their desires, thus 
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negating the need for an anonymous identity). This, however, is a persona that has been 
carefully constructed by the offender to appeal to the child and win their trust.  
 
Once these images have been taken, the Internet and other new technologies, such 
smartphones, Peer-to-Peer networks (P2P), and USB pen drives, allow for greater 
distribution to other individuals with an interest in children when compared to traditional 
offline distribution means such as hard copy and postal system  (Beech, Elliott, Birgden and 
Findlater: 2008: 219). These new methods allow for distribution across international borders 
to a wider population at lower cost; distributors need not know each recipient personally, 
especially in the case of P2P networks. Research conducted by CEOP and the European 
Financial Coalition (EFC) found that the number of commercial websites of distributing 
indecent images of children was falling (EFC, 2010: 8) at the same time P2P methods of 
image distribution were increasing (CEOP, 2010a: 4). Similar research by the Internet Watch 
Foundation (IWF) identified that the number of URLs with child sexual abuse content known 
has ‘remained fairly stable for the last three years however the overall number of domains on 
which this content is found has decreased by 57% since 2006’ (IWF, 2009: 15). In addition to 
the wider distribution of images made possible by new technologies, the length of time an 
image is available is potentially infinite. Whereas in the real world, copies of indecent images 
can be destroyed by police and authorities when recovered, images circulated via digital 
means may have been copied an unknown number of times. As a result, police and 
authorities can still remove images from websites and other locations when they are 
discovered but there will remain an unknown number of copies in offender image collections. 
Older images feature predominately on commercial sites whilst newer images tend to be 
found on P2P networks; the dominance of historic images on commercial websites is 
explained as “it means very little outlay for the organisers as they are not having to pay to 
have images produced, leaving them with only having to pay for their website and server 
costs; and secondly, there is less risk of a victim or abuser being identified if the images are 
historic” (EFC, 2010: 15). The higher risk associated with newer images leads offenders to 
increasingly use P2P networks with the inherent increased level of security and restricted 
membership (EFC, 2010: 15). 
 
The longevity and wide distribution of images can serve to re-victimise those featured in the 
images many years after the abuse took place. The wide distribution network available via 
these new technologies means that often the image is circulated to other jurisdictions out 
with the control of the UK police. Bodies such as the IWF act to ‘block’ access to commercial 
websites that host indecent images in an effort to stop victim accidentally viewing their abuse 
   
18 
 
online. The IWF also operates a hotline where members of the public can report the web 
addresses (URLs) of suspected child abuse images so they can be blocked. The foundation 
also has agreements with police and ISPs whereby the IWF, on finding a child abuse image 
hosted in the UK, can issue a ‘removal’ notice to the ISP to remove the image from public 
access and retain evidence for the police. The IWF is an example of industry self-regulation 
with 98.6% of UK Internet Service Providers signing up to their list of blocked URLs11; the 
organisation also passes this intelligence to UK police and, in the case of overseas websites, 
appropriate partners. This multi-agency approach has been successful in reducing the 
amount of known child abuse images hosted in the UK from 18% in 1997 to less that 1% 
since 200312. Whilst this is a very positive step, it is unknown how many of these websites 
have simply moved to a different jurisdiction and are still operating. Added to this, research 
by CEOP and other organisations (CEOP, 2010a: 4) suggests that the number of 
commercial websites is declining in favour of P2P. 
 
The new distribution methods provided by the Internet have enabled offenders to amass 
even larger collections of images which are increasingly graphic in nature (Beech et al, 
2008: 226). Whereas indecent images would have previously been distributed in hard copy 
using clandestine methods, the Internet has allowed for images to be posted online and sent 
via e-mail, private messages, and web forums.  These methods have allowed for multiple 
copies of the same image to be disseminated to other offenders throughout the connected 
world in an instant, where the images can again be copied and distributed further. Research 
suggests that the size of an offender’s collection can increase the standing of that individual 
in their closed abuse network (Quayle and Taylor, 2002: 886). The Internet has allowed for 
offenders to establish their own ‘support’, validation, and trading networks, utilising websites 
and forums (Plasencia, 2000: 17), and, like any network, there is an inherent hierarchy.  
 
Research and interviews conducted with offenders suggest that offenders build or increase 
the size of their collections to gain standing with their group (Quayle and Taylor, 2002: 886). 
Similarly offenders may only be invited to join a particular network after contributing images 
to the group; for example the W0nderland Club,  a 300 member organisation, required 
individuals to provide 10,000 indecent images to gain entry into the group (Beech et al, 
2008: 221). This may also be used as a tactic to identify law enforcement officers attempting 
                                                          
11 http://www.iwf.org.uk/services/blocking/blocking-faqs (accessed 07/12/10) 
12
 http://www.iwf.org.uk/services/removal (accessed 07/12/10) 
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to infiltrate the network, due to professional and ethical issues associated with law 
enforcement involvement in distribution of indecent images. The analysis of images in these 
large collections indicates that many of the images are historic and have been seen by law 
enforcement on previous occasions (EFC, 2010: 15). 
 
As mentioned previously, the wide distribution of the same image, across multiple users and 
jurisdictions, makes it impossible to ensure that all copies are recovered; the existence of 
these images in circulation, and the knowledge of this, can lead to the re-victimisation of the 
young person should they encounter the image of their abuse in later years (Beech et al, 
2008: 218). Even the knowledge that the images still exists can cause distress to the victim.  
When these images are posted on websites hosted in the UK, the work of the IWF can be 
vital to combating the re-victimisation through the blocking and removal of such pages; 
however in the P2P and personal trading environments images may only be deleted once 
offenders have come to the attention of authorities, and even then there may be other copies 
held in other offender collections. 
 
The increased penetration of ICT into everyday life has also placed webcams into the homes 
and bedrooms of young people; at the same time research has identified the phenomenon of 
self-taken images increasing and these images are being found in the collections of 
offenders (CEOP, 2010b: 10). Though it must be noted that not all self-taken images are 
obtained by offenders through the grooming or contact processes, the increasing 
sexualisation of young people and the effects of dissociative anonymity – a disconnect 
between the ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ worlds and the consequences of actions – has led to many 
more young people posting self-taken images of themselves online, commonly via social 
networking websites, or sending them to partners. There have been cases identified (CEOP, 
2010b) where recipients of these self-taken images (such as a boyfriend) have then 
distributed them amongst friends until they eventually end up in the possession of an 
offender.   
 
Technology has simultaneous provided the offender the opportunity to share more and to do 
so with increasing anonymity (Esposito, 1998: 541). As previously discussed, the prevalence 
of online technologies that require little or no verified personal information and the use of 
these by offenders often causes frustration within law enforcement. In many cases, 
offenders utilise many of these services to mask their identity.  Every web connected device 
is assigned an IP address to connect to the Internet and, through investigation, law 
enforcement are able to obtain information from the Internet Service Provider responsible for 
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that IP address regarding the user of that IP address, and thus the user of the Internet 
connection. However there are many difficulties that law enforcement face in obtaining this 
data, and doing so in a timely fashion. If the IP address should correspond to an ISP in the 
UK, officers must make an application to the ISP using the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 and satisfy the conditions of the Act; if the address is located out with the 
UK, then a diplomatic request, known as an International Letter of Request (ILOR) must be 
submitted by lawyers in order to obtain evidence (Bowling, 2009: 156). Both these routes 
may incur delays of varying lengths and, as a result, by the time the request is processed the 
data may no longer be available (Harfield, 2008: 490). In the UK, there is no consistent 
length of time that ISPs retain data, although a voluntary code exists, and this can lead to 
many investigations being discontinued due to lack of available evidence, as the ISP returns 
to the law enforcement agency stating the data is no longer held – depending of the type of 
data, voluntary retention times can range from 4 days (website viewing history) to 12 months 
(subscriber information). Across the European Union the situation is similar, Article 6 of 
Directive 2006/24/EC, which governs the retention of communications data, stipulates that 
member states hold such data for between 6 and 24 months and provides the legal 
conditions for storage and access to this data (Feller, 2010: 1). However, with such a wide 
date range, countries are often led by their views on civil liberties, data protection, and 
privacy, and for those countries which opt for the lower end of the date range, the data is 
often no longer available by the time an International Letter of Request is received, due to 
the lengthy legal processes involved in executing the ILOR. In many of these cases, the non-
existence of the communications data means it is not possible to identify the offender 
(CEOP, 2010a: 6). 
 
The development and growth of international travel 
The number of UK nationals travelling overseas has increased dramatically over recent 
years, from under 30 million in 1987 to over 70 million in 2007 (Bowling, 2009: 151). There 
are many possible explanations for this, including the rise in the ‘low-cost’ airlines, such as 
EasyJet and Ryanair, and increased competition in the tourism sector. Of course not all of 
those travelling overseas will be involved in crime, but these same conditions have greatly 
aided the development of transnational crime.   
 
The rise in the number of low-cost airlines has had the knock-on effect of increasing 
competition in the airline industry, causing the traditional airlines to lower their costs and 
ticket prices. This has resulted in the availability of cheaper flights globally, contributing to 
the increase of 60% in worldwide air travel between 1995 and 2007 (Bowling, 2009: 151). 
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Ease of travel has allowed for Organised Crime Groups to operate across multiple 
jurisdictions with greater effectiveness.  Lowering international travel costs has also enabled 
an increased number of sex offenders to travel overseas to commit contact offences. Child 
sex crime ‘hotspots’ have been typically found in the South East Asian countries of Thailand, 
Vietnam and Cambodia with academic and police research identifying an increasing number 
of individuals travelling to these countries to commit sexual offences with children (Bertone, 
2004: 19). 
 
Challenging social and political structures 
Whilst it has been identified that an increasing number of UK nationals with a deviant sexual 
interest in children are travelling to these ‘hotspot’ countries, the falling cost of travel cannot 
be stated as the sole driver. The same increases in contact offences against children have 
not been seen in western European countries, where there is also a high concentration of 
low-cost airlines. Child sex offenders are also drawn to the South East Asian ‘hotspot’ 
countries due to their perceived weaker political and law enforcement capabilities (Flowers, 
2001: 154). Essentially, there is the belief that they are less likely to be caught for these 
offences due to the lack of resources and corruptibility of officials (Williams, 2002: 169).  
 
‘As organised crime involves activities across international borders, the corruption and 
bribery of government officials are important tools to facilitate the conduct of the 
criminal activity and to enable the criminal organisation to operate with impunity’ 
(Schloenhardt, 1999: 9). 
 
Poverty in these countries also provides the ideal conditions for the illegal, and legal, sex 
industry to flourish. Individuals suffering from a lack of employment and life opportunities 
have often been led into this industry to support themselves, their families, or their lifestyles 
(Flowers, 2001: 151). This has been seen to varying degrees throughout the world but none 
more so that in South East Asia; The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that 
prostitution ‘represented between 2 and 14 per cent of the economic activities of Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines’ (Poulin, 2003: 38). The existence of the sex industry in 
these countries is widely known throughout the world and serves as an attraction to many 
westerners, but it is the existence, and prevalence, of the child sex industry that is also 
attracting a number of these individuals. Economic conditions have led many poor families to 
‘sell’ or ‘rent’ their children to individuals for money (Doyle, 1999: 123; Plasencia, 2000: 19). 
It is due to these conditions that offenders can commit their deviant actions safe in the 
knowledge that the parents and child are unlikely to report them to authorities for fear of 
prosecution themselves and the loss of a revenue stream.  
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Similarly, poverty in these countries has led to the abandonment of many children as parents 
are unable to afford to look after them. The limited ability of the state to care for these 
children as led many western expatriate nationals to set up orphanages and NGOs to care 
for these children. The vast majority of these individuals do very important work, however 
there have been cases where those with a deviant sexual interest in children have used this 
opportunity to set up an organisation, or utilising an existing organisation, with the aim of 
providing them contact with vulnerable children (Sullivan and Beech, 2002: 163). With limited 
resources of the states in question and no national vetting schemes, many of these 
individuals are able to do so with ease. 
 
The limited capacity, and motivation, of the State to act in these situations has forced NGOs 
and international law enforcement to take a proactive role in capacity building and identifying 
these rogue individuals (Bertone, 2004: 13; Arnold and Bertone, 2002: 37). CEOP has been 
involved in two such cases, including the investigation on a UK national who befriended a 
vulnerable Indian family in order to abuse their daughter13, and an investigation into a UK 
national committing abuse in a Cambodia orphanage14. Both these investigations were 
conducted in-country through a multi-agency partnership between local police, CEOP, and 
NGOs; the local police lacked the resources and capabilities to carry out the investigation on 
their own.  
 
‘”Transnational criminal today tends to be active in several countries, going where the 
opportunities are high and the risks are low” (Williams, 2001: 58). 
 
Given the limited capabilities of the States in question, many collaborative multi-agency 
approaches have been established by many different countries, including the UK, USA, and 
Australia. CEOP established the International Child Protection Network (ICPN) in 4 of the 
‘hotspot’ countries: Cambodia, Romania, Thailand and Vietnam. The ICPN ‘Advisory Panels’ 
in each country represent collaboration between police, government, NGOs and CEOP with 
the aim of capacity building, providing education and awareness training, and intelligence 
sharing between panel members. The arrest of the UK national involved in abuse in a 
Cambodian orphanage was the direct result of intelligence passed to CEOP through the 
                                                          
13
 Press Release, http://www.ceop.police.uk/Media-Centre/Press-releases/2010/GUILTY-PLEA-FOR-
OVERSEAS-CHILD-ABUSER (accessed 14/12/10) 
14
 Press Release, http://www.ceop.police.uk/Media-Centre/Press-releases/2010/BRITISH-MAN-
CHARGED-IN-CAMBODIA-AS-ORPHANAGE-IS-INVESTIGATED-/ (accessed 14/12/10) 
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ICPN Advisory Panel in Cambodia. CEOP and each of the ICPN Advisory Panels will be 
examined in depth in later chapters of this thesis.    
 
The response to transnational crime  
The increasingly globalised and non-state based nature of crime has prompted state law 
enforcement bodies into considering new and innovative approaches to fighting crime which 
goes beyond their jurisdiction (Sheptycki, 1995: 616). These new approaches, in addition to 
transcending the nation-state border, have, in many cases, also transcended the traditional 
law enforcement model (Bowling, 2009: 152). The police-focused model is no longer 
effective in this international and virtual environment as ‘national boundaries no longer exist 
in cyberspace’ (Esposito, 1998: 541). David Wall (2007: 186) has described child 
pornography as an example of a ‘hybrid cybercrime’, a crime which existed prior to the 
advent of the Internet but has utilised its existence to further its effects. These hybrid 
cybercrimes have taken advantage of the nodal nature of the Internet which has limited the 
scope and abilities of the traditional policing model and given rise to other non-state actors in 
the online environment (Wall, 2007). This has led new arrangements to be increasingly 
multilateral and multi-agency in nature, combining police agencies with other law 
enforcement bodies (such as tax and customs authorities), NGOs and the private sector.   
 
An examination of the many international multi-agency arrangements shows there is no 
single multi-agency ‘model’. The following chapters will examine the range of different multi-
agency structures and examples of international law enforcement arrangements in 
operation, paying particular attention to the methodology and rationale behind their operation 
and development. Within these international organisations and arrangements; several key 
components can be seen. A common component seen throughout the many international 
organisations is the existence of a formalised constitution and operating procedures. These 
documents outline the rules and regulations of the organisation, including their role and 
remit. Given the diverse international nature of the membership of these organisations, with 
contrasting legal, social and political systems, this is an issue exploited by criminals who 
‘have learned to use the discrepancies that occur between different national legal and 
financial systems to their best advantage (Schloenhardt, 1999: 8). It is necessary to find 
common ground and the importance of this factor cannot be understated, as certain methods 
of investigation and admissibility of evidence which exist in one country may be illegal or 
restricted in another. For example, there are Interpol member countries which have sought 
the extradition of individuals under the ‘Red Notice’ system for political crimes; this may be 
something that is common practise in the issuing country, however the Interpol Constitution 
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(Article 3) specifically deems the organisation to be non-political and therefore such law 
enforcement actions with a political motivation cannot be facilitated through Interpol 
channels15. The necessity of this constitution is demonstrated through the wide variations of 
legal and judicial frameworks found across the membership. 
 
The precise composition of these formalised working arrangements can be seen to vary 
based on what is acceptable to the membership of that organisation, and it can be seen that 
organisations with a larger, more diverse, membership often have a greater requirement for 
such a codified structure in order to keep the organisation functioning. Additionally, it can be 
seen that the larger and more diverse the organisation, the smaller the remit for activity. This 
can be explained through the lack of consensus and increased diversity of membership 
(Bowling, 2009: 158). For example, Interpol has 190 member countries with widely varying 
political, cultural and legal systems and as such the organisation has focussed on areas 
where there is common ground, such as providing a communication platform to connect 
member countries. Whereas other, more regional, organisations such as Europol and 
Ameripol have a more geographically exclusive membership with a greater degree of 
political, legal, and social harmonisation and commonalities (Bowling, 2009: 154); this fact 
allows these organisations to take on a wider remit to include more joint operational activity. 
 
That said, countries are able to join more than one international organisation to meet their 
needs; however it could be argued that this creates a ‘patchwork quilt’ (Sheptycki, 1995: 
629) forming ‘a complicated, interconnecting, mesh of formal structures and informal 
arrangements, serviced by a range of information systems (which are often incompatible)’ 
(Benyon, 1992: 32). For example the UK is a member of many organisations, including 
Interpol, Europol, and Sirene16, and with each organisation possessing a different role and 
remit, membership of a combination of these bodies may be required to meet the needs of 
an operation. The specific differences and rational behind each of these organisations will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
 
Such international collaborations have seen membership expand from outwith state 
organisations to include private sector organisations and specialised NGOs. The non-state 
nature of many international crimes requires the assistance of non-state actors:  
                                                          
15
 http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/legalmaterials/constitution/constitutiongenreg/constitution.asp 
(accessed 03/02/11) 
16
 http://www.soca.gov.uk/about-soca/working-in-partnership/international-partnerships (accessed 
03/02/11) 
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“Globalisation has also brought new actors onto the international scene. The power of 
these new actors, like multinational companies and bank on the legitimate side of 
international business and transnationally organized crime syndicates on the 
illegitimate side of international business rivals those of many states” (Sornarajah, 
1999: 409). 
 
The growth of the transnational crime has seen the increased involvement and importance of 
transportation providers, such as DHL and FedEx (Cassella, 2003: 93), and money transfer 
bodies (Weimer, 2000: 201), such as MoneyGram and Western Union, in the law 
enforcement process. Having been identified as two of industries which can be used by 
criminals to facilitate international crime, representatives of their commercial organisations 
are increasingly interacting with international law enforcement.   
 
Similarly, NGOs are playing an increasingly important role as specialised experts in the 
international environment. For example, the rise in international parental child abduction, 
facilitated by easier international travel, has resulted in UK NGOs becoming increasing 
involved in bringing about the recovery of a child using civil means, rather than the criminal 
law route. In the child protection environment, specialised NGOs are often better placed and 
better resourced that their law enforcement colleagues in some developing countries. The 
role of NGOs in South East Asian countries in tacking child exploitation served as a driving 
factor for CEOP to develop its international Advisory Panels to facilitate a closer, more 
effective, working relationship between law enforcement and NGOs in these ‘hotspot’ 
countries. In several countries, there was already a basic relationship with NGOs and police 
carrying out joint operations against child abusers. Such partnership often involved the 
NGOs supporting the police with their experience and resources, whilst the police possessed 
the legal mandate to conduct criminal investigations. The ability and ease of interaction 
between state agencies and private sector varies between countries and in each ICPN 
countries, this relationship posed unique, country-specific, challenges to ICPN organisers 
and members which had to be overcome. A detailed analysis of the ICPN will examine the 
effectiveness of the working arrangements both in terms of multi-agency working, but also in 
its ability to overcome specific cultural challenges presented.  
As it has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, in an increasingly technical and 
transnational environment the most appropriate expert resource may not be the state law 
enforcement agencies but those private sector organisations, both commercial and NGO, 
who have relevant expertise. Given this fact, the role of multi-agency arrangements has 
never been more central to the success of law enforcement efforts. The willingness for 
traditional state law enforcement bodies to engage with non-state actors can be seen 
increasingly with such organisations as Interpol and Europol, and indeed on a national level 
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with CEOP and its subsequent development of the ICPN. The involvement on non-state 
actors does not diminish the ability of the state to carry out its law enforcement functions but, 
in the 21st century, it is, in fact, dependant on these non-state bodies to enable it to fulfil its 
mandate. However, the success of such state/non-state interaction is based on the effective 
consideration of a range of political, social, cultural and legal factors. These factors and the 
effect in practice on these arrangements will be examined in this thesis. 
 
“Failure to develop viable, coordinated international policies in the face of ever-growing 
transnational criminality, however, may undermine the nation-state in the 21st century” 
(Shelly, 1995: 1) 
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Chapter 2: The Different Models of Multi-Agency Working 
 
This chapter will examine the further introduce the concept of multi-agency working through 
the detailed examination of the key factors which impact on this type of working. In the first 
instance, a broad discussion of the 3 main models of multi-agency working will be discussed, 
highlighting the rational and motivations behind each model; other, more informal, methods 
of multi-agency interaction will also be discussed at this point. Following the exploration of 
these models in a broad sense, the rest of the chapter will focus on the key factors relevant 
to multi-agency working which must be considered when creating a multi-agency 
arrangement. Given the transnational nature of this thesis, attention will also be paid to those 
specific factors which must be considered when operating in the international environment.     
 
The previous chapter examined the nature of the globalisation and rise of transnational 
crime and identified the increased involvement of non-law enforcement actors in tackling 
crime. This involvement can take the form of co-operation on an ad hoc or occasional basis 
utilising known contacts, or, in cases demanding regular contact on a formal basis, parties 
can go beyond this informal co-operation and commit to a structured multi-agency 
arrangement. Embarking on a formalised multi-agency approach, rather than occasional co-
operation, involves commitments to be made, affecting all areas of operation, by the parties 
involved. As such, multi-agency arrangements require resources that informal co-operation 
does not, therefore consideration must be given to whether co-operation is sufficient or if a 
multi-agency arrangement is required. The formal co-operation between traditional law 
enforcement, NGOs and/or the private sector can take place using a variety of different 
structural and operational models. There is no one single ‘multi-agency’ model (Salmon, 
2004: 157) but rather each multi-agency working arrangement is formalised after considering 
many specific situational factors relating to the actors involved, the environment they operate 
in, and the type of co-operation required (Home Office, 2000: 1).  
 
As previously discussed, it is the efforts to combat child exploitation and increase child 
protection which have seen the greatest push towards the establishment of multi-agency 
arrangements. Domestically, Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), 
introduced in the Criminal Justice and Courts Services Act 2000, have brought together 
police, probation, social services and other ‘responsible authorities’ in order to effectively 
manage certain types of offenders, primarily sex offenders (Home Office, 2005: 1; Kemshall 
and Maguire, 2001: 238; Nash and Ryan, 2003: 164) and internationally the launch of the 
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Virtual Global Taskforce in 200317 saw the child protection units of Australia, Canada, UK, 
USA and Interpol (later enlarging to include Italy, New Zealand and the UAE) collaborate in a 
multi-agency arrangement to protect children. 
 
As a result of a literature review and assessment of practitioner research in the field of child 
protection, three general structures of multi-agency working were identified within existing 
multi-agency arrangements and organisations (DCFS, 2009; Atkinson et al, 2005). These 
are: 
 
 Multi-agency Panel (also known as ‘Decision-making groups’)  
 Multi-agency Team (also known as ‘Coordinated delivery’)  
 Integrated Service (also known as ‘Operational-team delivery’)  
 
Within these three identified styles of working, there can be variations in the format and 
operation of the arrangements to order to accommodate all actors and achieve the intended 
objectives. Ultimately the aim of establishing a multi-agency arrangement is to improve on 
existing working practices in order to achieve outcomes as a better level of service, more 
effective partnerships between agencies, and improved co-ordination of services, in order to 
achieve enhanced and improved outcomes (Cheminais, 2009: 24). For example, the 
creation of CEOP brought together agencies and actors who already worked together, on an 
inter-agency basis, but the creation of the Centre enabled the streamlining of these practices 
in order to better focus on their organisational aims of child protection. To achieve this, 
flexibility is required to meet the expectations of a potentially disparate group of actors; the 
nature of such a coalition-esqe arrangement may require compromise in order to 
accommodate all actors. However, due to the diluting effect of compromise, multi-agency 
arrangements are more successful when actors share similar goals and objectives (Webb 
and Vulliamy, 2001: 330). The three general models represent different rationales and level 
of integration based on a combination of what is acceptable to the actors involved, and what 
is required to achieve the goals of such an arrangement. This balancing act is essential and 
can play a part in determining if the arrangement will be effective in achieve its goals or 
whether it will become ‘just a talking shop and no action’ (Sampson, Stubbs, Smith, Pearson 
and Blagg, 1988: 489) and fails due to lack of involvement by actors.  In the context of this 
research, CEOP can be seen to demonstrate an example of an integrated service, with the 
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ICPN representing a looser arrangement in the form of a multi-agency panel. These will be 
explored in-depth later in this thesis.    
 
Examining the three models of multi-agency working 
During the initial formation of a multi-agency arrangement, discussions are required involving 
all potential actors to ascertain their level of commitment, expectations, and intended 
outcomes as a result of forming such an arrangement; this is a fluid process and these 
factors will vary between arrangements (Goris and Walters, 1999: 633). These factors, 
amongst others, can greatly assist in the decision-making process when designing the most 
appropriate multi-agency structure. Following these discussions, formal terms of reference 
are usually drawn up to outline the roles and remit of the arrangement (Lowndes and 
Skelcher, 1998: 314); this greatly assists in managing the expectations of the involved 
parties based on the model of arrangement they have chosen (Hague and Malos, 1998: 
374).  
Multi-agency Panel 
This model represents the loosest association of different agencies with actors remaining 
based in their usual places of work, thus retaining their distinct identities and affiliations. The 
panel operates through the holding of meetings and the frequency of these meetings can 
vary depending on the nature of the arrangement; from regular meetings on a monthly or 
other fixed term to occasional meetings in response to a specific event. On this basis the 
level of integration is limited, therefore a strong panel chairperson and often codified 
structure and terms of reference, is required to ensure that the arrangement remains 
focused and effective (Goris and Walters, 1999: 634; Ling, 2002: 638). If this does not occur 
the arrangement may fail due to lack of participation and communication between members. 
Communication is key, and effective communication (Salmon, 2004: 158), via regular 
telephone or email contact, can offset the potential negatives of limited face-to-face contact; 
irregular contact and geographical distance has been identified as a cause of failure 
amongst multi-agency arrangements of this type (Webb and Vulliamy, 2001: 329). The use 
of technology, as identified, can assist in promoting communication and participation 
between members (Wastell et al, 2004: 190).  
 
This arrangement is the least resource intensive multi-agency model since there is often no 
additional staffing requirements, although more formalised panels may employ staff in a 
secretariat role (such as the ICPN), as involvement in the panel is an additional role for 
those already employed within an agency. There is, however, the possibility that the 
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additional role of panel membership may be neglected (Sloper, 2004: 576), or not fully 
realized, due to work pressures involving the panel member’s day job (DCFS, 2009; Hague 
and Malos, 1998: 381). Similarly, the loose nature of this arrangement means that there is 
no need for a fixed physical location and meetings can be held at any location, often at an 
office of a participating agency thus reducing building maintenance costs. Panel members 
have the ability to use the resources of their ‘home’ agency, such as IT and training (Abbott 
et al, 2005: 157), therefore leaving the operation of the panel with limited expenses. 
 
However, the loose nature of this arrangement can hinder the effectiveness of the panel and 
the ability to achieve outcomes, as there is the potential for panel members to retain a 
primary affiliation and loyalty to their home agency. This may impact on the ability for 
decisions to be made by the panel (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 326) as members may 
object if there is a conflict with their own agency’s aims and objectives. Without compromise 
this may lead to a stalemate situation and potential collapse of the arrangement; this 
reinforces the need for terms of reference and remit to be organised at an early stage to 
ensure that all parties are aware of their roles and responsibilities.  
 
Ultimately the panel is only as good as its members (Sloper, 2004: 576). Given the loose 
nature of the arrangement, members can be seen as representatives of their agency and 
there may be a reluctance or defensiveness in becoming fully involved with the panel, for 
fear of damaging their reputation. Similarly, the effectiveness of the arrangement is 
dependent on the ability for those members involved to be able to made decisions in their 
‘home’ agency; therefore a degree of seniority is required in the staff involved in the panel 
(Sloper, 2004: 575). If members lack the ability to enact or commit to the decisions agreed 
within the panel or ‘makes things happen in their own agencies’, the panel risks becoming a 
‘talk shop’ or ‘sterile exercise’ (Webb and Vulliamy, 2001: 330).       
Multi-agency Team 
This model offers more integration between partners, with more formalised operating 
procedures (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 314) and regular contact between members than 
the previous arrangement. Actors involved in a multi-agency team arrangement are often 
directly recruited or seconded to the team from their original (or ‘home’) agencies. This is a 
marked difference from the ‘additional role’ status found in the multi-agency panel model as 
involvement in the team is the primary role for the actor, resulting in numerous benefits for 
both the individual actors and the team as a whole. By refocusing participation in the multi-
agency team from an ‘additional role’ to a ‘primary role’, individuals involved should have 
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more time (Sloper, 2004: 576), and less distractions, to carry out the work of the team 
without the pressures of managing the workloads of two roles (Moran, Jacobs, Bunn, and 
Bifulco, 2007: 146); a situation seen in multi-agency panels which has the potential for 
commitment to the multi-agency arrangement to suffer when there were pressures in the 
actor’s primary role (Abbott et al, 2005: 160). 
 
The increased ability for the participating actors to focus on the work of the multi-agency 
arrangement helps to reducing the difficulties of competing affiliations between the team and 
the ‘home agency’ (Salmon, 2004: 156). A clearer identification with the multi-agency team 
rather than home agency provides a greater ability to commit to activities of the team without 
the constraints and interference of home agency priorities. That said, participation in a multi-
agency team does not prohibit actors from contacting and interacting with home agencies; 
one of the strengths of the multi-agency arrangement is the ability to draw on the resources 
and expertise of the many different participating agencies. Therefore there will still be 
contact with the home agencies when required to achieve the objectives of the team.  
Additionally, seconded personnel may be required, by the terms of their secondment 
agreement, to maintain a degree of contact with their primary employer. 
 
The increased level of integration and affiliation to the team also allows for the creation of a 
clear and authoritative management structure. This model provides more responsibility and 
authority to the chairperson or team leader; the leader of the multi-agency team will be 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the team and its members. This is in contrast 
to the multi-agency panel model where line management is carried out by actors within the 
home agency. The streamlined nature of management removes the potential source of 
conflict seen in panel arrangements whereby disagreements may occur between the leader 
of the panel and a participant’s line manager in their home agency.  
 
The decision to pursue a multi-agency arrangement of this nature implies a willingness to 
create more than a ‘talking shop’; this can be seen through the increased resources that 
need to be committed to facilitate the working of team, including recruitment, human 
resources, stationary and IT costs, potential building management and budgetary 
management. As there are significantly more costs associated with this model, the role of 
budget management and accountability becomes an important issue (Lowndes and 
Skelcher, 1998: 324) with discussions and arrangements put in place to ensure contributions 
are received from all participating agencies and managed effectively and to the satisfaction 
of all parties (Sloper, 2004: 576). Given the level of resources needed to support this 
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endeavor, there is an increased amount of governance with participating agencies being 
more involved and committed to multi-agency working and achieving the aims and objectives 
set out for the team; the failure of this arrangement would be more costly, in both financial 
and reputational terms, compared with a low-cost multi-agency panel. As such, the oversight 
of seconded personnel may be higher to ensure that they are performing or providing ‘value 
for money’ and those seconded or recruited into the team may have a higher level of 
seniority or experience than those involved in multi-agency panels. An increased level of 
experience, in theory, should allow for difficult and challenging situations to be resolved 
easier than if faced by a less experienced member of staff. Similarly, a more senior actor 
should be more empowered to carry out the actions of the multi-agency team both within the 
team and their home agency given their place in the organizational hierarchy.  
 
The increased integration provided by this model allows the potential for better, more 
consistent, working relationships between actors from different agencies to be created. 
Actors brought together under a multi-agency team are often located within the same office 
or building, thus alleviating many of the issues such as geographical distance between 
actors and communication concerns which can lead to the breakdown of a multi-agency 
setup. Co-location also allows for participating actors to gain an increased understanding of 
different agencies (Moran et al, 2007: 146) and increased networking opportunities through 
working on a daily basis with members from agencies other than their own (Abbott et al, 
2005: 160). With seconded personnel, this also has the benefit of professional, and 
personal, contacts being made and continued on return to the home agency upon 
completion of the secondment. However, it is possible that some members of the team may 
work offsite from the rest of the team and this must be considered. 
Integrated Services 
This model represents the greatest level of integration in multi-agency working and further 
builds on the previous model in bringing together different agencies in order to provide a 
multi-agency service. Arrangements utilising this model are often based in a singular location 
or office thus taking advantage of the benefits outlined in the multi-agency team model. 
However, as the name suggests, the actors are more integrated into this location and it is 
less common for participants to work at their home agencies, preferring to work in the same 
location as their colleagues (Moran et al, 2007: 146). This further strengthens the potential 
for greater communication as a higher number of participants will be based in the same 
geographical location and therefore the risk factors of distance and frequency of contact 
need not apply. Similarly, higher integration of actors from different backgrounds allows for 
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greater collaboration and for participants to gain a greater understanding of the working 
practices of their colleagues from different agencies (Watson, 2006: 20); therefore further 
breaking down the institutional barriers that exist between often competing agencies (Abbott 
et al, 2005: 158). 
 
Barriers between agencies are further broken down when using this model, as the multi-
agency arrangement represents itself using one identity, rather than a collection of the 
different identities of the participating home agencies. The use of one ‘brand’ can have both 
internal and external benefits; internally, participating actors will operate as representatives 
of the ‘brand’ rather than of their home agency. This serves to formulate a collective identity 
and working practices between staff participating in the arrangement (Leadbetter, 2006: 53) 
thus reducing the affiliation to previous agencies and the effects of the fragmentation and the 
negative impacts previously discussed (Frost, Robinson, and Anning, 2005: 192). Creating a 
collective identity allows participants to more easily pursue the aims and objectives of the 
arrangement, and to enact the decisions of the multi-agency arrangement (Hughes, 2006: 
68) without the concerns over conflicting with their home agencies priorities. This can lead to 
staff becoming more passionate and dedicated to the success of the arrangement 
(Leadbetter. 2006: 57) as this will also reflect on their own performance and feelings of 
achievement.  
 
The construction of a single brand does pose several issues, overcoming entrenched 
institutional affiliation can sometimes be difficult, and especially so for staff who have a long 
history of working for a particular organisation. Similarly, the creation of a single working 
practice for the new ‘brand’ can be challenging and the success of this can be affected by 
how different and disparate the working practices of the participating agencies are, as the 
new working practices will need to acceptable and accountable to all the different agencies 
(Sloper, 2004: 575). Failure to account for all participants and their needs, may lead to the 
creation of a working practice that is unsuitable and unwelcomed by staff from particular 
agencies and this could, in time, lead to such an agency feeling they are no longer able to 
participate in the multi-agency arrangement.   
 
Similar to the previous model, strategic agreements will be in existence between all 
participating agencies (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 314) covering such issues as 
personnel, funding, and training. However, as ‘integrated services’ are designed to be more 
concrete and long-term in nature, these agreements need to be more comprehensive to 
ensure that the long-term aims and objectives of the arrangement can be met. These 
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agreements may set out the funding and personnel commitments and contributions for a 
longer period than the multi-agency team model, and as such will require a greater 
commitment from participating agencies to remain involved in the arrangement over the 
longer period. Given these issues, the formation of such an integrated service model 
arrangement may take a more protracted period of time, as any issues and concerns held by 
potential participating agencies are resolved. At this stage some agencies may choose not to 
become involved in the arrangement as the commitments are too great. In this case, a multi-
agency team model may be worth considering. 
 
Other forms of multi-agency arrangements 
There is also the potential for multi-agency arrangements to take a less formalised structure. 
These can take the form of multi-agency meetings arranged on a one-off or ad-hoc basis to 
discuss or examine a single short-term issue. Arrangements of this style can beneficial in 
bringing together agencies to discuss common issues however, resembling a substantially 
less formalised version of the multi-agency panel, the success of such meetings can be 
limited and the negative issues found in panel arrangements can be exacerbated due to the 
short-term nature of the meeting. For example, a good working relationship between 
participants may not be possible due to the different institutional and professional cultures 
which exist in the participating agencies. These differences, due to the ad-hoc nature of the 
meetings, are difficult to overcome in a short period of time and as such may detract from 
the effectiveness of the meeting. However, there is the possibility that meetings of this 
nature may form the basis for the formation of other multi-agency arrangements, as 
participants find areas of commonality that could best be explored on a more regular, and 
more formal, basis (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 322).   
 
Conferences based on a particular issue or theme can also be effective at facilitating several 
of the benefits of multi-agency working, such as networking and greater understanding of 
different agencies. The subject and content of a conference will greatly dictate the number 
and range of attendees; a narrowly focused conference covering a specific or niche theme 
may reduce the range of participants to a selection of the ‘usual suspects’; if this occurs, 
there is limited networking benefit to be obtained as this may have already have occurred in 
other professional settings. Conferences with a wider theme or subject may encourage the 
attendance of a wider range of professions thus making networking opportunities more 
viable; successful networking may lead to the identification of collaborating working 
opportunities and lead to potential other, more formalised, forms of multi-agency working. 
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Factors to consider when designing a multi-agency arrangement 
Through the examination of the many different variations of multi-agency arrangements, 
several key factors have been identified which must be considered when designing an 
arrangement and choosing which of the above models to utilise. These factors, to varying 
degrees, present potential challenges to the success of a multi-agency working arrangement 
and must be accounted for at an early stage to avoid difficulty and conflict arising. These 
factors have been identified as: 
 
 Funding and resources  
 Division of responsibilities between actors 
 Identification with ‘home’ agency or multi-agency arrangement 
 Communication 
 Professional cultures 
 
The extent to which these factors impact on an arrangement will depend on which model is 
selected, as some factors will be more relevant than others; for example, funding issues will 
be less prevalent on the multi-agency panel model when compared to the integrated 
services model due to the lower cost nature of the panel. However, to some degree, these 
factors will affect all models of multi-agency working and are indicative of the challenges of 
bringing together different actors. Each of these factors will be examined in greater detail 
below.  
Funding and resources 
The level of funding and resources required for the operation of a multi-agency arrangement 
will vary depending on which model is chosen. Higher levels of integration and formalisation 
will require a larger amount of financial contributions in order to cover operating costs such 
as building maintenance, HR, and administrative costs. These may not be wholly applicable 
in multi-agency panel arrangements where participation is an ‘additional role’, allowing 
participants to utilise the resources of their own agency. However, in multi-agency teams, 
and to a greater extent in integrated service arrangements, where there are efforts to create 
a distinct ‘brand’ and increased separation between arrangement and ‘home’ agency, these 
costs will be higher. 
 
During the formulation of arrangements, consideration must be given and discussions had 
between partners surrounding the funding contributions by individual participating agencies 
and the duration for which this funding will be provided. Greater levels of integration and 
formalisation of multi-agency working can lead to these arrangements having increased 
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permanence; therefore longer-term arrangements following the ‘integrated services’ model 
require both increased funding and a more comprehensive funding strategy than multi-
agency panel arrangements, which are less formal and may be short-term in nature. 
Discussions of this nature are crucial in the early stages in order to ensure potential 
participants are both aware of, able to provide, and able to sustain the levels of resources 
needed to create their selected multi-agency arrangement. Such discussions may lead to 
participants revising their multi-agency aspirations and selecting a different model as the 
basis of their arrangement (Salmon, 2004: 157). 
 
Such increased permanence can also be more resource intensive, thus requiring increased 
financial oversight and consideration with a budget-holder clearly identified and able to be 
held to account. Participants must clearly consider their aims, expectations, and objectives 
for entering into a multi-agency arrangement before committing resources (Sloper, 2004: 
575). Not all agencies are the same and participants will have different abilities to commit 
resources, both financial and personnel, to an arrangement and therefore the funding of 
arrangements may not be divided evenly between all participants. This issue must be 
considered to ensure there is no friction between members. Smaller, or less resourced, 
agencies must consider whether they can sustain the levels of funding required for the 
duration of the arrangement. These discussions must also consider the ability to supply 
personnel, either in the ‘additional role’ or as an extraction from their agency, for the length 
of the arrangement.      
 
The relationship between the new working arrangement and the ‘home’ agencies must also 
be considered in terms of resource sharing. The ability to utilise facilities, expertise, and the 
training resources of a collection of different agencies, can assist in achieving the aims and 
objects of the arrangement. This can also be beneficial to individual members of staff 
involved in the arrangement through the cross-fertilisation of skills, experience, and working 
practices, made possible through access to different agencies. Staff may also be able to 
take advantage of the different training courses offered by the participating agencies (Abbott 
et al, 2005: 157). Neither of these opportunities may have previously been available, 
however the precise nature of access should be discussed during preliminary meetings. 
 
In addition to issues surrounding funding by participants, there is also the possibility of 
funding from external bodies such as charities, NGOs, and government. Applications for this 
form of funding can be a complex and lengthy processes and consideration towards bidding 
for such funds should be made at the earliest opportunity. 
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Division of responsibilities between actors 
Within any team, there is a need for individuals to be assigned clearly defined roles to 
ensure that there is limited duplication of effort by participants when attempting to achieve 
the aims and objectives of the arrangement (Abbott et al, 2005: 160; Sloper, 2004: 575). 
This is especially pertinent when considering a multi-agency arrangement which involves a 
wide range of different actors and skill sets. On this basis, a clear strategic plan is required 
from the outset, outlining a clear division of roles and responsibilities (Lowndes and 
Skelcher, 1998: 324), to ensure that the individual talents of staff from participating agencies 
are used effectively to pursue the aims, objectives, and combined efforts of the multi-agency 
arrangement (Barclay and Kerr, 2006: 44). It is important to ensure that the relevant 
specialist skills of staff are identified at the formation stage to enable the correct assigning of 
roles. The identification of required skills for roles can also be beneficial when considering 
resourcing and recruitment, as vacancies within the multi-agency team can be most 
effectively filled through the targeted recruitment of required skill sets (Sloper, 2004: 576), 
rather than the recruitment of generalists (Frost et al, 2005: 192). 
 
During the formation of an arrangement, the varied nature of participating agencies must be 
considered. Whilst multi-agency arrangements involve a collection of agencies joining 
together in joint working, each with their own specialist area of expertise and unique 
contribution, attention must also be given to the nature in which these agencies work 
together (Salmon, 2004: 157). There is the risk of larger, or more vocal, agencies dominating 
the multi-agency proceedings (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 323), leading to the formulation 
of aims and objectives that are closely aligned to those of the larger agencies (Moran et al, 
2007: 147), and this can result in many adverse effects. If aims and objectives are produced 
for the new multi-agency working arrangement which reflect those of a single participating 
agency rather than as an outcome of collaboration between partners, this can negate the 
primary need for a new arrangement as the purpose of a multi-agency arrangement is to 
create a new way of working. As a result of reproducing aims and objectives similar to one of 
the one participating agency, other agencies may feel their reasons for joining the 
arrangement are not being met, leading to disillusionment, reduced commitment, and lower 
motivation (Frost et al, 2005: 192). Such an outcome has the potential to lead to the failure 
of the arrangement and also has the potential to damage wider inter-agency relations 
(Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 323).   
 
In light of the wide range of actors and interests, it is important that a strong chairperson or 
team leader (depending on which model is chosen) is appointed to oversee the running of 
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the arrangement (Sloper 2004: 575). Like the formation of aims and objectives, the person 
appointed to the role must receive the support from all participating agencies else 
confidence in their leadership may be undermined or otherwise affected, as their role is an 
important link between the arrangement and the ‘home’ agencies. Lack of support or 
confidence in the appointed person may lead to agencies becoming disillusioned with the 
multi-agency arrangement potentially leading to its failure or ineffectiveness. On the other 
hand, the appointed person has to be empowered, and confident, enough to challenge the 
actions or commitment of participating agencies when required. 
 
Identification with ‘home’ agency or multi-agency arrangement 
Bringing actors from different agencies to work together as part of a team presents many 
challenges that must be overcome to enable the effective functioning of the arrangement. 
Different working practices (Barclay and Kerr, 2006: 44) and strong feelings of attachment to 
their ‘home’ agency may lead to competitiveness between actors and a potential 
unwillingness (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 317) or resistance to adapt their behaviour to 
the new working environment (Leadbetter, 2006: 56). This is counterproductive to joint 
working as this will detract from the aims and objectives of the arrangement.  This issue 
must be addressed at an early stage to ensure that the initial momentum and commitment to 
multi-agency working is maintained. 
 
In addition to this, actors who feel a stronger attachment to their ‘home’ agency over the new 
multi-agency arrangement may be unwilling to pursue courses of action that contradict those 
of their ‘home agency’ and this can present in many forms (Frost et al, 2005: 193-194). 
Firstly, actors may be less committed and less motivated to the work of the arrangement and 
this will impact on its effectiveness. Secondly, actors may require the aims and objectives of 
the multi-agency arrangement to be diluted or changed to de-conflict with those of their 
‘home’ agency. This can be fatal to the multi-agency arrangement as, as previously 
commented, diluting the aims and objectives of the arrangement may result in a less 
effective arrangement and thus impact on the motivation and commitment of agencies 
participating, potentially resulting in agencies withdrawing from the arrangement if there is 
little benefit to be achieved with the diluted aims and objectives. Weak aims and objectives 
may result in the arrangement becoming merely a ‘talking shop’ with little effective outcome 
(Sampson et al, 1988: 489). 
 
Therefore a strong identification with the aims and objectives of the multi-agency 
arrangement is key to the success and the ability to achieve this can be affected by the 
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range of actors involved; the effectiveness of multi-agency arrangements is greatly aided 
when its members ‘shared the same, or similar and compatible, priorities, goals and values’ 
(Webb and Vulliamy, 2001: 330). Those arrangements which bring together a wider and 
more disparate collection of agencies may be forced to produce weaker, or more general, 
aims and objectives to satisfy all parties (Harfield, 2008: 492; Scott and Meyer 1983:140). 
 
The impact of these issues will be determined by the level of integration and therefore which 
model of multi-agency working is used. As previously discussed, higher levels of integration, 
which require greater levels of funding and commitment from partners, are likely to deter 
actors and agencies who are not fully committed, or  prepared to commit, to the aims, 
objectives, and working practices of the arrangement. As a result, an increased commitment 
to the arrangement should reduce the willingness of participants to engage in inter-agency 
rivalries that could have a disruptive impact on the team (Leadbetter, 2006: 57). 
 
That said, no matter which method of multi-agency working is selected, it is the responsibility 
of the chairperson or team leader to create an inclusive working environment and sense of 
team (Ling, 2002: 638). Effective actions of this nature can result in increased motivation and 
‘allegiance’ of participants to the new multi-agency working arrangement; a commonly used 
technique is the utilisation of ‘team building’ opportunities (Sloper, 2004: 576) and events 
where participants work together towards a common goal or objective, whilst at the same 
time conducting personal networking with new colleagues (Watson, 2006: 18).  
Communication 
Effective communication is central to the success of any team or multi-agency arrangement 
(Abbott et al, 2005: 160) and crucial in overcoming the barriers presented by different 
working practices, inter-agency rivalries, and other issues raised by previously discussed 
factors. There are, however, specific issues that are particularly prominent in multi-agency 
working. The level to which they impact on the success, or failure, of an arrangement varies 
depending on which model of working is implemented; typically those models with a higher 
level of integration have a reduced number of issues surrounding communication (Salmon, 
2004: 158).  
 
The scale to which actors participating in multi-agency arrangements are geographically 
dispersed throughout different locations can have an impact on the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the arrangement. Models of a less integrated nature may experience 
challenges in sustaining momentum, enthusiasm, and progress, as participants may have a 
limited or irregular contact with each other; this can cause participants to not feel involved or 
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focused on the multi-agency work. This can be especially prominent when involvement is an 
‘additional role’, as seen in multi-agency panels, which competes for time and resources with 
the participant’s regular work (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 322). Whilst the existence of 
geographical distances may be unavoidable, the effective provision and use of IT and other 
communication technologies, such as e-mail, telephone, and voice conferencing, can be 
used to mitigate the impact of this (Sloper, 2004: 576). Similarly, the frequency of meetings 
can also impact on the cohesiveness of the working arrangement (Abbott et al, 2005: 160). 
Such irregular contact can also exacerbate the issues found in the previous factors such as 
inter-agency rivalry and limited sense of team (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 322).  
 
Within any arrangement that involves the use of staff from one agency being seconded to 
other, there is a need for effective dialogue and relationship between both agencies. This is 
required for many reasons. Firstly, as one of the strengths of multi-agency arrangements is 
the ability to utilise the resources of the participating agencies, contributing agencies may be 
more willing to allow the use of their resources, in addition to those already provided as part 
of the multi-agency agreement, if there is a good line of communication and working 
relationship in existence. Similarly, when agencies are committing their resources to an 
arrangement, either personnel or funding, it is important that contributing agencies are kept 
informed and involved in the decisions; this can either be as a courtesy or a specific 
condition of their involvement. This is an important factor to consider as maintaining the 
satisfaction of all parties can be crucial to order to maintain their involvement in the 
arrangement. If there is a poor relationship between contributing agencies and the multi-
agency partnership, contributing agencies may fail to see the benefits of their continued 
involvement, or that such involvement is too problematic, and withdraw.  
 
Professional cultures 
Every agency can be said to possess a culture, or working style, of its own, and bringing a 
collection of, potentially very different, cultures together under a multi-agency arrangement 
can be challenging (Moran et al, 2007: 147). An agency’s sense of professional culture is 
informed by their working practices, priorities, and terms of reference, which can vary 
dramatically between agencies (Kemshall and Maguire, 2001: 251). As previously 
discussed, these differences have the potential to negatively impact on the functioning of the 
multi-agency arrangement as it can adversely affect the cohesion and integration of the new 
team (Abbott et al, 2005: 161); as participating actors retain their primary identification with 
their ‘home’ agency. Therefore it is important that any new multi-agency arrangement 
possess its own sense of identity and culture (Frost et al, 2005: 190), which is supported and 
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adopted by all staff involved; ‘inter-agency cooperation is recognised as problematic with 
clashes between professional cultures’ (Webb and Vulliamy, 2001: 315), 
 
In addition to this, agencies contributing to the arrangement may have different 
understandings or appreciation of concepts such as information-sharing, confidentiality, and 
security (Salmon, 2004: 157). This is especially evident when comparing the working 
practices of law enforcement and NGOs where there are clear differences in culture. For 
example, law enforcement bodies, as state agencies, are subject to a plethora of legislation 
and data-sharing restrictions which they must adhere or face sanction; this is in contrast with 
private bodies and NGOs who are less controlled by state legislation but may be more 
influenced by their own internal policies. Such differences in culture may lead to mistrust 
between partners from different backgrounds and an unwillingness to cooperate (Leadbetter, 
2006: 56) or share information for fear of information being mishandled (Frost et al, 2005: 
193). These issues must be overcome at an early stage to ensure the effective working of 
the multi-agency arrangement and to ensure that no data is passed to unauthorised 
individuals; ‘Problems of confidentiality abound in multi-agency working, with different 
agencies constructing and working by different conceptions of ‘confidentiality’ and its limits of 
relevance’ (Sampson et al, 1998: 483). 
 
The use of jargon and technical vocabulary specific to agencies can also present difficulties 
when joining a multi-agency arrangement (Barclay and Kerr, 2006: 44), as there is the 
potential for misunderstanding and misinterpretation as definitions may vary between 
agencies (Salmon, 2004: 157). Law enforcement is notorious for its ‘police culture’, most of 
which would not translate, or be understood by those from other agencies.   
 
The hierarchy of personnel and rank/structures varies between agencies and therefore it is 
important that consideration be given to this fact when recruiting staff into the multi-agency 
arrangement. Recruitment must be targeted at the right level and tailored to the appropriate 
grade in each agency to ensure consistency; as two agencies may have vastly different 
interpretations of the requirements of a particular grade (Moran et al, 2007: 145). In addition 
to this, those seconded from participating agencies must have the authority and ability to 
make decisions on behalf of their agency when required. Any inability on the part of 
participants to affect actions has the potential to reduce the effectiveness and abilities of the 
arrangement; potentially leading to the arrangement becoming a ‘sterile exercise’ (Webb and 
Vulliamy, 2001: 330).     
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Issues affecting multi-agency working in the International environment  
Designing and implementing a multi-agency approach in the international arena requires 
additional factors to be also considered, in addition to those mentioned above. These issues 
are experienced in all forms of international working and not just multi-agency arrangements, 
such as bi-lateral arrangements. However, in the multi-agency context, these factors must 
be considered in addition to those mentioned above.   These include: 
 
 Language 
 Jurisdictional differences 
 Protectionism and relationships 
 Political and cultural 
 
Language 
This factor is perhaps the most obvious issue when bringing together participants from many 
countries, as they will very likely not all natively speak the same language. The manner in 
which this is dealt with can greatly affect the ability of the multi-agency arrangement to 
function. One option is the selection of a common working language for use within the 
arrangement. This, however, requires the competence of all participants to have a working 
ability to communicate in the selected language. Attention must also be paid to the use of 
overly technical language which may not be easily understood. Similarly, words may have 
different meanings when translated by participants and therefore there is a need for clear 
and considered use of language to avoid any potential instances of miscommunication, 
mistranslation or misunderstanding which may impact on a good working relationship 
between participants being established. 
 
The considered application of non-verbal communication is just as important as verbal 
communication. Just as words may have different meanings and may be understood 
differently by participants, so may body language, with seemingly innocent actions by 
participants appearing as hostile by those of other nationalities. The use of non-verbal 
communication is especially pertinent in international multi-agency arrangements, as this 
can be an effective tool to overcome linguistic difficulties.   
 
An alternative option is to utilise translators within the arrangement working in real-time. 
Whilst this does remove the requirement for all participants to speak the same language, it 
does increase the resources, and associated costs, required for the arrangement. The cost 
of translating both verbal and written documentation has the potential to become a major 
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stumbling block for potential participants; for example, the European Commission spends 
approximately 300 million Euro translating documents into 23 of the working languages of 
the EU (European Union, 2010). Whilst many multi-agency arrangements of an international 
nature will not be on the same scale as the European Union, this example serves to show 
the costs of translation is a signification factor. Real-time translation will also have an impact 
on the productivity of meetings, as every spoken word must be translated into the language 
of each participant; this is a time consuming task which will reduce the amount that can be 
achieved in a meeting.   
 
Jurisdictional differences  
The laws and legislation of each country involved in the multi-agency arrangement may vary, 
with activities legal in one jurisdiction being illegal in another, and vice versa. This is 
especially relevant to those multi-agency arrangements in the law enforcement context as 
the aims and objectives of the arrangement may need to be diluted to ensure uniformity 
across all countries participating; for example, in the child protection context, laws 
surrounding exploitation and abuse of children will vary depending on the definition of a 
‘child’ and the age of consent (Ivezaj, 1999: 824). Therefore the multi-agency arrangement 
must ensure that its aims and objectives are applicable in all participating countries.   
 
In addition to this, law enforcement bodies in participating countries may have no legal 
framework or capability to implement the measures and outcomes of the multi-agency 
arrangements (Harfield, 2008: 487). As a result, the decision making process within the 
arrangement must devise realistic aims and objectives with consideration towards the 
capabilities of the countries involved. However, multi-agency arrangements can be used with 
great effect to overcome resourcing issues and build capacity by bringing together the NGO 
and private sector with law enforcement that may be able to pool resources and intelligence 
in a practical manner. This form of capacity building has been used by the ICPN and will be 
explored in depth later.    
 
Protectionism and relationships 
Similar to the issues of agency identification examined earlier, the relationship between law 
enforcement, NGOs, and the private sectors will vary between countries and these 
differences must be taken into account when devising a multi-agency arrangement. In some 
countries, such as the UK, there is a willingness, through CEOP, to engage with the NGO 
and private sector to achieve the aims and objectives of the centre, in the form of staff from 
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these agencies being seconded to CEOP; this will be explored further later.  Similarly, in the 
countries of south-east Asia where ICPN panels have been set up, NGOs frequently support 
local law enforcement with resources and intelligence to enable them to take enforcement 
action. In these instances there can be seen to be a good working relationship between 
parties and an appreciation of the contribution that each party makes. However, other 
jurisdictions may be more reluctant to involve NGOs and private sector in law enforcement 
matters (Harfield, 2008: 487). Countries which have a relationship of this nature may be 
uneasy about joining or contributing to a multi-agency arrangement involving non law 
enforcement partners. 
 
The degree to which law enforcement bodies will share information and intelligence may 
vary between countries and this must be considered when forming a multi-agency 
arrangement. If there is not a two-way flow of information between participants, or a flow of 
information that is acceptable, then actors may question their involvement in the 
arrangement if they cannot identify any benefit to their agency. This may lead to agencies 
withdrawing from the arrangement. 
 
Multi-agency arrangements involving public, NGOs and private sectors can also provide 
networking opportunities, facilitate relationship building, and potentially realise many of the 
benefits identified earlier as agencies gain a greater awareness and understanding of each 
other’s professional culture (Moran et al, 2007: 147). This may produce realisable benefits 
on a wider scale outside of the multi-agency arrangement. 
 
Political and cultural (national) 
The allocation of roles and responsibilities within a team arrangement may be affected by 
political and cultural sensitivities. This is an extension of the relationship issues identified 
previously and may impact on the effective operation of the multi-agency arrangement, as 
appointments to roles may be based or influenced by political or cultural factors and not on 
the relevant skills possessed by the participants. This may result in a less effective 
arrangement as the skills sets of participants are not utilised to their maximum potential; 
however, such a compromise may be required to achieve the support of certain participants 
and therefore allow the arrangement to function. Such sensitivities may be especially 
prevalent when appointing an individual as chairperson or team leader. For example, 
participants from countries operating a state-centric model may favour the appointment of a 
chairperson or team leader from a state agency rather than the NGO or private sector. This 
may be a tactical move by the NGO or private sector representatives to gain favour with the 
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state, or it may be a condition of the state to ensure their participation in the arrangement. 
This will be further examined in the case of the ICPN Advisory Panel in Vietnam, where the 
state representative holds the chair, having limited experience of child protection, despite the 
participating NGO being better resourced and experienced in these matters. Such an 
appointment may be a required, and accepted, trade-off in the eyes of NGOs and private 
sector if the multi-agency arrangement can still produce some level of benefit.       
 
Putting factors in context 
The ‘domestic’ factors of multi-agency working have been subject to much academic and 
practitioner research, this cannot be said of the ‘international’ factors where, especially in the 
child protection environment, limited research exists. Through the identification of these 
‘international’ factors, it is the expectation of this thesis that, through the selected case 
studies, their impact and role will be assessed and their connection/impact on the 
traditionally ‘domestic’ factors identified. Given the limited research in this unique 
environment, it is envisaged that this Doctorate will contribute to the academic knowledge of 
this field.   
 
An examination of the above models of multi-agency working and the factors which affect 
them, especially the factors relevant to international multi-agency working, is important as it 
provides the theoretical framework required to conduct a practical assessment of multi-
agency arrangements. The methodology of this assessment will be examined in Chapter 4. 
 
Using these models and factors, a detailed analysis of multi-agency working will be 
undertaken utilising CEOP, as an example of a domestic UK multi-agency arrangement. The 
CEOP International Child Protection Network will provide the basis for an analysis of the 
international factors utilising the countries of Cambodia, Romania, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
The following chapter will examine a further selection of multi-agency arrangements which 
operation in the law enforcement and child protection environment. Utilising a selection of 
both UK and international case studies will allow for an effective analysis and critical 
assessment to be undertaken of each of the models and factors, their significance, and the 
rationale behind them.  
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Chapter 3: Examples of International Multi-Agency Arrangements 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are a variety of different international multi-agency 
arrangements which have emerged as a response to transnational crime, each with their 
own particular benefits and challenges. As a result, actors/countries may join more than one 
international organisation to meet their needs, thus creating a ‘patchwork quilt’ (Sheptycki, 
1995: 629) of international provision. This has the potential to form ‘a complicated, 
interconnecting, mesh of formal structures and informal arrangements, serviced by a range 
of information systems (which are often incompatible)’ (Benyon, 1992: 32). In order to better 
understand the variety of international organisations operating in the law enforcement 
environment, this chapter will present an analysis of a selection of these organisations and 
will conduct a critical evaluation of them utilising the factors of multi-agency working 
identified in Chapter 2. Examining these organisations in connection with the findings of the 
previous chapter will serve to demonstrate how different organisations are affected by them, 
and how this affects their ability to achieve their stated aims, and emphasise the complex 
interaction between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ factors as raised in the previous chapter. 
These organisations will also serve as counterpoints for the analysis of the ICPN network in 
later chapters, with a view to achieving the aims and objectives of this research.  An 
examination of a wide selection of multi-agency arrangements in this field will add depth to 
the research and strengthen the contribution that this research will make to the field. The 
arrangements to be examined include: 
 
 Interpol 
 Europol 
 Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography (FCACP) 
 European Financial Coalition (EFC) 
 Virtual Global Taskforce (VGT) 
It should be noted that not all of these examples started as arrangements in the wider ‘multi-
agency’ sense, for example Interpol and Europol began as law enforcement only 
arrangements before identifying the potential contributions that non-law enforcement actors, 
such as NGOs and private sector, could make to their responses to transnational crime.  The 
remaining examples in this chapter were created to include a wide cross-section of actors 
from the onset. This further demonstrates the role of non-state actors in a globalised 
environment which limits the abilities of traditional state-centric law enforcement.  
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Interpol18 
Created in 1923, Interpol has developed into the largest international multi-agency 
organisations in the law enforcement environment with 190 member countries. The 
organisation’s full title is International Criminal Police Organisation – Interpol and operates 
on a decentralised network basis with each member country operating a National Central 
Bureau (NCB) that serves as the contact point for all other Interpol members; the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency operates as the UK’s NCB. Interpol also operates a headquarters 
(known as the General Secretariat), based in Lyon, France, as well as several regional and 
sub-regional hubs through the world (Deflem, 2006: 245). 
 
The decentralised nature of the Interpol network allows for direct contact between member 
countries without going through a central hub. That said, assistance can be requested from 
Interpol General Secretariat, in order to facilitate a request in cases of difficulty. As 
previously discussed, the capabilities and resources of member countries will vary and this 
will affect the ability to respond to requests (Harfield, 2008: 487). Intervention by the Interpol 
General Secretariat can also assist member countries in achieving outcomes. Membership 
of the organisation brings together a wide variety of jurisdictions, legal frameworks and 
concepts, and capabilities to achieve outcomes. As previously discussed, in order to account 
for the vast differences in its membership, Interpol possesses strong governance 
arrangements in the form of a Constitution, outlining the operating procedures, and General 
Assembly, containing representatives from each NCB and meets annually. Efforts to account 
for the disparate nature of membership can be most clearly seen in Article 3 of the 
Constitution which states “It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any 
intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character19”; given the 
different practices of member countries, this article is important in establishing a baseline of 
what is acceptable to all members, to ensure participation (Scott and Meyer 1983: 140) and 
represents, to some countries, a restrictive compromise. The sole focus on criminal matters 
can be frustrating to some members leading them to join other international organisations, 
thus creating ‘patchwork quilt’ (Sheptycki, 1995: 629). It is important to understand the 
subjective nature of what constitutes ‘political, military, religious, and racial activity’, and 
these are subject to variations across member states, adversely affecting the operation of 
                                                          
18
 The researcher had, at the time of writing, had served 5 years with the UK’s Interpol bureau. As a 
result, this section is also informed by professional practice.  
19
 Interpol Constitution, 
http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/legalmaterials/constitution/constitutiongenreg/constitution.asp 
(accessed 08/02/11) 
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the organisation through disagreement (Barnett and Coleman, 2005: 597). Adherence to 
Article 3 is monitored to ensure that banned activities are not carried out under the guise of a 
criminal investigation (Fijnaut 1997: 114); even if the activity constitutes a criminal offence in 
that country (Bresler 1992:121), for example ‘terrorist incidents are broken down into their 
constituent parts, only the criminal elements of which can then be identified and subjected to 
police investigations’ (Deflem, 2006: 247). This highlights the difficulties that political and 
cultural differences between members can cause multi-agency arrangements as members 
may have differing interpretations of the remit of an arrangement; for example the distinction 
between law enforcement and state security varies greatly across jurisdictions.   
 
The differing legal frameworks of member countries restricts the ability of Interpol to engage 
in operational activities. However, membership of Interpol provides access to a 
communications network, the I-24/7 system, covering 190 countries; whilst this allows a 
member country to make an intelligence request to one country, the ability to respond to that 
request is dependent on their national legislation. For example, certain jurisdictions are able 
to procure personal information, such as financial records, on an intelligence basis whilst 
other jurisdictions require an evidential request; as Interpol shares information on an 
intelligence basis, alternative means, such as an International Letter of Request, would be 
required (Bowling, 2009: 156). Interpol maintains a series of centralised specialised 
databases, covering DNA, fingerprints, stolen works of art, and child abuse images. Member 
countries, through their NCB and subject to their national legislation, are able to submit 
information for comparison against contributions from other member countries; this has the 
potential to identify offenders who operate across multiple countries and identify victims of 
abuse through the International Child Sexual Exploitation image database (ICSE)20.  
 
Interpol also operates a system of colour coded ‘Notices’, accessible via the I 24/7 system, 
covering requests for extradition (Red), requests for information (Blue), warning notices for 
dangerous offenders (Green), and missing persons (Yellow). The Interpol ‘Green’ notice is 
often used in cases of travelling or missing sex offenders to warn member countries of the 
risks that they may pose to their citizens21; a ‘Red’ notice may also be used to seek their 
extradition if they are wanted by authorities.  Notices are vetted and published by Interpol 
HQ to ensure that they pertain to solely criminal matters and not those banned under Article 
                                                          
20
 Interpol ‘Crimes Against Children’ Factsheet, 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/FactSheets/THB03.pdf (accessed 08/02/11) 
21
 Interpol ‘Crimes Against Children’ Factsheet, 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/FactSheets/THB03.pdf (accessed 08/02/11) 
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3 of the Constitution; this procedure also assesses whether these notices are used with a 
covert intention of a banned activity (Fijnaut 1997:114). 
 
Membership of Interpol provides a valuable tool when dealing with child sexual exploitation 
and abuse through access to 190 member countries, specialised databases, and the ability 
to warn, and receive warnings, about dangerous offenders. However, the vast differences in 
legal frameworks and concepts between the global membership can restrict the 
effectiveness of these tools (Deflem, 2006: 247), for example some countries, due to their 
national legislation, are unable to share personal information, of victim and offender, such as 
DNA or fingerprints on an intelligence basis, this therefore means that opportunities to 
identify victims, and offenders, may be missed. In addition to this, it is not guaranteed that 
countries, even if their legislation will allow, will utilise the analytical services and databases 
of the organisation, for example whilst some countries may be permitted to submit DNA, 
fingerprints, or abuse images to Interpol’s databases for cross-referencing, many do not take 
advantage of this. The lack of uniformity across the membership creates a patchy response 
and brings into question the effectiveness of Interpol’s analytics capabilities. As a result the 
organisation can be classed as a “technical organisation that facilitates cooperation” (Barnett 
and Coleman, 2005: 596), with the organisations main strength being the global 
communication system, I-24/7, which allows law enforcement agencies to communicate on a 
bi-lateral, or multilateral, basis. In order to ensure this co-operation works as smoothly as 
possible, Interpol has adopted 4 official working languages (Arabic, English, French, and 
Spanish). These represent the most commonly spoken languages within the membership 
and NCB’s are typically fluent in at least 2 of them.   
 
Interpol is funded by contributions by member states that are based on the size and scale of 
their economies; the design and style of implementation of an NCB is at the discretion of the 
member state, and as such can vary in size and capabilities (Gerspacher, 2005: 426). This 
also can produce a patchy response as there is no uniformity of service or capability. Interpol 
can be described as following the ‘multi-agency team’ model, outlined in Chapter 2. This is 
demonstrated through the Interpol branded network of 190 countries, with each NCB 
operating as an ‘Interpol’ bureau as opposed to a branch of the national police. Whilst 
officers working within an Interpol NCB are officers of a national police service, when 
assigned to the designated department running the Interpol NCB, they operate under the 
‘Interpol’ identity; this assignment is also typically a ‘primary role’ rather than an ‘additional 
role’ as officers are largely assigned on a full-time basis to Interpol activities. For example, in 
the UK, SOCA officers working in the UK’s Interpol NCB acknowledge themselves as 
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‘Interpol London’ rather than ‘SOCA’. This also allows for easy identification of the Interpol 
NCB by others. 
 
Europol 
Created by the Treaty on European Union in 1992, as a response to organised crime within 
the EU borders, and fully operational by 1999, Europol is the criminal intelligence agency of 
the European Union. Europol, the European Police Office, consists of representatives from 
all EU member states and has co-operation agreements with many other strategic partners 
such as members of the EEA, USA, Canada, Australia and Interpol. The headquarters of 
Europol is based in The Hague in The Netherlands.  
 
Each member state of Europol maintains a liaison office in Europol’s headquarters, allowing 
for face-to-face interaction between different members, and a Europol National Unit (similar 
to the Interpol NCB); requests for intelligence are transmitted by member states from their 
Europol National Unit  (ENU) to their liaison office who then take the necessary action. This 
is notably different to Interpol where communication is largely facilitated through e-mail and 
telephone directly between national units located in the member states. This face-to-face 
contact between a relatively small number of liaison officers allows for greater personal and 
professional relationships to be formed; a key factor to effectiveness identified in Chapter 2. 
In the UK, the Serious Organised Crime Agency acts as both the Interpol NCB and Europol 
ENU. 
 
The multi-agency and multi-disciplinary nature of Europol is seen through the makeup of its 
staff, both permanent and seconded liaison officers; individuals are not only recruited from 
the national police services, but also “staff members from the various law enforcement 
agencies of the Member States and covering specialized areas such as customs, 
immigration services, intelligence services, border and financial police”22. The UK Liaison 
Bureau, for example, contains officers from SOCA, Metropolitan Police, HM Revenue and 
Customs, and the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA). 
 
Discussed previously in Chapter 2, multi-agency arrangements with a more homogenous 
membership are able to construct stronger aims and objectives, and Europol is an example 
of this. As a regional organisation, the member states of Europol have similar (but not 
identical) legal frameworks and are all signatories to European Union and Council of Europe 
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 http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=faq (accessed 10/02/11) 
   
51 
 
ethics and human rights legislation (Gerspacher, 2005: 420). On this basis, it is no surprise 
that the remit of Europol is greater than Interpol. In addition to criminal acts, the organisation 
also deals with terrorism matters. This is made possible as the member states all share a 
standardised notion of what constitutes terrorism.   
 
This harmonisation also allows for Europol to have a more operational role through the 
establishment of Joint Investigation Teams (JIT). A JIT can be established when concerned 
states wish to co-operated in a specific operation; the formalised process ensures that 
evidence gathered in one country is admissible in the county of prosecution and gives 
officers the legal mandate to operate in participating member states. This allows for the fast 
track exchange of evidence, rather than by the slower International Letter of Request 
(Gerspacher, 2005: 429), and for closer cooperation and integration of investigating teams. 
Whilst a JIT does speed up some processes, it does not account for many of the other 
difficulties associated with international working, as identified in this research. Therefore, a 
JIT must not be considered as a solution to the challenges of international law enforcement 
but rather as one of the many tools available to assist. 
 
Similar to Interpol, Europol facilitates the exchange of information between member states 
and can provide analytical support to investigations. However, the smaller and regionalised 
nature of the organisation allows these activities to be carried out more comprehensively 
than is possible through Interpol. Whilst the majority of exchanges are electronic, it is 
possible for issues to be clarified in person given the co-location of the respective liaison 
officers in The Hague. Similarly, the regionalised nature of organisation means that the 
members witness many of the same trends and suffer many of the same types of criminality; 
therefore the analysis and strategic assessments produced by Europol analysts have 
relevance to all member states.  
 
Europol also operates an intelligence database entitled the European Information System 
(EIS)23, this system allows for intelligence to be submitted by all member states and cross-
referenced against information already held on the database; this allows for member states 
to identify links between crime groups operating in, and across, the different jurisdictions. 
The ability to operate a multi-jurisdictional intelligence system is only possible due to the 
harmonised nature of the organisation and the legislation and culture of its 27 members 
(Gerspacher, 2005: 420); this serves to address concerns surrounding the security and use 
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 Europol History http://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/history-149 (accessed 07/07/2012) 
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of the information submitted to the central database (Deflem, 2006: 247). This is in contrast 
with the databases and systems operated by Interpol that are of a more limited nature, 
restricted to areas where census can be found across all 190 members. Naturally it is easier 
to identify common ground with 27 members as opposed to 190. It is difficult to imagine an 
intelligence database of a similar detailed nature being operated by Interpol given the geo-
political and trust issues that affect certain member states (Bassiouni 2002, 93); for example 
it is difficult to imagine the USA being willing to supply their intelligence to states such as 
Iran and North Korea! 
 
The working language of Europol is English; however staff at Europol must also be 
competent in another of the official languages of the European Union24. This is reflective of 
the fact Europol is a smaller organisation that others such as Interpol, and there are many 
advantages to this; the ability to communicate in a single language removes the time-delay 
between a message being received, being translated, and actioned. This ultimately has a 
cost-reducing benefit as this is no requirement for a translation department; though if 
required documents can be translated ad hoc by colleagues who are fluent in the required 
language25.  
 
The organisation was previously funded from contributions from member states. However, 
when Europol was transformed into an EU agency on 1st January 2010, funding of the 
organisation came from the general EU budget26. Whist ultimately it is the same member 
states’ providing the funding, the transition to an EU agency has resulted in an increase in 
fiscal accountability and oversight as Europol must now show its accounts to EU 
institutions27. 
 
Europol, as an organisation, can therefore be described, as per Chapter 2, as an example of 
the ‘integrated services’ model multi-agency arrangement. This can be demonstrated 
through the co-location of staff, at a single location, operating under a shared identity, and 
                                                          
24
Europol Recruitment Website 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/vacancies/vacancDocs/Europol%20Recruitment%20Guidelines%20Se
pt%202010.pdf (accessed 11/02/2011) 
25
 Discussion with Europol official 11/02/2011 
26
 Europol Press Release, http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=news&news=pr090408.htm 
(accessed 11/02/2011) 
27
 Europol History http://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/history-149 (accessed 07/07/2012) 
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the use of a single working language. The harmonised nature of national legislation of 
member states allows for a greater level of integration and service provision; this allows 
Europol to conduct a greater range of services, particularly analytical, than Interpol albeit 
over a smaller geographical area. The differences identified between Interpol and Europol 
adds weight to the idea of  the ‘patchwork quilt’ argument as both organisations have 
advantages and disadvantages which can be mitigated through membership of both. For 
example, Interpol has a much greater geographical reach but Europol, within the EU, has a 
greater analytical capability. 
 
The following examples are multi-agency arrangements with a specific child protection focus 
and can be seen as very different approaches when compared with the more integrated 
examples of Interpol and Europol, representing the multi-agency panel model and 
demonstrating many of the factors associated with this model.  
 
Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography (FCACP) 
Created in 2006, the organisation brings together members of the US banking and payment 
industry and Internet Service Providers (ISPs), together with assistance from other private 
industry partners. FCACP is managed by the National Centre for Missing and Exploited 
Children (NCMEC), a US based NGO, and represents almost 90% of the US payment 
industry28. The aim of the organisation is to tackle commercial child pornography by 
preventing websites and companies from accessing the payment services they require to 
operate. Similar to the European Financial Coalition, to be discussed later, the ‘financial’ 
focus of this arrangement limits the scope its activities to the commercial distribution of child 
pornography, and does nothing to tackle the non-commercial distribution which is generally 
seen as a greater threat. 
 
The organisation has produced a document containing best practice for the payment 
industry to assist them in detecting new, or existing, customers (or ‘Merchants’) who are 
using their financial services to process funds gained from the sale of commercial child 
pornography. The best practice aims to build upon existing ‘Know your Customer’ verification 
processes by detailing specific factors common to commercial child pornographers; such as 
the use of multiple business names, questionable business licences or legal structure, 
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 FCACP Backgrounder, http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/FCACPBackgrounder.pdf 
(accessed 15/02/11) 
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invalid contact information on the application, and/or the use of a post box address (FCACP, 
2007).   
 
As a result of the strengthening of verification processes and the sharing of best practice, 
NCMEC reports that, in the first year of operation, there was a 50% reduction in reports of 
unique commercial child pornography websites submitted via its Cyber tip line29 reporting 
mechanism. However, research suggests that, with traditional payment methods now 
unavailable, commercial child pornographers are seeking alternative payment methods 
(FCACP, 2008; MacCarthy, 2010: 1077). 
 
This arrangement has a predominately American membership. This provides for many of the 
benefits seen in regional multi-agency arrangements such as homogeneity of language and 
culture. Whilst there is a regional membership and focus, there is the scope of international 
benefits. It is important to note that even if commercial child pornography websites and bank 
accounts can be located out with the USA, the company used to process the payments for 
access may not (Richards and Calvert, 2007: 514). As a result, the pornographer may 
attempt to utilise, unknowingly, a payment company who is a member of FCACP and has 
implemented the best practice guidelines; this could lead to the disruption of the website 
through the inability to process the commercial transactions (MacCarthy, 2010: 1077).  
 
The arrangement serves as a model to other organisations such as the European Financial 
Coalition, a similarly focused initiative, launched in 2009 and there have been scoping 
assessments carried out into established a financial coalition in the Asia Pacific region. 
 
European Financial Coalition (EFC) 
Created in 2009 as a 14 month pilot project, the EFC replicated many of the features of the 
FCACP but with a European focus and membership.  Originally consisting of 11 members, at 
the end of the pilot phase there were 29 members30. This membership consisted of a wider 
cross-section of stakeholders, including payment industry (including non-traditional payment 
industry such as Western Union), wider corporate sector, and NGOs.  In contrast to FCACP, 
the EFC included many law enforcement agencies from European countries and was 
coordinated by the Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) centre.  
                                                          
29
 www.cybertipline.com 
30
 http://www.ceop.police.uk/EFC/members (accessed 16/02/11) 
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As a result of significant law enforcement membership, the objectives of the EFC included 
intelligence gathering and assessment of commercial child pornographic websites, as well 
as the aim of seizing assets of offenders (EFC, 2010: 23). The remit of the EFC was also 
extended to education, awareness raising within industry and commercial actors, and 
training (thus possessing a wider remit that FCACP). In order to achieve this, the multi-
agency arrangement was organised into 5 distinct working groups: law enforcement co-
operation working group, payments industry working group, internet and technology working 
group, legal working group, and the awareness raising and prevention working group. Each 
of these groups were chaired by, and limited to, members of the respective sectors (EFC, 
2010: 24). Given the diverse membership of public and private bodies, there were concerns 
about the sharing of information between law-enforcement and non-law enforcement, a 
previously identified factor in multi-agency arrangements. The legal working group was 
tasked to identify ways of resolving this issue.  
 
At the conclusion of the pilot phase, the EFC produced two best practice guides: one for the 
payment industry (similar to that produced by FCACP), and one for law enforcement aimed 
at providing guidance to enable investigations to be conducted, across Europe, to ‘a 
common standard’ (EFC, 2010: 26). A second phase of the EFC is subject to European 
Union funding and discussions are ongoing. Those involved in the pilot have utilised the 
networking benefits of membership and continue to meet on an informal basis31. 
 
During an assessment conducted by the EFC Secretariat of the pilot phase, many of the 
difficulties found in operating a multi-agency arrangement of this type (multi-agency panel) 
were found. Out of 27 EU member states, only 7 countries were represented in the law 
enforcement working group. It was identified that the geographic dispersal, and the 
associated travel costs required to attend meetings, were barriers to membership. Some 
countries were also unwilling to join the EFC, and thus commit their limited resources, if they 
were already members of other international multi-agency arrangements (EFC, 2010: 28) – 
in this case, some organisations were unwilling to form a ‘patchwork quilt’ due to lack of 
resources. However, the EFC, as a whole, has created links with FCACP and the Virtual 
Global Taskforce (below) resulting in both a ‘patchwork quilt’ and an ‘interconnecting mesh’ 
as described by Benyon (1992: 32). Additionally it was noted that ISPs were unwilling to 
formally commit to the EFC, though they did attend some meetings, and it was hypothesised 
that this was due to concerns over the impact that membership would have on their 
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commercial activities (EFC, 2010: 28) – an example of conflict that can occur to an 
agency/organisation when considering joining a multi-agency arrangement. 
Virtual Global Taskforce (VGT) 
Created in 2003, the VGT consists of law enforcement agencies from Australia, Canada, 
Italy, New Zealand, UAE, UK, and the USA; INTERPOL is also a member of the VGT. The 
arrangement also includes many private sector partners including Microsoft, AOL, Lycos, 
and British Telecom. The VGT is predominately law enforcement focused and this can be 
seen in the aims and objectives: ‘to make the Internet a safer place, to identify, locate and 
help children at risk; and to hold perpetrators appropriately to account’32. The arrangement 
achieves this by sharing intelligence and providing assistance to member’s operations, if 
required.  
 
The VGT have also carried out several multi-jurisdictional operations aimed at detecting and 
arresting offenders; this was only possible due to the law enforcement membership. For 
example, Operation PIN, launched in 2003 and ongoing, consists of a specially designed 
website which purports to offer child abuse images. If users decide to enter the website, and 
thus demonstrating a desire to access these images, they are presented with a message 
stating they have committed a criminal offence and their details have been passed to the 
appropriate law enforcement agency. This operation has received a significant amount of 
publicity which has created a deterrence effect; as the VGT states “the existence of this 
website has undermined the confidence of those who think that the internet is an anonymous 
place where child sex offenders and other criminals can operate without fear of being 
caught”’33. In some jurisdictions, the methods of Operation PIN may have been considered 
as entrapment, and the ability to carry out this operation was only possible as VGT members 
were of the same viewpoint that it was lawful in their country. 
 
In addition to providing law enforcement support and assistance, the VGT also provides 
advice to children and young people through the arrangement’s website34. This guidance 
includes signposting to the educational resources of VGT members (such as the 
ThinkUKnow program of CEOP) and links to NGOs aimed at young people. The VGT has 
also embraced new multimedia technologies and has produced educational videos which 
                                                          
32
 http://www.virtualglobaltaskforce.com/what_we_do.asp (accessed 17/02/11) 
33
 http://www.virtualglobaltaskforce.com/news/vgt_setup.html (accessed 17/02/11) 
34
 http://www.virtualglobaltaskforce.com (accessed 17/02/11) 
   
57 
 
have been posted on YouTube. The website also provides instructions and links to the 
abuse reporting mechanisms of each arrangement member. 
 
The VGT has also proactively engaged with industry partners to reach young people. 
Through its partnership with Microsoft, a VGT abuse reporting button has been included on 
its popular instant messaging program, MSN Messenger, since 2006; thus allowing users to 
report inappropriate contact and messages with a simple click. In the first week of operation, 
CEOP saw a 113% increase in UK reporting, the majority of those reports being less than 18 
years old35. The inclusion of the VGT reporting button in MSN Messenger decreases the 
amount of advertising space and revenue available to Microsoft and it is estimated to cost 
the company around £30,000 per month in lost revenue36. 
 
The ‘virtual’ nature of the VGT means that the majority of communication is carried out via 
secure e-mail, telephone and encrypted online workspace. However, physical meetings are 
held twice a year in one of the VGT member countries; this enables VGT members to 
overcome the potentially impersonal nature of online communication. The working language 
of the VGT is English, based on the predominance of English speaking members. 
 
These examples of international multi-agency arrangements demonstrate many of the 
factors, and encounter many of the difficulties, identified in Chapter 2. There has been 
extensive academic interest in Interpol and Europol, given their broad remit and integration 
with international police processes. However, attempts to critically examine the multi-agency 
arrangements established to tackle child abuse and exploitation has been met with a paucity 
of information; there has been little academic interest in these arrangements, potentially due 
to their small membership and niche role. The existing literature on FCACP, EFC and the 
VGT is largely self-produced by the arrangements themselves, and this raises the potential 
for positive bias (especially in the case of the EFC who are seeking new funding) in their 
reporting. However, taking this into account, the documents produced by these 
arrangements still produced some practical examples of the factors identified in the literature 
review, and the actions that the arrangements had taken to account for them. A similar 
experience was found with CEOP’s International Child Protection Network, with no previous 
academic, or internal, research having been carried out on the arrangement.  
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 https://www.ceop.police.uk/Safer-By-Design/Report-abuse/ (accessed 17/02/11) 
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Summary 
The multi-agency arrangements can be classified as examples of the following models, as 
identified in Chapter 2. 
 
Multi-agency Arrangement Model 
Interpol Multi-agency Team 
Europol Integrated Services 
Financial Coalition Against Child 
Pornography (FCACP) 
Multi-agency Panel 
European Financial Coalition (EFC) Multi-agency Panel 
Virtual Global Taskforce (VGT) Multi-agency Panel 
Table 1: Examples of multi-agency arrangements and their classification 
 
The examples in this chapter demonstrate that the challenges of multi-agency working are 
compounded by the effects of working internationally. This reiterates requirement for the 
effective consideration of ‘international’ factors, as discussed in Chapter 2, in order to create 
an effective working environment. 
 
The forthcoming comprehensive examination of the ICPN will utilise the same factors 
identified in Chapter 2 and used in the analysis of the multi-agency arrangements in this 
chapter. By using the same factors and utilising standardised data collection methods (as set 
out in the following chapter), there will be a level of comparability which will allow the findings 
in this chapter to be compared and contrasted against the result of an analysis of the ICPN. 
This has many benefits as it allows the analysis of the ICPN, in later chapters, to not only 
consider the findings of the primary data collection conducted for this research project, but 
also how the ICPN relates to similar multi-agency panel arrangements, such as FCACP, 
EFC and VGT.  The precise nature of this methodology will be discussed in greater details in 
the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
This chapter will examine the underlying methodology utilised in this thesis, beginning with a 
restating of aims and objectives before a detailed consideration of the various data collection 
tools utilised in order to achieve these. This discussion will consider the rationale of each 
data collection tool and reason for use in this thesis with reference to relevant literature. The 
implementation of each tool and the manner in which data was collected will also be 
examined with reference to each data collection tool. Following this discussion, the various 
ethical considerations present in this methodology, and the methods employed to mitigate 
them, will be considered. The chapter will conclude with an initial exploration of the 
limitations of the methodology and its impact on the ability to achieve the aims and 
objectives.  
 
Aims and Objectives 
The aim of the research project is: 
To examine the dynamics of multi-agency arrangements in different cultural and legal 
contexts 
 
In order to achieve this aim, the following research questions have been devised:  
 What multi-agency approaches exist in the International Law Enforcement 
environment and how do they differ? 
 What are the potential benefits of multi-agency approaches in Law Enforcement? 
 How do organisational and cultural variations affect the formation and operation of 
multi-agency arrangements?  
 What are the challenges to multi-agency Law Enforcement and can they be 
overcome?  
 Are multi-agency approaches effective in different jurisdictions? 
 
Data Collection 
This research has adopted a multi-method approach in order to gather comprehensive data 
with a view to answering the above research questions. A quantitative and qualitative data 
collection approach was taken with the ICPN members, utilising documentary analysis, 
participant observation, questionnaire, focus groups and interviews. The data collection 
occurred in two phases; at the South-East Asia ICPN Regional Workshop held in Vietnam 
during March 2011, data was collected from Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam ICPN 
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Advisory Panels and during June 2011, data was collected from the Romania ICPN Advisory 
Panel through a bi-lateral meeting. The principles and rationale behind the use of these tools 
in outlined below. The extensive discussion of how each tool was implemented and data 
collected is reflective of the complexity of international working due to the many challenges 
posed by the international dimension and the diverse nature of actors and jurisdictions. 
 
A mixed method approach towards data collection was selected for this research. Given the 
complex research environment and subject matter, the utilisation of several data research 
tools in a complementary and coordinated manner would help to deliver more reliable results 
(Bouchard, 1976: 268). The coordinated use of these tools allowed for each data collection 
method to build on previous results and add to, and clarify, the results obtained from the 
other collection methods (Ivankova, Creswell and Stick, 2006: 3); this can be most evidently 
seen through the use of interviews to expand on data obtained through the questionnaire 
method.  
 
Similarly, the use of a mixed method approach allows the triangulation of results and thus is 
effective in testing the validity and reliability of data collected (Greene et al, 1989: 256). The 
collection of data using several methods allows for the data to be tested for consistency, and 
also allows for any deficiencies in individual methods, such as bias, to be mitigated (Greene, 
2008: 17). 
 
Individual data collection methods inherently have advantages and limitations when 
compared with other methods. The use of a mixed method approach allows for the strengths 
of each method used to be maximised (Jick, 1979: 604). The use of these selected data 
collection methods, used to obtain the specific types of data they are best designed for, lead 
to an increase in the quality of the results (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004:15). This can 
be demonstrated through the use of participant observation and focus groups to collect data 
on interaction between individuals; whilst questionnaires and interviews can allude to how an 
individual interacts with others, they do not present the same data collection opportunities 
since they do not measure actual interaction. However the use of these other methods can 
be used to triangulate the data collected.   
 
Case Study 
The use of a singular case study in a research project to collect data, test hypothesis, and 
conclude aims and objectives has both advantages and disadvantages as a research 
methodology. The use of a case study can allow for ‘real world’ testing of literature and 
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theoretical concepts identified in the research, and allows the researcher to explore, and 
gain a significant insight into, the environment being studied (Stake, 1979: 6). This provides 
the research, through the deployment of data collection tools discussed in this chapter, a 
level of contextualisation and validity, as analysis and conclusions made by the research can 
be demonstrated in a physical environment and not restricted to a theoretical basis 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006: 223).  A singular case study provides consistency, validity, and reliability 
across all of the aims and objectives, as there are few internal variations within the study.  
 
However, the use of a case study makes the findings and analysis context specific 
(Abercrombie et al, 1984: 34) and this can negatively impact the ability to make 
generalisations based on the findings (Gerring, 2004: 346). A limited ability to make 
generalisations has the potential to limit the relevancy and impact of a piece of research. 
However the significant, and increasing, use of multi-agency arrangements in law 
enforcement provides this research, and its findings, with a high degree of relevancy and 
value (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 233) as this case study, and the findings and observations derived 
from it, is representative of many multi-agency law enforcement arrangements found in the 
UK. That said, arrangements in the law enforcement context differ from those in other 
environments and the findings from this research may not be wholly applicable. However, 
Peattie (2001: 260) argues whilst the use of one case study may limit the ability to make 
generalisations across the board, it allows for detailed analysis to be conducted in one 
context, which may have increased benefits for practitioners in that field due to the level of 
detail, and focus, afforded to the research. This is a specific issue that will be addressed in 
the limitations section. 
 
CEOP was selected as the case study as access could be gained to sources as a result of 
the author’s professional practice and ‘insider’ relationship (Vinten, 1994: 30); at the time this 
research was carried out, the author of this thesis served as the CEOP International Liaison 
Officer. Based on the wish to utilise CEOP and its overseas network as a case study, a 
research proposal was submitted to the CEOP outlining the aims and objectives of the 
research and what access was required. Prior to submission, it was identified that a proposal 
that offered mutual benefit to both the research project and CEOP would be more likely to be 
accepted. On this basis, the proposal to CEOP styled the use of research data collected as 
dual purpose, the data would serve to inform the academic thesis but also serve as an 
evaluation of the ‘CEOP model’. This would identify to CEOP management examples of best 
practice and highlight areas of improvement. This was especially applicable in connection to 
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the CEOP International Child Protection Network (ICPN), which at the time of data collection 
had only been operating for around 12 months. 
 
The ICPN is an attempt to export the multi-agency model to other jurisdictions where there 
are child protection concerns. It was also identified that also using the ICPN as a case study 
would allow for an examination of multi-agency working across several jurisdictions which 
would identify the critical factors that affect the success of the approach. It was decided that 
a throughout examination of each of the 4 ICPN networks would be carried out to compare 
and contrast cultural and organisation differences. 
 
Following the submission of the research proposal, several meetings were held with CEOP 
management aimed at clarifying aspects of the proposal in order to deliver a useful product 
of CEOP. Despite the use of these meetings to ensure that any research would also be 
useful to the organisation, CEOP management were keen to stress their support for 
members of staff to undertake academic research and study and as such every effort would 
be make to support this research. In addition to access to CEOP and ICPN staff, it was also 
agreed that one day per week could be dedicated to the research project at the expense of 
the author’s day job.  
 
As the CEOP International Child Protection Network is a relatively new initiative, an in-depth 
literature review did not identify any academic reports or review. This was identified by 
CEOP management as a reason for supporting the project. The literature did identify CEOP 
and government documents that outlined the business case and strategy for the ICPN. 
These were examined and relevant information was sanitised for inclusion in this report. 
 
Documentary Analysis  
Documentary analysis, as a data collection tool, is only as relevant as the documents 
available for analysis, and it must be understood that their context was ‘not specifically 
gathered for the research question at hand’ (Stewart, 1984: 11). Therefore, in this instance, 
the nature of the environment being researched presented great opportunities through the 
wealth of governmental and non-governmental publications concerning the organisations 
featuring in this research. Given the often restrictive nature of these organisations, official 
publications offer an insight into the workings of the organisations, which would otherwise be 
unavailable, providing a context for the research (Appleton and Crowley, 1997: 1010). An 
aspect of this restricted nature was overcome through the insider positioning of the 
researcher. As an ‘insider’ working for CEOP, many internal documents and publications 
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were accessible, with permission, for documentary analysis. These documents would not be 
readily available to non-CEOP personnel (Vinten, 1994: 30). This issue of insider positioning 
will be examined further later in this chapter. 
 
This tool allows for research to be conducted into the rational and operating procedures of 
organisations. In order to fully understand the organisations featuring in this research, both 
the ICPN and those discussed in Chapter 3, documentary analysis presented an opportunity 
to better understand the nature and culture of the target organisations. This data collection 
tool was appropriate for this research as it presented an opportunity to study key documents 
surrounding the creation, and operation, of the ICPN Advisory Panels. This provided a 
framework for developing other data collection tools by providing an understanding of the 
aims and objectives of the panels, and also highlighting the limitations and areas of interest 
for the research. For example, conducting an analysis of the ICPN aims and objectives 
document provided evidence of the ambition and scale of the Advisory Panels. This provided 
a basis for the construction of the questionnaire and interview guide as it identified areas 
which should be further examined by other, more appropriate, data collection tools.  
 
Despite the many advantages of documentary analysis, caution must be paid to ensure that 
the written text, and its meaning, is not misinterpreted by the researcher, thus leading to a 
different interpretation of the document than intended by the author (Sixsmith and Murray, 
2001: 428). However, in this case, the effective use of the case study, participant 
observation and other data collection methods served to increase the understanding of the 
context being researched, thus providing a greater insight and appreciation of the 
environment featuring in the documents analysed therefore reducing the potential for 
misinterpretation (Hakim, 1993: 1141). 
 
Participant Observation 
Participant observation allows for a researcher to gain an insight into the day-to-day 
workings and interactions within the environment being studied. This data collection method 
presents an opportunity to study an environment, over a period of time, and allows the 
researcher to observe interactions between individuals within the organisation (Jackson, 
1983: 40). 
 
This method was selected as it provided an opportunity to gain first-hand experience of the 
environment being studied, in contrast to other data collection methods, such as interview 
and questionnaire, which rely on the self-reporting of participants (Becker, 1958: 654). The 
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first-hand experience, over self-reporting, provides many advantages as the researcher as 
able to observe the environment ‘as is’ rather than how the participant reports it. This is 
particularly relevant to this research as the very nature of the questions posed, especially 
those into professional culture, presents the opportunity for respondents to report a biased 
view of their environment (Drury and Stott, 2001: 51). As a result, this tool allows for a 
greater understanding of the data as it provides for comparison between observed data 
(through this data collection tool) and reported data (questionnaire and interviews). This 
provides an opportunity to identify inconsistences and areas for further study.  
 
Care must be taken using participant observation to not adversely affect the environment, 
and interactions, being studied (Johnson, Avenarius and Weatherford, 2006: 114). This tool 
provides an opportunity to be both participant and observer. For this research, a more 
observational use of the tool was deemed to be appropriate. This would allow for limited 
disruption to the environment being studied whilst also providing rich data which could be 
used in triangulation with other data collection methods (Jarvie, 1969: 506).  
 
This method contains many ethical considerations which must be considered, including the 
sensitivity of environment being observed (particularly in the child protection environment) 
and the effect the research has on those observed. It is essential that these considerations 
are accounted for in the research design and the considerations for the research can be 
seen later in the chapter. 
 
Between September 2010 and April 2011, participant observation was undertaken at the 
CEOP centre in London. During this period of time, the researcher was seconded to CEOP 
as the International Liaison Officer; this provided a unique ‘insider’ position which allowed 
exposure to the organisation and thus a richer data collection (Vinten, 1994: 30; Vidich and 
Shapiro, 1955: 33). The purpose of this participant observation was to examine how the key 
factors identified in the literature review related to the CEOP model of multi-agency working. 
In order to understand the rationale behind the International Child Protection Network 
initiative, it was necessary to understand the organisation which established its model.  
 
Upon the commencement of the secondment, discussions were held with management on 
the possibility of conducting research at CEOP, including participant observation. As CEOP 
actively encourages its staff to undertake research projects for personal development, the 
proposal was successful. Since the seconded position was based within the CEOP centre, 
permanent access to CEOP members of staff, during the working day, was possible. The 
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data collection requirements meant that the participant observation would involve minimal 
personal contact and interaction with individual members of staff, and would largely consist 
of causal observations of the working environment – a method of participant observation 
referred to as a ‘Observer as Participant’ (Brewer, 2000: 84; Vinten, 1994: 30). However, all 
CEOP members of staff were informed of the observation and advised that no personal data 
would be collected during the data collection; an issue that was very important given the 
sensitive nature of working environment.   
 
Using the key factors of multi-agency working identified during the data collection phase, 
observations were focused on these aspects and were carried out over six months. In order 
to build trust amongst the group, observations were subtle and relied on situations 
presenting themselves; rather than activity encouraging situations to occur that would 
provide the data. This meant that the full 6 months were needed to order to collect the data; 
however it did mean that the participants became comfortable and relaxed (Jackson, 1983: 
41) and trusting (Lohman, 1937: 893) leading to a situation where the presence of an 
researcher did not overly alter the flow or outcomes of the observed scenarios (Vinten, 1994: 
32; Schwartz and Schwartz, 1955: 346). Carrying out the research over the extended period 
of time also produced results that were more representative of actual working practices, 
since the researcher had experienced them on a day-to-day basis, rather than an 
unrepresentative snapshot which may have occurred if trust had not been built up over time 
(Schwartz and Schwartz, 1955: 344). That said, participants in the observation – colleagues 
– were reminded frequently that participant observation was taking place (Jackson, 1983: 
42) as informal conversations took place with colleagues curious about the research and the 
ability to balance employment and academic studies. This was especially noticeable whilst 
the researcher was designing and piloting other data collection tools (mentioned below) 
during working hours. These frequent reminders ensured that participants were aware that 
data collection was taking place, giving participants the opportunity to raise concerns or 
withdraw their consent (Vinten, 1994: 31). Whilst several queries were raised, there were no 
objections to the participant observation taking place; this was taken to mean consent had 
not been withdrawn.  
 
Throughout the 6 month period of data collection, details of relevant situations were 
recorded into a notebook shortly after the event took place. Notes were not taken during the 
situation itself as it was felt that overt note-taking would interrupt the flow of the situation by 
drawing attention to the face observations were being made (Schwarz and Schwarz, 1955: 
344) 
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Further to participant observation conducted within the CEOP centre, the researcher also 
observed a meeting of the Romanian ICPN Advisory Panel held in June 2011. This gave a 
direct experience of the interactions between panel members and provided a practical 
context for the qualitative and quantitative data collected from panel members. At the start of 
the 1 hour meeting, the CEOP representative announced the researcher’s presence and 
explained the purpose of my attendance, inviting any comments or queries from panel 
members. There were no objections to the researcher’s presence at the meeting; it is 
believed this was due to the high engagement with panel members and the briefings they 
were given regarding the nature and scope of the research being conducted. By fully 
informing the participants of the research taking place, any fears or concerns over the data 
collection were allayed.  
 
Given the researchers immersion into the environment under observation, as an employee 
of CEOP, it was important to maintain a balance between participant in the environment and 
observer of the environment (Jarvie, 1969: 505). Employment within the environment under 
observation had the potential to lead to bias (Vidich, 1955: 357), this potential would 
increase the longer the researcher remained at CEOP as CEOP working practices became 
the norm (Schwarz and Schwarz, 1955: 352). However, this was averted by the fact the 
researcher was on secondment and retained a strong attachment to the professional 
practice and culture of my permanent employer.  
 
Questionnaire 
Questionnaires are a useful data collection tool to obtain large-scale quantitative data which 
can be subject to statistical and graphical analysis (Murray, 1999: 148). Given the large 
numbers of individuals involved in the ICPN Advisory Panel arrangement, this data collection 
tool was identified as appropriate to gain standardised responses from across all panels to 
questions formulated in response to the findings of background research, identified in 
Chapters 1 and 2, and the documentary analysis of CEOP and ICPN documents.  
 
The standardised nature of this data collection tool means that it can be easily understood 
by respondents and effectively reproduced across different environments (Boynton and 
Greenhalgh, 2004: 1313). These were considerations for this research as the majority of the 
sample frame did not speak English as a first language and therefore the data collection tool 
used to obtain the majority of data had to be clear and refined. The fixed nature of the 
questionnaire format provided an opportunity for extensive refining through piloting of the 
draft questionnaire and redrafting to ensure the questions were relevant and written in plain 
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English (Rattray and Jones, 2007: 237). The fixed nature of the tool means that changes to 
questionnaire cannot be made after the fact; meaning that effective piloting and drafting is 
required before the questionnaire is deployed (Boynton, 2004: 1372). In the case of this 
research, the drafting of the questionnaire was aided by the use of other previously 
discussed data collection tools. 
 
Questionnaires can be simple to administer and complete. This was an important 
consideration for the research project as the data collection opportunities were limited to the 
ICPN regional workshop in Vietnam and bi-lateral meeting in Romania. Therefore the 
existence of a fully drafted and tested data collection tool, completed prior to the events, 
allowed for effective collection of data.  
 
Whilst there was the possibility of using online or postal questionnaires for this research, it 
was felt that the additional factors and considerations associated with these types of 
questionnaire, such as the need for IT access (in the case of online questionnaires) and 
combatting potentially high levels of non-return (in the case of postal questionnaires), meant 
that delivering the questionnaire in person was the most appropriate option (Armstrong and 
Overton, 1977: 396). This also allowed for respondents to ask any questions directly to the 
researcher and it also allowed for a verbal introduction to be given regarding the 
questionnaire (in addition to the information sheet attached to each questionnaire). It was felt 
that providing the respondents with these opportunities would increase the questionnaire 
response rate and reduce any misunderstandings (Schaeffer and Presser, 2003: 73).  
 
A semi-structured questionnaire was designed in order to examine issues such as 
communication, information-sharing, knowledge, and education. These questions were 
aimed at examining experiences both pre- and post-ICPN to ascertain the effect that the 
implementation of a structured multi-agency approach had on the effectiveness of child 
protection in the ICPN jurisdictions. This questionnaire would also be used to collect data for 
the in-house CEOP evaluation project and therefore the questionnaire was designed in 
consultation with CEOP research staff to ensure that the responses collected were beneficial 
to both this research project and CEOP. Given the dual purpose of the questionnaire, special 
care had to be taken when designing the accompanying questionnaire information sheet to 
ensure that respondents were aware that the data would be used for academic and CEOP 
purposes. The information sheet also stated that respondents could contact the author if 
they had any questions regarding the research or questionnaire: as this research was dual 
purpose, respondents were provided with both a University of Portsmouth and CEOP e-mail 
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address. A final draft of the information sheet was passed to CEOP for comment and 
approval. A copy of the questionnaire and information sheet can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
Given the geographical spread of the ICPN members, it was not feasible to visit each 
member as this would prove too costly in terms of finance and time. However, through good 
fortune and timing, in March 2011, a 2 day ICPN Regional workshop was arranged by CEOP 
which brought together representatives from Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam (ICPN 
representatives from Romania were not in attendance though they were surveyed later). It 
was agreed with CEOP that the final session of the workshop would be given to data 
collection for this project. This session was designed to continue the multi-method approach 
and included both the deployment of the questionnaire and the conducting of focus groups. 
 
Effective piloting of the questionnaire amongst CEOP colleagues refined the wording of the 
questions to be clear and easily understandable by the respondents; this was especially 
important considering that for many respondents, English would not be their first language. 
During preparations for the workshop a delegate list was obtained and it was identified that 
delegates from Cambodia and Thailand had a very good working knowledge of English. It 
was felt that, to ensure that the questionnaire was fully understood, the questionnaire should 
be also translated into Vietnamese. Several copies of the questionnaire were translated and 
distributed to delegates from Vietnam with comments translated on return. In total 60 
questionnaires were distributed to delegates which resulted in 34 replies being received, this 
represented a 57% response rate. 
 
The questionnaire was also presented to the Romanian ICPN Advisory Panel at a separate 
meeting held in Bucharest in June 2011. In order to ensure consistency, the process for 
delivering the questionnaire used with the other 3 ICPN Advisory Panels in Vietnam was 
repeated. In total 7 questionnaires were delivered to delegates and all were returned – 
representing a 100% response rate. Whilst the conditions were slightly different and a period 
of time had passed between questionnaire sessions in Vietnam and Romania, it was felt 
that, for completeness and regional comparison, delivering the questionnaire to the 
Romanian ICPN Advisory Panel would be worthwhile and useful to the research. 
 
Focus Groups 
Focus groups allow for many individuals to participate to a discussion which is less formal 
that an interview (Kitzinger, 1995: 299). The use of this data collection tool requires careful 
planning and management, however, if used correctly, can generate rich qualitative data as 
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it allows for a group of individuals to come together, led by a facilitator, to discuss a series of 
questions posed (Folch-Lyon and Trost, 1981: 444). This has dual benefits for the research 
project as it allows both for the collection of data relating to the questions discussed, but also 
the nature of the discussions and the interactions between members of the group (Sim and 
Snell: 1996: 189). 
 
For the purposes of this research, it was felt that this tool would enhance the data collected 
during participant observation as interactions could be observed between individuals from 
different sectors and cultures (Sim, 1998: 346). This deals directly with the research 
questions posed in this project and offers triangulation with other data collection methods. 
Similarly, this method allowed for the ICPN environment to be experienced ‘as is’, through 
observing the collective group dynamic, rather than ‘as is reported’, through individual 
questionnaire and interview (Wilson, 1997: 212). This also allows for an individual’s strength 
of feeling to be observed when challenged by other members of the focus group (Morgan, 
1996: 139). An advantage over participant observation is that the researcher does not need 
to wait for interactions to occur naturally, as the focus group is directed; this allows for a 
significant amount of data to be obtained in a shorter period of time. However, utilising both 
methods in this research has allowed for greater detail and insight. 
 
Focus groups can sometimes be difficult to control as individuals in the group may compete 
with each other to speak at the same time, or, conversely, the focus group may stagnate if 
the individuals are unwilling to contribute to discussions. These can be overcome through 
effective facilitation (Powell and Single, 1996: 501) and in this case the discussions were 
facilitated by a CEOP Officer who had experience in leading focus groups. These potential 
difficulties can also be overcome by effective engagement with the participants and 
discussing topics to which they have an active interest.  This was certainly the case in this 
research project as the questions posed in the focus groups directly related to the operation 
of the ICPN.   
 
The discussions within a focus group are often tape, or video, recorded or notes transcribed 
by the facilitator, and there are advantages and limitations with both recording methods. The 
use of recording equipment can ensure that all conversations are recorded and no data is 
missed, however the presence of a recording device can be off-putting to participants and 
disruptive to the flow of discussions. Facilitator transcribed notes can be off putting to 
participants but can lead to data being missed; the flow of the discussion can also be 
adversely affected by the facilitator who can be distracted writing notes (McLafferty, 2004: 
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192). However, for this project it was decided that facilitator transcribed notes would be the 
most appropriate, given the cultural sensitivities of using recording equipment in South East 
Asia. Whilst it was accepted that some information would be missed, the experience of the 
facilitators would limit this consequence. 
 
Following the completion of the questionnaire during the final workshop session, workshop 
delegates were also divided into 4 mixed groups containing a mixture of languages and 
sectors represented; each group containing a range of ICPN countries and sectors and 
facilitated by a member of CEOP. It was felt that using focus groups, as a method of group 
interaction, would stimulate discussion and debate based on their own experiences and thus 
produce a rich data collection (Morgan, 1988: 12). This method of data collection would 
serve to build on the quantitative responses gained through the questionnaires and outline 
the rational and thought responses behind them (Morgan, 1996: 134). The purpose of the 
focus groups were also dual role, continuing the theme of workshop session, and therefore 
the inclusion of CEOP Officers, as facilitators, in the data collection phase was possible; it is 
considered that some delegates may not have responded as openly given their presence but 
the data collected was still useful and relevant to both projects. 
 
Each focus group was given a unique question to discuss (Kitzinger, 1994: 103) and these 
were explained to the delegates, along with some potential topics for discussion, before 
commencement through a PowerPoint presentation (see Appendix 2). The following 
questions were posed to the groups; 
 
 Communication in the ICPN: How can this work better? 
 How can the ICPN be used to strengthen regional co-operation? 
 How to maximize the impact of the ICPN? 
 The story so far: best practice and lessons learnt through the ICPN  
 
The focus groups discussed their question for 25 minutes, led by a CEOP Officer as 
facilitator, and the outcomes were recorded by the facilitators in note form. Prior to the event, 
discussions were held with the 4 facilitators as a group, regarding the aims and objectives of 
the focus groups and how to conduct them with a view of achieving a degree of 
standardisation, and thus comparability, across all 4 focus groups. It is worth noting that all 
facilitators had previous experience, both academic and professional, of conducting focus 
groups. The use of facilitators was also important to ensure that the discussions remained 
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on topic and did not descend into an off-topic ‘moan session’ (Watts and Ebbutt, 1987: 31). It 
was expected that there could be some discussion of sources of frustration (Kitzinger, 1994: 
112), but it was important to ensure that these disclosures were relevant to the topic being 
discussed. De-briefs were also conducted with the CEOP facilitators shortly after the 
workshop to gain further information on the outcomes and the nature of the conversations; 
with specific focus on the nature of interaction between the different representatives.  
 
Due to the participant observation of the Romanian ICPN Advisory Panel, no focus groups 
were conducted in Romania. This was due to the low numbers of participants and the desire 
to avoid duplication of data. 
 
Interview 
Interviews are an effective method of collecting qualitative data on a one-to-one basis. This 
method allows for a rich data collection using open-ended questions (Caplow, 1956, 165), 
this is one advantage over questionnaires as there is the ability to ask follow-up questions or 
ask for clarification of a respondents answers. Interviews can, however, be used to expand 
on answers given in a questionnaire. Interviews follow a structured or semi-structured set of 
questions (or schedule) which are put to respondents. Similar to questionnaires, the effective 
piloting and drafting of an interview structure is important to ensure the successful collection 
of data. It is also important to be familiar with the interview guide in order to standardise the 
delivery of the interview to all participants; ensuring the standardised delivery of the interview 
will assist in the validity and reliability of the data collected. In selecting this data collection 
tool for this research project, it was envisaged that this tool would be used to expand on the 
quantitative questions posed in the questionnaire thus following the mixed-method approach 
(Halcomb and Davidson, 2006: 40). 
 
The use of an interview schedule allows for information on specific points of interest to be 
obtained but also allowed for additional – unexpected – information to be gathered which 
could prove beneficial during analysis. The semi-structured nature of the interview therefore 
relies on a series of prepared prompts and sub-questions to ensure that the interview does 
not go off on a tangent (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006: 315). The interviewee-led 
nature of the interview means that the interviewee should be more relaxed and therefore 
more willing to supply in-depth answers to the questions asked.  
 
Unlike written data collection methods, the conducting of interviews can be affected by 
various factors, such as location and comfort of the interviewee, and verbal/non-verbal cues 
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from the interviewer (Dexter, 1956: 157). However, effective pre-planning can mitigate such 
negative effects and selecting an interview location which is quiet, comfortable and free from 
interruption, can greatly increase the effectiveness and flow of the interview. Conducting 
interviews can be a time consuming process and therefore the number of interviews which 
can be conducted in a given time is limited. As a result, it is important to ensure that a 
manageable number and range of interviewees are selected (Goldie and Pritchard, 1981: 
64).  
 
In addition to the questionnaire and focus groups, interviews were also conducted with a 
range of delegates representing all ICPN countries in attendance at the workshop and all 
sectors (including government, NGO, and police). This enabled a wide range of views to be 
collected. The Interviews with ICPN members followed a semi-structured guide which had 
been devised prior to the workshop. This guide was constructed with reference to the key 
factors and considerations identified as relevant to multi-agency working; this would allow for 
practical examples to be gathered and compared against the results from the literature 
review. By collecting data from all sectors represented in the multi-agency arrangement, it 
was possible to examine the relationships between the different sectors and how they 
worked in practice. The wide representation of ICPN countries allowed for these inter-sector 
relationships to be examined in different jurisdictions, allowing for analysis of any variations 
identified. The language and wording of the interview used in the interviews were especially 
important as the majority of the conference participants did not have English as a first 
language. In order to ensure, as best as possible, that the content of the interviews were 
understood by the interviewees, a rigorous process of piloting, review and further piloting 
took place. After several redrafts, the interview guide was ready to be used at the workshop. 
 
Prior to the workshop, several potential interviewees were approached by e-mail to request 
their participation. This also allowed for interviews to be scheduled prior to the workshop, 
thus reducing the workload during the workshop. Interviews were scheduled during the 
comfort breaks throughout the 2 days of the workshop. This allowed interviews to be 
conducted without impacting on the interviewee’s ability to attend all of the workshop 
sessions. 
 
An information sheet (see Appendix 1) to gain informed consent was designed and given to 
interviewees at the start of the interview. This document explained the nature of the interview 
and the types of questions that would be asked. The interviewees were informed that they 
could pass on any question that they were uncomfortable with or did not wish to answer. 
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Interviewees were then asked to sign and return the information sheet, thus indicated their 
consent.  
 
In contrast to the dual role of the questionnaire, the interviews conducted and the data 
collected would be for the sole use of this project. Interviewees were advised that, at no 
time, would CEOP Officers or management have access to the recordings or transcripts; the 
objective of this, aside from ethical considerations, was to ensure that interviewees felt 
comfortable during the interview and gave open and honest answers, without fear of 
negative consequences. In addition to this, interviewees were advised that all interviews 
would be anonymous and the details of interviews, and those interviewed, would not be 
disclosed to CEOP. Interviews were conducted in a private meeting room at the workshop 
venue; this removed the potential for interruption and background noise adversely affecting 
the recording of the interview. Conducting the interview in private, and away from other 
delegates, provided a degree of anonymity to the interviewee    
 
During the course of the 2 day workshop, several additional interviewees were approached 
and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, several interviews were conducted in Bucharest 
in June 2011 during the bilateral CEOP-Romanian ICPN Advisory Panel meeting. These 
interviews followed the same procedures and conduct as those conducted during the 
regional workshop in Vietnam. As a result, the data collected in relevant and comparable. 
A total of 9 interviews were conducted resulting in approximately 3 hours of data. The 
interviews were recorded using a digital audio recorder to ensure that as much data as 
possible was recorded. The interviews were then transcribed and stored on an encrypted 
computer system.   
 
Ethical considerations 
One of the main ethical considerations which presented during the design of this research 
project was the nature of the environment being studied – child exploitation and protection. 
However, throughout the design and data collection phases, there was never any contact 
with children and interaction was limited to professionals. The interactions with professionals 
were handled sensitively given the subject matter. Some of data collected during this project 
was dual purpose and as a result presented several ethical considerations. Whilst most data 
collected was for this research project alone, the data collected through the questionnaire 
and focus group was also to be used for a CEOP research project. Given the range of data 
collection tools used it was important to inform respondents both for what purpose the data 
was collected and who would have access to it.  
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The participant observation conducted within CEOP presented many ethical considerations, 
particularly relating to issues of access, awareness and reporting of data (Vinten, 1994: 31). 
These factors were incorporated into the methodology and it was ensured that the 
participants knew of the activity taking place, consented to it, and were reassured that no 
sensitive or confidential information was recorded. At no time was there direct contact with 
children. The remaining ethical considerations surrounded how data was collected and 
reported (Hughes, 2006: 239). Due to the aims and objectives of the participant observation, 
these issues were limited. The observations were limited to how CEOP and its officers 
related to the key factors of multi-agency working identified through the literature review; this 
meant there was no need to record the personal information or interactions of individual 
CEOP Officers but rather presenting a general overview. Therefore the level of participation 
and interaction with officers, for the purposes of the research, was limited and the method of 
participant observation utilised would be described as that of ‘Observer as Participant’ 
(Brewer, 2000: 84; Vinten, 1994: 31).  This provided anonymity to CEOP Officers, who were 
fully aware of the observation taking place. Though it is acknowledged that the extended 
period of time over which the participant observation was conducted assisted in developing a 
trusting relationship whereby participants felt comfortable disclosing information (Lohman, 
1937: 893). 
 
As the questionnaire and focus groups were conducted within the same session at the ICPN 
regional workshop, it was possible to brief delegates on these issues at the same time. In 
order to achieve informed consent (Hughes, 2006: 239); delegates were advised that the 
data collected from these tools would be used for both a CEOP project and a university 
thesis; in doing so, delegates were made aware that some of their responses would be 
viewed by CEOP Officers. As a result, it is possible that respondent were guarded in their 
responses. In addition to this, each questionnaire, both English and Vietnamese translations, 
contained a comprehensive information sheet aimed at covering any potential questions that 
respondents may have had. The semi-structured interviews, however, were for the sole 
purpose of this project and would not be viewed by CEOP. It was therefore important to 
inform interviewees of this, as the nature of the questions were more probing than the 
questionnaire and focus groups. By advising the interviewees that their information would 
not be shared or accessible by CEOP allowed for open and honest, and sometimes quite 
frank, interviews to take place. It was clear by many interviewees would not have been so 
open if they though their comments would be passed to CEOP. 
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The issue on anonymity of respondents was dealt with differently for each data collection 
tool. The questionnaires did not ask any personal and identifying questions, except for 
asking which ICPN Advisory Panel they were a member. However, given the high number of 
delegates from each panel, it would be difficult to identify those completing a questionnaire. 
Similarly, the potential for individual Vietnamese members to be identified, upon completion 
on a Vietnamese translated questionnaire, was limited due to the high number of 
Vietnamese delegates. The completed questionnaires were not passed to CEOP, however 
the data contained within was passed, in Word and Excel document format, to ICPN 
management for their analysis.  
 
The focus groups presented no ability to shield identities of delegates from CEOP Officers. 
This had the potential to present ethical concerns. However, the nature of the focus group 
questions were not critical of CEOP, but rather discussing ways of advancing the ICPN 
Advisory Panels, and therefore it was felt that delegates could participate without negative 
personal consequences. It was however accepted that some delegates may chose not to 
participate fully because of this issue. 
 
Interviews were arranged without the involvement of CEOP; however they were aware that 
they were being conducted. CEOP Officers were not aware of the identities of those 
interviewed. This separation of involvement was designed to protect the identity of 
participants. The protection of anonymity was further enhanced through conducting the 
interviews in a private meeting room away from the remaining workshop delegates and 
CEOP Officers. At no time were the names of interviewees, and organisations they 
represent, recorded; the interview transcripts were labelled only with which ICPN Advisory 
Panel they are involved in, and whether they were Government, NGO, or Police. As each 
sector was represented on each ICPN Advisory Panel by several members, it would not be 
possible to identify the interviewees from the information recorded. The original audio 
recordings, and transcripts, were stored on an encrypted laptop and were not accessible by 
CEOP Officers.  The same ethical considerations presented themselves in both the 
Vietnamese and Romanian data collection exercises and were dealt with in an identical 
manner. 
 
Insider/Outsider positioning 
During the data collection phase of this project the researcher was seconded to CEOP as 
the International Liaison Officer; working for the organisation that was being utilising as a 
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case study provided unique access opportunities and the impact and consequences of this 
‘insider’ position had to be considered (Vinten, 1994: 30).  
 
As an ‘insider’ the researcher was able to gain unique access to CEOP Officers and ICPN 
members that would not have been available to other researchers (Vinten, 1994: 30; Vidich 
and Shapiro, 1955: 33). This level of access presented many advantages during the data 
collection phase. It allowed for participant observation to be conducted within CEOP, subject 
to the methodological and ethical considerations previously discussed, and provided access 
to the ICPN regional workshop which is typically limited to law enforcement, child protection 
and other parties at the discretion of CEOP. The ability to attend the ICPN regional 
workshop allowed for questionnaires and interviews to be conducted with an audience who, 
given their high positions in the hierarchy of their organisation, would have been less willing 
to take to an ‘outsider’.  
 
As both a CEOP Officer and researcher there was the possibility of role confusion (Martin, 
2006: 229), therefore, as previously discussed, it was crucial that delegates and respondents 
knew the exact nature of the data collection, the research, and the uses of the data collected 
from them (specifically who could access it). Through the use of information sheets, a 
presentation at the start of the session, and verbal briefings, it was felt these issues were 
clarified for the respondents, as previously discussed. Operating in a dual role also had 
implications for the neutrality of the research (and researcher), with the potential for bias in 
favour of CEOP as an employer (Jarvie, 1969: 506; Vidich, 1955: 357), However, 
discussions with CEOP management, at the initial stage of research, sought to clarify the 
researchers position and the positioning of the research as an independent piece of work, 
free for influence and interference from CEOP management (Hughes, 2006: 237). An 
agreement was reached that using some of the data collected, with the informed consent of 
the respondents, would be used to produce an evaluation of the ICPN for internal CEOP 
purposes. This led to CEOP management, satisfied that they would see benefit from the 
research, allowing access to be granted and research conducted for this thesis. 
 
Naturally conducting research in a sensitive law enforcement environment brought potential 
security and confidentially issues (Martin, 2006: 229). As a CEOP Officer, the researcher 
was bound by legislation surrounding disclosure of restricted data and the Official Secrets 
Act; it was therefore important that any information contained within the final research project 
document was not sensitive or subject to restrictions. 
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Limitations of Study 
Whilst the methodology of this study has been designed to capture as much relevant data as 
possible, and to obtain data relevant to the key factors identified through the literature review 
in Chapter 2, it is accepted that the diverse nature of multi-agency arrangements, both 
structural and contextual, means that the results of this study may not be wholly 
representative of all arrangements. The extent to which each arrangement can be 
customised presents a challenge to a study of this nature as there is little universality and 
comparability across different multi-agency models and arrangements; the very nature of the 
multi-agency arrangement is to create a response to a specific, individual, context or 
situation. However, by also considering other multi-agency arrangements with a child 
protection focus, as seen in Chapter 3, this study can be said to accurately reflect multi-
agency arrangements operating in this specialised environment. 
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Summary 
On the basis of the methodology outlined in this chapter, the following table demonstrates 
which data collection tool(s) were primarily used to fulfil each of the objectives of this 
research. Whilst the mixed method approach utilised all the data collection methods 
collectively to achieve the aims and objectives, there would be certain tools which had a 
greater primacy for selected objectives. The complexity of data collection and the challenges 
of collecting data from participants from several jurisdictions can be seen as reflective of the 
many challenges of multi-agency working, reinforcing the notion that the challenges of multi-
agency working are compounded by the challenges of operating internationally. 
 
Aim 
To examine the effectiveness of multi-agency approaches to law enforcement in different jurisdictions: 
The case of CEOP and the ICPN 
Objective Primary Data Collection Method(s) 
What multi-agency approaches exist in the 
International Law Enforcement environment and 
how do they differ?  
 Documentary Analysis 
What are the potential benefits of multi-agency 
approaches in Law Enforcement? 
 Documentary Analysis 
 Participant Observation 
How do organisational and cultural variations 
affect the formation and operation of multi-agency 
arrangements? 
 Documentary Analysis 
 Questionnaire 
 Interview 
What are the challenges to multi-agency Law 
Enforcement and can they be overcome? 
 Documentary Analysis 
 Participant Observation Questionnaire 
 Focus Group 
 Interview 
Are multi-agency approaches effective in different 
jurisdictions? 
This objective will draw upon all of the data 
collection methods outlined in this methodology 
Table 2: Data collection methods relevant to each research question 
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Chapter 5: Findings 1 – CEOP as a Domestic Multi-Agency 
Arrangement 
 
As described in the methodology chapter, participant observation was conducted within the 
CEOP centre between September 2010 and April 2011 with the aim of examining how 
CEOP, as a multi-agency arrangement, relates to the key factors identified in Chapter 2. 
This chapter will examine, in turn, each of these factors against the data collected during the 
participant observation. Following this, CEOP will be examined, in a broad sense, as an 
example of single-jurisdiction multi-agency arrangement, with a view to comparison against 
the ICPN.  
 
Participant observation was used as a means of identifying these factors based on the rich 
data that could be collected and, as raised in Chapter 3, limited research had been 
conducted in the CEOP environment and written relevant documentation did not exist. 
During this time period the researcher was seconded to CEOP as the International Liaison 
Officer, working in the Harm Reduction faculty, and thus benefited from being an ‘insider’. 
The following analysis of CEOP, against the key factors of multi-agency working, is the result 
of participant observation, supported by documentary analysis.  
 
Funding and resources  
The activities of the CEOP Centre, and particularly the Operations and Intelligence teams, 
are very resource intensive and, understandably, with a national remit and a relatively small 
budget, financial governance and oversight is a considerable factor. It was observed that any 
activities, such as overseas travel, required approval in writing from several different levels 
of management. Whilst members of staff were observed obtaining the required approval, the 
procedure was also set out with CEOP operating procedure documents. At each level, 
managers required a business case, outlining the reasons for the expenditure, the aims and 
objectives, and the expected benefits of undertaking the activity. At times, the amount of 
‘paperwork’ was seen to be a frustration for members of staff; however there seemed to be a 
general acceptance that the process was required. On several observed occasions, 
overseas travel and attendance at events and conferences was denied due to the limited 
benefit it would bring to CEOP; this was frustrating for the member of staff who wished to 
attend. On one observed occasion, an application to travel to a conference in Romania was 
denied and was especially frustrating as the application had been approved by several 
lower-level managers before being denied by the head of faculty. Throughout the 6 month 
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period of the observation, this approval process was witnessed many times in connection 
with international travel as part of ICPN activities. On each occasion, a detailed business 
case was presented to authorising managers for approval. There were a few instances 
where the business case was returned to the submitting member of staff for amendments or 
further information. During the observation period, no international travel or activities were 
declined, though several amendments were requested and, in a few instances, the number 
of staff intending to travel was reduced. The high success rate of business cases can be 
attributed to the knowledge and focus of the submitting members of staff; there were many 
instances where members of staff were presented with opportunities to attend overseas 
conferences but they did not submit a business case to managers as they knew that it would 
not be approved. Overall, it was evident that there were good financial oversight and 
governance arrangements in place. 
 
The issue of external funding, as identified in Chapter 2, was evident during the observation 
period; this was not surprising since a large proportion of CEOP’s budget came from 
external partners. It was observed that some positions within CEOP, such as financial 
investigators and internet specialists, were funded by external partners, both public and 
private, on a rolling yearly basis. These funding partners included the NSPCC and Visa 
Europe. During the period of observation, the funding of several financial investigator 
positions were up due for renewal. The renewal process involved detailed negotiations with 
the funding partner and CEOP, consisting of evaluating the work carried out by the member 
of staff against the objectives previously set. This process was lengthy, and whilst the 
researcher was not privy to the negotiations, it was clear that this process led to some 
anxiety for the member of staff whose future position in CEOP was uncertain. Throughout 
the observation period, there were also many bids and proposals, from such bodies as the 
European Union and the Council of Europe, to order to fund, or participate in, educational 
awareness projects and thematic research in south-east Asia. The application process 
varied depending on the external organisation but it was clear that this was a resource and 
time intensive process, with members of CEOP staff devoting extended period of time to 
prepare bid documents. During the 6 month period, 3 applications were made for funding to 
develop educational products for use in eastern Europe, and, given the level of personal 
investment by applying staff, there was emotional scenes when the results was received; 
this was the case for both successful and unsuccessful bids but with differing reactions.  
 
During attendance at several HR meetings throughout the observation period, it was 
observed that smaller agencies, such as local authorities, were, due to resourcing issues, 
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only able to supply members of staff on secondment for a shorter period of time, typically a 
maximum of 6 months, compared to larger police forces who had seconded, in one instance, 
the same individual to CEOP for more than 3 years working within the image identification 
department. This demonstrates that participating agencies need to carefully consider their 
aims and objectives when seconding members of staff and the length of time they can 
maintain the funding of the secondment (Sloper, 2004: 575).  During the observation period, 
the secondment period of 2 members of staff – intelligence officers – was not renewed. Both 
individuals sought to remain at CEOP rather than return to their home agencies, and whilst 
no vacancies existed at that time, they made it clear that they would apply to join CEOP 
permanently at the earliest possible opportunity. 
 
It was observed that seconded members of staff were able to utilise the expertise and 
resources of their home agency; this benefited both the seconded member and wider CEOP 
staff. Several members of permanent CEOP staff were able to attend training courses run by 
a seconded colleague’s home agency at no cost (Abbott et al, 2005: 157) – this was seen as 
several members undertook training with the NSPCC. It was suggested that if these 
members of staff applied as general external training applicants, they would have been 
charged to attend the course. In another observed interaction, a seconded member of staff 
was able to gain assistance from their home agency’s research team when conducting a 
strategic assessment; the ability to utilise this resource reduced the duplication of effort as 
certain niche elements applicable to the strategic assessment had already been undertaken 
by the home agency; this also reduced costs to CEOP in terms of staff time and fieldwork.     
 
Division of responsibilities between actors 
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 324) advise that a clear strategic plan with clear roles and 
responsibilities is required from the outset in any multi-agency arrangement. CEOP has such 
a plan and it is published both on the CEOP intranet, for members of staff, and the external 
website. This has allowed for potential members of staff, either through direct recruitment or 
secondment, to understand the ‘values’ of CEOP before applying to join the Centre; 
understanding the aims, objectives and values is essential in a multi-agency environment 
(Barclay and Kerr, 2006: 44) and CEOP has taken steps to ensure that all members of staff, 
and potential joiners, are aware of these. Throughout the observation period, and as a new 
member of staff, the researcher received several e-mails and documents outlining these 
factors, and the CEO of the Centre routinely held talks to staff in which these values and the 
progress against the business plan were articulated. Additionally, the clear division of roles 
and responsibilities were made clear to all CEOP members of staff through the creation and 
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distribution of organograms which details the hierarchy and responsibilities of each CEOP 
employee 
 
Barclay and Kerr (2006: 44) remark on the importance of ensuring the right individuals are 
employed within a multi-agency arrangement. Whereas many multi-agency arrangements 
may employ generalists, the specialist nature of CEOP requires the targeted recruitment of 
individuals with certain skill sets and experience (Frost et al, 2005: 192). Through analysis of 
the vacancies advertised by the HR department’s intranet page, it was clear that the 
technical nature of some of the roles advertised required a specific individual with previous 
knowledge and training, such as image identification or specialist interviewers. In reality it 
was observed that the majority of individuals recruited to these roles had previously held an 
identical position in a local police force before, or shortly before, joining CEOP. The specific 
nature of the advertised roles severely limited the potential for existing members of CEOP to 
move between roles, as there were no provisions for providing the specialised training 
required to carry out these roles. As a result, the skills required were procured from outside 
the organisation rather than produced internally. The targeted nature of recruitment, and the 
hiring of staff from identical roles in other law enforcement agencies, resulted in CEOP 
possessing a body of staff who share the same aims and objectives, principally to protect 
children. As a result there seemed, at least during the period of observation, to be no internal 
dissent over the aims and objectives.  
 
However, it was clear, despite the many different agencies represented through secondment 
to CEOP, that CEOP was the dominating agency and set the aims and objectives of 
activities undertaken by the Centre. Throughout the period of observation, several tasking 
meetings were attended which involved representatives from  CEOP, social services, NGOs 
and police and during these meetings it was clear that larger agencies, including CEOP and 
a larger police force, dominated the proceeding through controlling the agenda and being 
the most vocal during discussions. This supports the view of Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 
323) who state that larger agencies have the potential to dominate the agendas of multi-
agency arrangements. Agencies who seconded members of their staff to CEOP appeared to 
have little influence on the overall strategic plan. However, this did not appear to result, as 
Frost et al (2005: 192) suggested, in feelings of disillusionment from partner agencies. Due 
to the specific nature of child protection and targeted recruitment of staff from identical roles 
in other agencies, unlike many other multi-agency arrangements, there was limited scope for 
divergent aims and objectives. The existence of strong aims and objectives with consensus 
amongst staff has led CEOP to avoid becoming a ‘talking shop’ (Sampson et al, 1998: 489). 
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That said, as remarked by Sloper (2004, 575), there was still the need for a strong 
chairperson (or Chief Executive Officer in the case of CEOP) to oversee the running of the 
arrangement. During period of observation, this individual charged and it became evident, 
over the remaining observation, that the new CEO had a greater level of support from 
partner agencies that his predecessor. Several meetings were observed where the new 
CEO met with counterparts from other government and law enforcement bodies, the level of 
interpersonal communication and positive feeling was significantly higher than similar 
observed meetings between the previous CEO and partners. As suggested in the Chapter 2, 
the greater support and empowered of the CEO has allowed him to challenge partners 
agencies when commitment or support has been lacking. It was observed that, since the 
appointment of the new CEO, additional support from the private sector, in terms of both 
funding and technical support, and an increase in the range of agencies prepared to second 
members of their staff to CEOP has been secured. This can be seen as demonstrating 
Sloper’s requirement for a strong leadership in a multi-agency arrangement.    
 
Identification with ‘home’ agency or multi-agency arrangement 
Throughout the observation period, attention was paid to the question of staff identification. 
In an example previously discussed, when the secondments of 2 members of staff, from 
police forces to CEOP, were not renewed, both individuals made attempts to remain at 
CEOP rather than return to their home agencies. Whilst no vacancies existed at that time, 
they made it clear that they would apply to join CEOP permanently at the earliest possible 
opportunity. This demonstrated a clear identification with the CEOP model and ‘brand’. 
 
On commencing the observation period the researcher was expecting to see evidence of 
different and competing working practices. It was also expecting, based on the literature 
review, to observe some seconded staff members possessing strong feelings of attachment 
to their ‘home’ agency. However, as the CEOP model of multi-agency, multi-sector working 
is unique, so too was the working environment. Identification with the aims and objectives of 
CEOP was also replicated with identification with the CEOP ‘brand’; seconded members of 
staff did not refer to themselves as being seconded but rather as members of CEOP. Over 
the 6 months of observation, there were only occasional references made by a seconded 
member to their ‘home’ agency – and the content was less that complimentary.  
 
Individuals working at CEOP expressed a sense of pride at working for the Centre and 
shared in the positive, and negative, experiences as a united team. The success, or failure, 
of an operation or activity, was shared and felt by all member of CEOP, regardless of 
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whether they were directly involved. This was particularly evident when it came to media 
coverage involving the arrest of CEOP suspects, where it was very common for large groups 
of staff, often representing both permanent and seconded members, to gather around the TV 
to watch the coverage; physical reactions to the coverage, as expressions of pride and joy 
(and occasionally frustration) were mirrored across all staff. At these times it was difficult to 
identify members of staff who didn’t fully identify with the multi-agency arrangement. Scenes 
like these added to the sense of commitment and identification with the CEOP model by 
members of staff. As a result, over the entire observation period, no inter-agency rivalries 
(beyond friendly office ‘banter’) were noted; the rivalries were good natured and had no 
disruptive impact on team cohesion (Leadbetter, 2006: 57)   
 
Ling (2002:638) states that it is the responsibility of the chairperson (or Chief Executive 
Officer, in the case of CEOP) to create an inclusive working environment. Upon commencing 
the role, during the 2nd month of observation, the CEO scheduled a meeting with each 
individual member of staff to both personally introduce himself and learn about his new staff. 
This created a large degree of goodwill, respect, and ‘allegiance’ for the CEO, with several 
members of staff comment that the new CEO was ‘just like them’ or ‘one of us’. An example 
of networking with new colleagues (Watson, 2006: 18), the individual meetings served as a 
motivation and moral boaster for members of staff following a period of uncertainly after the 
departure of the previous CEO.  
 
Communication 
The co-location of staff from different agencies has removed many of the challenges 
associated with multi-agency working, such as irregular contact and difficulty sustaining 
momentum and progress. It was observed that members of staff, from different agencies and 
professional cultures, had been able to transcend move beyond their affiliation to their home 
agency and work effectively with members of other agencies housed within the CEOP centre 
in London. The challenges of inter-agency rivalry and identification with aims and objectives, 
which can be exacerbated by communication issues, were countered through the design of 
the CEOP model and the working environment at the centre, which fostered a sense of 
community and mutual support (a key factor considering the nature of the work). Throughout 
the observation period, there were many events, such as sports and awaydays, held to 
foster this sense of communicate and CEOP identity.  
 
There were instances, encountered directly through the researchers assigned role at CEOP, 
where members of staff had to work away from the central office, back in their home agency 
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or on operation and on these occasions contact was maintained through e-mail and 
telephone and any negative impacts were limited by the short time they were away from the 
office. The use of alternative communications, in lieu of physical presence, reduced the 
negative effects of absence from the Centre. These were further reduced by the desire of 
these members of staff to keep in regular contact, not always in connection with work, with 
colleagues in the Centre. Such a conscious effort to maintain contact with CEOP, for both 
personal and professional matters, supports the notion of a strong identity, an identity which 
was observed through the 6 month period the researcher was located within the Centre. 
 
All but one member of CEOP staff, during the observation period, was based within the 
central office. One member of staff was seconded on a part-time basis from the NSPCC; as 
a result this staff member spent 3 days at his ‘home’ agency and 2 days at CEOP. Over the 
6 months of observation, the level of contact with this individual was noticeably less. CEOP 
communicated with this individual through e-mail and telephone; however, there were 
inefficiencies with this system as the individual possessed both a NSPCC and CEOP e-mail 
account, and, on occasion there was a delay in responding to e-mail requests. This may 
cause frustration with other colleagues. This individual was able, however, to bring access to 
many NSPCC resources that were previously unavailable to CEOP. 
 
All seconded members of staff regularly had review meetings, with CEOP line management 
and their line management from their ‘home’ agency. These meetings had the purpose of 
reviewing the contribution that the member of staff was making both to CEOP and their 
‘home’ agency. From observations, these meetings did not appear to be as tense as those 
surrounding funding; however, it must be considered that a poor review could lead to a 
reassessment of the funding of the post. A dedicated ‘Relationships Manager’ existed in 
order to liaise with external partners, in order to keep them informed of developments within 
CEOP and deal with any issues that may arise. Over the period of observation, this role did 
not appear to be very intensive with few issues or problems to deal with. This can be 
explained through the previous good practices, such as shared aims and objectives and a 
CEO who engages with external partners in a productive manner. 
 
Professional cultures 
Bringing together different professional cultures into a multi-agency arrangement can be 
problematic (Moran et al, 2007: 147) and bringing together police officers, social workers, 
and the private sector should, in theory, bring problems (Kemshall and Maguire, 2001: 251). 
Cooper et al (2008: 295) suggests that the main theoretical clash of professional cultures 
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should have been seen with the police officers, who are traditionally offender-focused, and 
social workers, who are traditionally victim-focused. Whereas these clashes of professionals 
may occur outside of CEOP, within the Centre there was generally observed to be a good 
working relationship between both professions. For example, several operational meetings, 
attended by both professions, were observed and it was clear that both professions were 
willing to incorporate offender-focused and victim-focussed elements into the operational 
strategy. Whilst there are disagreements observed, it was clear that both positions were 
accepted as valid ones by both parties. This could be attributed to the child-focused nature 
of the aims and objectives, and the emphasis that every child matters. As a result, the 
safeguarding of a child victim was given priority by both police officers and social workers; 
equally prosecuting the offender was seen as an important way to prevent other children 
being abused. Although, with some considering the police to be ‘unofficial social workers’ 
(Thomas, 1994: 5), perhaps this is not as surprising. This unique operating environment 
found at CEOP, when compared to other models of multi-agency law enforcement working, 
may impact on the generalisablity of the conclusions made in this research. However, it is 
the uniqueness of the case study, and the limited research previously carried out, which 
allows this research to make a significant contribution to wider academic and practitioner 
knowledge surrounding this type of environment and its suitability for use in other specialised 
environments.   
 
Over the six months of observation, it was evident that the traditional roles, as described by 
Cooper et al above, of police officer and social worker had blurred, resulting in a hybrid team 
of individuals who attempted, with the same resources, to achieve both safeguarding of 
victims and prosecution of offenders in equal measure. Creating this new culture, the CEOP 
culture, and the adoption by all members of staff, as previously discussed, removed the 
potential of clashes between the different agencies, as often seen in multi-agency 
arrangements (Webb and Vulliamy, 2001: 315); individuals, whether long-term CEOP 
members of staff or new arrivals, quickly adapted to the CEOP professional culture 
relinquishing their previous working practices. As a seconded member of staff from a 
traditional law enforcement agency, the researcher found that the professional culture of 
CEOP was unlike any organisation they had previously experienced. It was, at times, 
strange to see police officers, social workers, and private sector individuals mixing and 
sharing information freely within the same office; this was unlike the traditional law 
enforcement environment where private sector and social workers were viewed with 
suspicion and mistrust (Cooper et al, 2008: 301). It was notable that the police officers 
working for CEOP made a particular effort to reduce their use of police jargon and 
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terminology; indeed it was only noticeable when police officers were conversing with each 
other, out with the presence of CEOP staff from a non-police background.  
 
Given that the hierarchy structures of police officers, social workers, and the myriad of 
private sectors organisations involved with CEOP are different, it was important that those 
secondments into CEOP were carried out at the right level and grade. It was noted that the 
HR and recruitment team were very effective in this aspect, having produced a flowchart 
outlining the comparable grade structures across the different organisations involved in 
CEOP.  
 
CEOP as a model of multi-agency working: summary 
CEOP has a high degree of integration, evident through the formalised operating procedures 
and policies (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 314). These provide a clear, and streamlined, 
management structure with both permanent and seconded personnel managed by CEOP 
senior officers. As seconded personnel are accountable to CEOP mangers, rather than 
those in their ‘home’ agency, competition and conflict between agencies is reduced through 
the removal of competing management structures (Frost et al, 2005: 192). This integrated 
nature can also been seen through the governance structures in place; there is a clear, 
published, annual CEOP Business Plan and Statement of Accounts. These feature clear 
aims and objectives and a detailed breakdown of expenditure from the previous year with 
budgetary forecasts for the following year; to aid accountability and transparency sanitised 
copies of these documents are available to members of the public via the CEOP website. 
There documents and accounts are subject to final approval by the SOCA Board of 
management.   
 
The high level of integration can also been seen through the co-location of different 
agencies, each considering CEOP as their ‘primary’ role (Sloper, 2004: 576), in one building. 
These agencies include SOCA, UKBA, NSPCC, Local Authorities, and private sector and 
representatives of these agencies operate as a collective ‘CEOP’ rather than as members of 
their individual agencies; Leadbetter (2006: 53) states that the integrated nature of a multi-
agency arrangement can be effective in creating a collective identity and working practices, 
and this can be seen in the existence of the CEOP ‘brand’.  
 
Personnel working for CEOP, whether permanent or seconded, identify with and support the 
objectives and working practices of the Centre with little, overt, affiliation to previous 
employers. This serves to increase the effective and cohesive working environment 
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(Hughes, 2006: 68) as there is no fragmentation which could be potentially cause by inter-
agency rivalry (Frost et al, 2005: 192). Following the period of observation and an analysis of 
findings against criteria established through the literature review, CEOP can be described as 
representative of the ‘integrated services’ model of multi-agency arrangements. This is due 
to the highly integrated nature of the arrangement and the existence of a single ‘brand’ to 
represent used to represent the activities of the arrangement. 
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Chapter 6: Findings 2 – ICPN as an International Multi-Agency 
Arrangement 
 
Following the period of data collection utilising the methods described in the Chapter 4, 
collected data was analysed with reference to the key factors of multi-agency working 
identified in Chapter 2. This chapter now seeks to examine each of these key factors, both 
domestic and international, against the data collected from the ICPN Advisory Panels 
comparing and contrasting the findings from each of the ICPN Advisory Panels and 
accounting for any differences where possible. As identical questions were posed to each 
panel, it was possible to effectively contrast the different experiences of each jurisdiction. 
These findings will provide the basis for Chapter 7 which will answer the key research 
questions, previously identified as: 
 
 What multi-agency approaches exist in the International Law Enforcement 
environment and how do they differ? 
 What are the potential benefits of multi-agency approaches in Law Enforcement? 
 How do organisational and cultural variations affect the formation and operation of 
multi-agency arrangements?  
 What are the challenges to multi-agency Law Enforcement and can they be 
overcome?  
 Are multi-agency approaches effective in different jurisdictions? 
 
In order to effectively answer these, the concept of the multi-agency arrangement had to be 
defined and as a result the following key factors where identified and were studied in 
connection with the research questions: 
 
 Funding and resources 
 Division of responsibilities between actors 
 Identification with ‘home’ agency or multi-agency arrangement 
 Communication 
 Professional cultures 
 Language 
 Jurisdiction Differences 
 Protectionism and Relationships 
 Political and Cultural (national) 
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A full breakdown of questionnaire data, in graphical form, can be seen in Appendix 5.  
 
Funding and resources 
As discussed earlier, the effectiveness of a multi-agency arrangement is influenced by the 
level of resource allocated to it by each member; resource should be understood as both 
financial and material. A member’s cultural approach towards the multi-agency arrangement 
can affect the way they approach their membership and their commitment to it. This can 
subsequently affect the ability to ‘pool’ resources which has been seen as a common 
motivator for membership of such arrangements. 
 
Members of the ICPN Advisory Panels generally come from developing countries and 
institutions and are attracted to the multi-agency arrangement for the purpose of enhancing 
their individual effectiveness through collaboration and joint activity. Every ICPN member 
cited their involvement was in addition to their regular position in their home agency – an 
involvement identified previously as ‘additional role’, and in keeping with the ‘multi-agency 
panel’ design. Data identified that the three main reasons for an organisation to join an ICPN 
Panel were the perceived ability to increase networking opportunities, increase their training 
and awareness, and increase their level of information sharing with other organisations.  
 
One interviewee, from the NGO sector stated: 
 
“I think we have a lot of resources just around one table that we can pull on for 
anything to do with child exploitation”. [N2] 
 
When asked, having joined an ICPN Advisory Panel, if these perceived benefits were 
realised, there was a diverse response. Increased networking opportunities were identified 
as the main realised benefit for members of the South-East Asian ICPN Panels; the highest 
level was found in ICPN Cambodia and seen to accurately reflect the embryonic and often 
disjoined response to child exploitation in the country. Increased information-sharing was 
also identified as a realised benefit for all members, but most strongly in ICPN Cambodia 
(100% of questionnaire respondents) and ICPN Romania (71.4% of questionnaire 
respondents) which was not surprising considering the very limited interaction, prior to the 
ICPN, between Law Enforcement and the NGO sector.  
 
 
 
 
   
91 
 
One interviewee, from the public sector, remarked, membership was seen as 
 
“very useful in terms of information sharing in a kind of organised and structured way.  
I’m sure it was on between the agencies informally on an ad hoc basis anyway on a 
kind of case by case basis as needs arise but I think to come together more formally 
once in a while everybody’s welcomed that in terms of having a safe place to talk to 
each other and just have some support and compare and exchange notes on things.” 
[P3] 
 
Describing ICPN meetings as a ‘safe place’ to talk was replicated by many other 
respondents who highlighted the difficulties in cross-sector communication. This will be 
further examined later. 
 
Despite these benefits, many participants remarked, during interview and informal 
discussion, the composition of the ICPN Panels had changed over time as new members 
arrived and others discontinued their involvement. Throughout the interviews, several 
participants remarked that those members who had discontinued their involvement had 
lacked the resource or motivation to commit to the ICPN Panel, whilst others came to the 
ICPN with unmatched expectations of what membership would bring. An interviewee from 
the public sector, remarked 
 
“Some of them participated at the beginning of the meetings probably because they 
thought that it's something important they thought that it's something useful for them. 
Some of them did not continue to participate, did not respond to our invitations mainly 
because it was not the best moment for them for sure some of them, I know from them 
that they said that they have different ideas for the group. But my view is it's important 
once again to have the people who'd like to be part and who'd like to contribute 
otherwise not necessary to waste the time and efforts to bring to people in a group if 
they are not interested.” [P7]  
 
Many respondents reported, in the questionnaire, differences between their perceived 
benefits and actual benefits of membership; perceived benefits being what the respondent 
expected prior to membership of an ICPN Panel versus the actual benefits found once they 
were part of the Panel. With this in mind, it is possible that some of these respondents may 
disengage from the ICPN at some point. Reflecting the concerns raised in Chapter 2, those 
members with mismatched expectations/results of membership were largely those who were 
not members at the time of ICPN conception; therefore unable to influence the structure and 
scope of the panel to more accurately reflect their aspirations. 
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However, respondents did remark positively that those who remained as members – referred 
to as the ‘core group’ by one respondent  [P3] – were committed about ICPN Panel and 
actively participated in the Panel’s activities, sharing information and training opportunities 
developed by their own organisations with other members. Active membership was seen 
positively by other members as it did not ‘waste the time’ [N2] of the panel. 
 
It was also cited by several ICPN members that those belonging to the core group were 
typically organisations who were also able to commit financial resources to the panel on a 
continued basis; utilising this funding stream for the activities of the Panel as a whole. Based 
on organisational profile, many of the smaller organisations who had ceased members of the 
ICPN would not have been able to match this level of funding.  
 
It was clear that funding and resources played a significant role in ICPN involvement. An 
organisation’s ability to commit resources, whether it was time or material, defined whether 
they could take advantage of the benefits of ICPN membership. Indeed several 
representatives of organisations saw the benefits that the ICPN could bring, but could not 
sustain their involvement. This realisation was disruptive to the workings of the panels and 
was commented on by several members. The makeup and dynamics of panels fluctuated 
when organisations realised they could no longer meet the commitments and ceased 
involvement; suggesting that a stronger initial vetting of an organisations ability to match the 
funding and resources required for membership would lead to a more stable, and effective, 
panel. 
 
Division of responsibilities between actors 
A common feature of all the ICPN Panels, observed by the researcher, was the broad range 
of actors it brought together, bridging the gap between the public, private and non-
governmental sectors. The membership of the ICPN Panels, replicated across all panels, 
consisted of senior members of the respective organisations. On this basis, it could be 
expected that there would be issues of personality and ego; however this was not observed 
by the researcher or suggested by any participants. It was perceived by the researcher that, 
as each member brought a high degree of specialised knowledge, there was a high degree 
of mutual respect and benefit observed. 
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One panel member, from the NGO sector, remarked: 
 
“We have some really good members that CEOP had invited into the panel, because 
it's not just anyone, it's like special organisations. I quite rely on that panel now, I think 
we have a lot of resources just around one table that we can pull on for anything to do 
with child exploitation”. [N1]    
 
When further explored during interviews and informal discussions, it was clear that the 
success of the ICPN Panels, as observed by its members, could be, in part, largely 
attributed to the commitment and expertise of the members. The seniority of the core group 
of members meant that work and tasking that was given to these members was actually 
carried out; as previously discussed those members who did not contribute to the panel were 
viewed negatively and often did not remain members of the panel much longer. The view 
that individuals with a greater seniority within their agencies could ‘get things done’ [N1] was 
also replicated outside of the ICPN Panels when members engaged bilaterally with each 
other – the majority of participants remarked that their inter-agency engagement was now 
conducted at a higher level than prior to membership; the exception being ICPN Vietnam 
which saw little change after membership, with relations still predominantly conducted 
between senior officials. This may be attributable to the rank/grade oriented nature of 
Vietnamese society which places, especially in the state and law enforcement sectors; an 
emphasis on an individual’s attained status within the system. On this basis the same should 
have been seen in ICPN Cambodia, reflecting Cambodian society, however its absence may 
be attributed to the limited inter-agency engagement prior to the ICPN.  
 
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 323) advised that larger, or more vocal, agencies may 
dominate multi-agency proceedings; in the case of the ICPN this statement can be seen in 
two distinct ways. On one hand, the core group of ICPN members tended to be the larger 
agencies which in this field; this can in part be attributed to the limited resources excluding 
smaller agencies from participating in ICPN activities. Whilst it was known that smaller 
agencies had once been members of the ICPN Panels, and their reasons for departure 
explained by those current members interviewed for this research, it was not possible to 
obtain their reasons for departure from them directly.  
 
The role of the state and perception of state actors varied across the ICPN network, and this 
influenced the operations of the individual ICPN Panels. For example, in ICPN Vietnam the 
central role of the State meant that non-state actors felt it is necessary to differ to the State 
which it came to decision-making in the Panel. In Vietnam, a state actor was the Chair of the 
Panel. 
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One ICPN Vietnam member remarked: 
 
“NGOs won’t take the lead because they fear that will prejudice their position with the 
government”. [N4] 
  
In ICPN Cambodia, State actors were largely excluded from the formal ICPN arrangement 
due to existing State-led child protection structures in the country.  State actors were, 
however, included on an informal basis. It was also observed that State membership of the 
Panel in Cambodia would be detrimental to its effectiveness. As a result, an NGO member 
was Chair of the Cambodian panel. 
 
“Members communicate with the police through other channels as they have 
arrangements and other co-ordination bodies within the national child protection 
architecture. The members wanted it to be a place where they could more free 
discussions.” [N1] 
 
The Cambodian and Vietnamese NGOs view that state involvement would be hindering to 
the ICPN was, however, not cited by members of other ICPN Panels. 
 
Several non-State members of ICPN Romania remarked that, whilst state/non-state was 
relatively new, it was recognised that the involvement of both Romanian government and law 
enforcement was necessary as, commented by one member, “the civil sector did not always 
speak with one voice’ and the state sector ‘has more sway in bringing forward any changes 
in legislation” [N3]. Whilst the state/non-state interaction was relatively new, several non-
state members remarked they viewed those ICPN members from state institutions as 
professionals rather than, as one member commented, “the institution that they represent” 
[N5]. This view may have contributed to the election of an individual from law enforcement 
as the chair of the panel; discussions with members reveal they were not concerned that a 
state actor would be the chair as they had confidence in the individual. 
 
In Thailand, a country with an established history of state/non-state interaction, several 
members remarked that involvement of state actors were, as one member remarked [N6], a 
‘special benefit’ and ‘a bonus’. Whilst non-state actors had relationships with local State 
actors, there was benefit in having contacts, provided through ICPN membership, at the 
national level. Electing a member of the Royal Thai Police as Chair was seen as bringing 
additional benefits and improving the effectiveness of the panel.  
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One NGO member remarked of Thai State institutions: 
 
“These are bodies that we don't normally get contact with. If we're having issues and 
challenges at the more local level, if we need to remove a bottleneck we can go 
straight to a more senior level.” [N6] 
 
 
The differences across the 4 ICPN panels, observed in this section, highlights the extent 
political and cultural factors affect multi-agency arrangements. This will also be explored 
later in this chapter.   
 
The division of responsibilities within an ICPN Panel were affected largely by two main 
factors; the seniority of the members involved and the role of the State in the particular 
jurisdiction. The findings support the hypothesis that more senior members of an 
organisation are more effective at ‘getting things done’ ; however, care must be taken to 
avoid the domination of the panel by more vocal members at the expense of quieter or less 
senior members. This may, of course, be affected by the role of the state in that particular 
jurisdiction. Reception to state involvement in the ICPN varied, with some considering it 
beneficial and necessary (for both positive and negative reasons) whilst others considered 
state involvement as limiting. This demonstrates the importance of political and cultural 
factors. 
 
Identification with ‘home’ agency or multi-agency arrangement 
Given that the ICPN Advisory Panels follow the ‘multi-agency panel’ model it was not 
surprising that the all of the participants identified primarily with their ‘home’ agency. Many 
participants, during interview, were keen to talk about their home agency and their role within 
it, only then did the discussions move onto the ICPN. That said, and as previously noted, 
many participants remarked on the benefits than membership of the ICPN Panel had 
brought individually and collectively in their country; from the data collected there was no 
evidence of ‘talking shop’ stagnation and frustration as suggested by Sampson et al (1988: 
489). 
 
The ICPN Panels’ success in dealing with both ‘home’ agency identification and still 
remaining to producing effective working and outcomes is down to the remit of the panels’ 
activities, which focuses on collaboration and drawing on existing resources and expertise, 
rather than as a project-orientated body. Whilst this has resulted in diluted aims and 
objectives, for example there were no exchanges of personnel between the member 
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agencies or integration of members into a permanent body (as seen in the case of CEOP); 
the Panels seem to have avoided any fatal conflicts of interest between ‘home’ agency and 
involvement in the ICPN. Indeed, it is this acceptance of its limitations that has enabled the 
ICPN to focus on achievable goals rather than unreal expectations. For example rather than 
the ICPN commissioning a new training and education programme, which would require 
decision making and agreement of all members, the ICPN chairs elected to ask panel 
members to contribute some of their existing materials designed by their ‘home’ agency, 
these materials included educational video, posters and workshop materials; thus avoiding 
the production of any new material which may have conflicted with the position/message of 
an individual’s agency.  This also has enabled ‘home’ agencies to showcase and promote 
their own work to a wider audience with minimal additional costs and resources. This 
approach also recognises the individual contributions and expertise of each member, 
resulting in the added benefit of providing members with a feeling of worth and pride as the 
work of their individual agency is validated by a wider members of their sector; this may also 
foster allegiance to the ICPN Panel and reduce potential inter-agency rivalry as described by 
Leadbetter (2006: 57). 
 
Whilst panel members may work effectively with each other on a country-level, one 
participant (NGO sector) did raise questions over the CEOP’s motivation for the creation of 
the ICPN network; 
 
“I think CEOP has an agenda, I think they have a plan, a cunning plan, not a devious 
plan, but a clever plan, and I'm not sure if it's been sort of openly articulated. For the 
rest of us coming in, we don't have such a specific agenda.” [N2]     
 
The distinction between CEOP and ‘the rest of us’, as cited by one member, and coupled 
with a potential distrust of CEOP is a curious issue and may be evidence of the ICPN Panel, 
in the participants country, developing its own identity and evolving beyond a product of a 
CEOP initiative. If confirmed, this has the potential to create a conflict between CEOP and 
ICPN (mirroring the issues of ‘home’ agency/multi-agency identification). It must be noted 
that this was just the view of one participant and may not be representative of the wider 
ICPN network, however this participant was involved in first ICPN Panel to be established 
therefore it would be interesting to see, given the passage of time, whether other ICPN 
Panels follow this path. 
 
This issue demonstrates the difficult position of an individual when working for two masters: 
the multi-agency arrangement and their ‘home’ agency, as discussed in Chapter 2. A difficult 
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balance must be reached in order to retain the interest and involvement of organisations 
(through the creation of similar aims and objectives) whilst ensuring that these are suitable 
for all; consensus and buy-in is required to ensure continued involvement. During the ICPN 
conference attended by 3 panels, it was observed by the researcher that members meeting 
their counterparts from other ICPN countries for the first time would introduce themselves as 
members of their ‘home’ agency rather than of the ICPN Panel in their country; this will be an 
issue to monitor as identification with the panel is directly linked to its success. 
 
Communication 
The diverse membership of the ICPN Panels to include law enforcement, NGOs, 
government and private sector has the potential to overcome institutional barriers which had 
previously limited inter-agency interaction; for example getting representatives of different 
sectors into the same room for a formal meeting or informal discussion is an improvement, 
as this has proved difficult, to varying degrees, in each of the ICPN countries. It has already 
been seen that membership has increased the seniority of communication between 
members, additionally the majority of participants reported that frequency of communication 
increased between individual members following membership of an ICPN Panel. This 
increase was most pronounced in Vietnam, a country with a low level of inter-agency 
interaction. On this basis, it was expected that Romanian members would also have 
reported a significant increase in communication, however the data collected only showed a 
modest increase – this may be due to the relative infancy of the Romanian ICPN Panel. It 
would be interesting to revisit the Romanian Panel in the future to see if, given time, the 
Romanian panel also demonstrated the communication benefits cited by the panels in South 
East Asia. This view was supported by one Romanian member who stated: 
 
“It’s [ICPN Romania] still a young group and we still have to build trust between 
members” [P7] 
 
Cambodian members also showed only a modest increase in communication frequency; 
however members had reported high frequency of communication before membership of the 
ICPN. This result was not expected and may be more reflective of political and cultural 
considerations in the form of Cambodia’s competiveness with other south east Asian 
countries; anecdotal evidence, based on discussions with child exploitation professionals, 
suggests a sense of Cambodian ‘pride’ that British offenders are choosing Cambodia over 
their Asian neighbours. Therefore this data may not be reliable. The majority of participants 
also reported increased frequency of communication outside of ICPN meetings, suggesting 
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that the multi-agency arrangement has also provided networking opportunities for members 
(Watson, 2006: 18). 
 
The predominant communication methods before membership of an ICPN Panel were face-
to-face meetings and e-mails. Upon joining an ICPN Panel, the preference for these 
methods, in the main, did not change however their frequency did increase. The exception 
being ICPN Romania which saw a slight shift from face-to-face meetings to email; however 
given the relative infancy of the Panel it is unclear if this is a trend. In fact it was noted that 
Romanian ICPN meetings were often rescheduled due to ‘home’ agency commitments by 
members; scheduling issues may explain the increased use of e-mail, in an attempt to 
mitigate the impact of infrequent face-to-face meetings (Sloper, 2004: 576).  
 
One member from South East Asia remarked: 
 
“It’s all about the face to face meeting. The one to one meetings are absolutely 
everything.  Without those nothing happens.” [N4] 
 
The use of direct face-to-face contact is a noted cultural factor in south east Asian societies 
so it is not unexpected that an ICPN member reported this. This existing cultural 
consideration may also have the benefit of strengthening the ICPN Panels in the region as 
Abbott et al (2005: 160) suggest that the frequency of meetings can affect the cohesiveness, 
and effectiveness, of a multi-agency arrangement. In Romania, a country reflecting a 
Western fondness for technology, it is possible that non face-to-face methods, such as email 
and telephone, which together were used more than face-to-face meetings by panel 
members, will still prove effective in achieving effective outcomes for the multi-agency 
arrangement. Again, only time will tell.  
 
These findings demonstrate the important, and complex, role that the ICPN plays in 
developing multi-agency working. In these countries, inter-sector communication is not the 
norm and is greeted with varying levels of hesitancy. Research indicates that involvement in 
the ICPN serves to normalise inter-sector communication amongst its members and this 
may lead to wider others identifying with the benefits of cross-sector working. It is also 
important to reflect upon cultural considerations to identify the most effective method of 
communication, as shown with Vietnam and the preference for face-to-face meeting.  
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Professional cultures 
A multi-agency arrangement which brings together a diverse range of sectors must 
recognise that each of these sectors will have their own identity – or professional culture – 
and, as stated by Webb and Vulliamy (2001: 315), clashes between these different cultures 
may prove problematic. Each ICPN Panel featured representatives from the government, 
law enforcement, NGO, and private sector and in many cases, participation in the ICPN was 
the first serious inter-sector interaction seen by these actors.  
 
A member from ICPN Cambodia summarised this point:  
 
“I think the CEOP panel has bought a lot of good organisations, well it definitely has 
bought a lot of good organisations together, and I think because the Advisory Panel's 
been formed, there's a sort of level of commitment. You have to qualify with the panel, 
it's not like a panel of like 18 organisations, it's what?  7 or 8, and everyone comes to 
the meeting every time so it's very high level of commitment.  Though they're already 
there in Cambodia, I don't think we knew each other's level of commitment until we 
formed the panel you know?” [N1] 
 
Researcher observations from the conference and interviews showed there was a 
willingness from most actors to overcome their preconceptions of the other members. 
However, minor clashes of professional culture could be seen in each ICPN Panel and those 
involved varied across the panels. For example, several members of the Cambodian panel 
commented on the hesitancy between the NGO and law enforcement sector, based on 
historical interaction between the two sectors which had been problematic – to the extent 
that law enforcement members were not officially members of the panel but considered 
‘advisory’ members. One NGO member remarked that there was distrust between the two 
sectors and only time would tell whether participation in the ICPN could overcome this. This 
distrust was also remarked upon by another NGO member who stated that ICPN meetings 
should be, as one member stated, a ‘safe place to talk’; when pressed it was clear that NGO 
members would be less willing to talk openly in the presence of Cambodian law 
enforcement; this is possibly explained by the fact that many NGOs in Cambodia perform 
investigations against offenders themselves due to a perceived inability of traditional law 
enforcement to do so. Several members of ICPN Vietnam also saw similar tension between 
the NGO and State sectors, with NGO members commented on the fact they were reluctant 
to challenge State actors during ICPN meeting for fear of damaging their bilateral relations. 
As a result, a power imbalance is observed with these panels which may, as stated by 
Abbott et al (2005: 161), damage the integration and cohesion of the arrangements.  
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A member of ICPN Vietnam, from the NGO sector, remarked on this point: 
 
“The people that get things done are the ministries but the ministries don’t want to take 
the lead and the NGOs won’t take the lead because they fear that will prejudice their 
position with the government.” [N2]  
 
The strongest cross-sector working relationships were observed by the researcher in ICPN 
Thailand and ICPN Romania, with parties from all sectors attempting to overcome cultural 
differences and work together. This was more pronounced in ICPN Thailand where the 
individual strengths and contributions of each sector, and member, were recognised; the 
NGO and private sector members observed that the presence of Thai law enforcement 
would enable ‘things to get done’, whilst at the same time, Thai law enforcement were 
accepting of the specialised knowledge of NGOs. This cross-sector cooperation may be 
based on previous inter-agency activity that has been conducted in Thailand, where State 
bodies have worked with NGOs on a bilateral basis. Similar acceptance and cooperation 
was cited by the members in ICPN Romania, where State actors had in the past engaged 
bilaterally with several of the NGO members. However, these tended to be exceptions to a 
situation where cross-sector cooperation was in its infancy; an issue that, as previously 
commented, several panel members hoped would be enhanced through participation in the 
ICPN. 
 
Salmon’s (2004: 157) observation that different sectors may have alternative interpretations 
of concepts such as information-sharing, confidentiality, and security were not observed by 
the researcher or reported by participants to a great extent in the ICPN initiative. This may 
be in part because of the nature of the work and they are engaged in and the subject matter; 
it may also be reflective of the seniority and expertise of the Panel members. Certainly a 
high degree of confidentiality and security of information were seen across all panel 
members, reflecting the policies and practices of their ‘home’ agency. The practice of 
information-sharing existed predominantly as one of inter-NGO exchange; the extent to 
which information was shared between non-state and state actors varied across the 4 
Panels. For example, NGO members of ICPNs Cambodia and Vietnam indicated a 
reluctance to share information with State entities for reasons of ‘human rights’ – one 
participant explained, during informal discussion, there was a fear of what action the State 
may take both toward potential victims and offenders. This concern was not cited by 
members of the remaining panels; potentially explained through the long history of inter-
sector interaction in Thailand, resulting in NGOs having confidence based on previous 
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history, and, in the case of Romania, being a signatory to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
Concerns over the use of technical language and jargon were not apparent during the data 
collection period. None of the participants raised any concerns when questioned on this and 
no issues were observed by the researcher during participant observations. This may be due 
to the highly specialised nature of the subject matter requiring an in-depth knowledge of this 
crime type and universality of concepts used. As the majority of the activity conducted 
against child exploitation in ICPN Panel countries is NGO-led, this may produce a situation 
opposite of ‘police culture’ whereby it is law enforcement themselves who struggle to 
understand the language and jargon used. This topic would make for an interesting further 
study. 
 
These findings demonstrate the varying and country-specific challenges faced by the ICPN 
initiative. The extent to which different sectors have been able to engage with each other 
varies between counties; each ICPN Panel has a different dynamic and sector hierarchy 
influenced by status of each sector in the country concerned. Overall, it can be seen that the 
establishment of the ICPN Panels has increased inter-sector dialogue and working. The role 
and view of the state, however, can be seen as the most influential sector in many ICPN 
countries leading other sectors to follow its lead. 
 
Language 
All of the ICPN Advisory Panels employed English as their working language during 
meetings and communications; this was despite the fact that the majority of members only 
spoke this as a second language with varying degrees of fluency. When pressed on the 
reason for this, representatives from each panel gave different reason why their 
arrangement used English over the national language. A member of ICPN Romania stated 
that English was used as the working language, despite the fact the majority of members 
were Romanian, as a ‘courtesy’ to the English speakers – for which there were two (CEOP 
and the British Embassy). This member also stated that many of subject-matter concepts 
would not translate effectively into Romanian and therefore English was the most effective 
way to ensure the concepts were understood.  
 
“I think that all of the people who were delegated or have come here are fluent in 
English and in their daily work they must know and use English, so I don't think there's 
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a problem in using this language. I mean I don't think that we lose something or we 
find it hard to express important ideas in English.” [P7] 
 
The opposite was evident from ICPN Thailand where the majority of members were native 
English speakers (indicative of the large British expatriate community) and there were only 
two Thai speakers, representing the Thai police and government. In both cases, there was a 
high degree of fluency and ability to communicate in English; during discussions with these 
members they explained that they had both been educated in English-speaking countries 
thus accounting for their language skills. 
 
ICPNs Cambodia and Vietnam displayed the only evidence of language having an 
influencing factor in this multi-agency arrangement; both for different reasons. Members of 
ICPN Cambodia were largely drawn from native Cambodian organisations, both public and 
private sectors, and possessed a varying range of English language skills. However 
members representing the State agencies possess very basic skills leading to the use of 
real-time translators during meetings; this was also seen during the ICPN regional 
conference which was attended by Cambodian law enforcement. The use of translators is a 
recognised tool in overcoming language barriers however it can have an interruptive effect 
on the flow of meetings due to the delay in translation; this was observed by the researcher 
during the conference as presentations and discussions were modified to account for the 
use of translators.  
 
One member of ICPN Cambodia remarked: 
 
“In my department not all the people can speak English, so it’s not so easy.  The 
challenge for us is that I have to translate many documents” [N5] 
 
Whilst the makeup of ICPN Vietnam was similar, consisting of native Vietnamese, all 
members had excellent English language skills and it seemed, during one-to-one 
discussions, that working in English was not a problem. However during official meetings 
and the conference, translators were used at the insistence of the Vietnamese State actors. 
The use of translators, despite the fact that these members understood English perfectly, 
was described by one non-Vietnamese member as Vietnamese ‘pride’ in their language and 
an attempt to demonstrate an degree of power and influence within the meetings. This could 
be an accurate assessment as it was clear from researcher observations that members 
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representing the Vietnamese State did not have a high degree of subject knowledge, despite 
being the most powerful member of the Panel. 
 
The use of non-verbal communication was also observed by the researcher, across all 
panels, to be largely reflective of occasional weariness, and in some cases distrust, of 
members from other sectors. On the whole this did not adversely affect ICPN meetings. 
However, during the ICPN conference, which brought together the 3 Asian ICPN Panels, 
negative non-verbal communication, such as lack of eye contact and defensive body 
language, were evident during interactions between law enforcement and government 
representatives from Cambodia and Thailand – an issue explained at the time as caused by 
national and political rivalries. (At the time of the conference, there was extensive media 
coverage that Cambodian and Thai armed forces had engaged in several skirmishes 
resulting in deaths on both sides). 
 
The choice of primary language used in the respective ICPN Panels can ultimately been 
seen to reflect the wishes, and needs, of the panel members. Whilst some panels choose 
English, citing the English-language basis of much of the subject literature coupled with the 
prevalence of English language skills amongst their members, other panels were more 
comfortable to use their national language, given the predominance of native speakers in the 
panel, utilising English translators when required. Ultimately, a panel must choose the 
language it and its members are comfortable with and will achieve the most effective results. 
 
Jurisdiction differences 
Across the 4 ICPN Panels were few observed jurisdiction differences in terms of how child 
exploitation was viewed; all parties approached child exploitation with the same sense of 
determination and severity. However differences were observed by the researcher and 
members in terms of how law enforcement in each jurisdiction were resourced and able to 
effectively tackle the crime, as suggested by Harfield (2008: 487). As expected, ICPN 
Romania, as an EU country, was significantly greater financially resourced that those ICPN 
Panels in south east Asia, as evidenced by the equipment and training available to the Panel 
members from their respective agencies; this also led to Romanian law enforcement having 
the capability to effectively operate independently of the private/NGO sectors and thus 
strengthen their position on the panel (by reducing their reliance on other members). The 
opposite was seen, to varying degrees, in the remaining ICPN Panels where law 
enforcement agencies were affected by lack of resources which reduced their abilities to act; 
this resulted in collaboration with the private/NGO sectors.  
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Jurisdictional differences, in the ICPN context, can best be described as an ‘East-West’ 
divide, with the sole European panel, Romania, being markedly different to those found in 
south east Asia, which have more closely related legal frameworks and justice systems. It 
would be interesting following the creation of ICPN in Spain and Ukraine whether these new 
panels support this hypothesis and relate closer to ICPN Romania than the south east Asian 
panels. 
 
Protectionism and relationships 
As discussed above, the levels of resource, financial and material, available to law 
enforcement members determines the extent to which this sector is reliant/dependant on 
other sectors. This was seen to the greatest degree in Cambodia where law enforcement 
and the non-state sector operated on an almost equal footing, with NGOs providing funding 
and training to law enforcement, and in some cases conducting intelligence gathering 
operations against offenders. That said, no NGO has been given the legal authority to act 
against offenders or protect children so any intelligence collected by NGOs must be passed 
to law enforcement partners for action; as a result the relationship is not totally equal but one 
where NGOs provide logistical and operational support to state organisations. This was 
observed in an operation against a suspected UK sex offender resident in Cambodia, law 
enforcement did not have appropriate vehicles to travel to the remote area to investigate – 
vehicles were then provided by NGOs counterparts to allow the officers to carry out their 
duties. ICPN Vietnam, and to a lesser extent ICPN Thailand, also recorded NGO training 
and support to law enforcement. Whilst training was provided to both, law enforcement 
partners in ICPN Vietnam were seen to benefit the most from this relationship – as NGOs 
were able to provide specialised training not available otherwise. The partnership 
relationships between NGO and law enforcement in Cambodia and Vietnam were surprising 
considering the state-oriented nature of these jurisdictions and the traditional dominance of 
state agencies. 
 
One member of ICPN Vietnam, from the government sector, remarked: 
 
“Before we started working with the ICPN, we didn’t know how to cooperate with other 
organisations. Now it’s not only the local organisations we work with, we also 
cooperate with international organisations. It’s good.”  [N5] 
 
Ultimately the ICPN initiative has the different challenge of overcoming long-standing 
working practices, viewpoints, and prejudices within member countries. It has been accepted 
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that inter-sector cooperation, working and respect will not happen overnight and that it will be 
slow process. However, as demonstrated previously, even at its young stage, the ICPN has 
assisted in changing attitudes and breaking down barriers to inter-sector working and the 
benefits of this have been widely reported by those involved.  
 
Political and cultural (national) 
As previously seen, political and cultural considerations largely focused on the role and 
perception of the State, play a significant factor in relations between sectors, the power 
relationships and leadership of the panel. In some ICPN Panels there was hesitancy, for 
various reasons, for private sector members to openly engage with members representing 
state actors. In ICPN Cambodia, the exclusion of State actors from meetings, with only 
informal associations, was deemed necessary so members could speak freely.  
 
Cultural issues and the role of the state was also seen as a influencing factor, for example In 
ICPN Vietnam, the state-orientated nature of the Vietnamese society led to the panel being 
led, directly (in terms of chairpersons) and indirectly (with NGOs fearing to challenge the 
State actors for fear of repercussions outside the Panel) by the State. The opposite was 
seen in ICPN Thailand, where due to the large expatriate community and influence, of the 
NGO sector, there was significantly less State dominance of the panels, whilst recognising 
that State members were the only ones who had the legal mandate to act. 
 
“The special benefit for us in Thailand is definitely the inclusion of the Royal Thai 
Police, because we don't normally get contact with them and if we need to remove a 
bottleneck we can go straight to them” [N6] 
 
ICPN Romania represented a very different panel than those of south east Asia with limited 
examples of the ICPN model being affected by political and cultural considerations. This may 
be explained through the similarities between Romania and the UK, as the designer of the 
ICPN model, in terms of shared European culture and membership of European political and 
legal institutions. On this basis it is not too surprising that, out of all 4 ICPN Panels, the 
Romania ICPN Panel most closely reflects the CEOP blueprint for way an ICPN Advisory 
Panel should operate. With the expansion of the ICPN network to Spain and Ukraine in 
2012-2013, it would be interesting to see if the Romanian experience is replicated there.        
 
In a similar manner to protectionism and relationships, the ICPN initiative is faced with 
country-specific considerations and once again demonstrates the need for flexibility when 
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operating a panel. The role of the state and the willingness to work with non-state actors 
(and vice versa) has an impact on the effectiveness of the panel and the views of its 
members; as shown through strong support for state involvement in Thailand and Romania 
in contrast with Cambodia and Vietnam. Each panel must use local solutions to make their 
actions as effective as possible.  
 
Reflecting on the country-specific nature of the ICPN Panel, one member from Vietnam 
commented: 
 
“We tried to set it up pretty much as had been tried and tested in Cambodia and 
Thailand and it didn’t work. We had to make adjustments” [N2].   
 
Summary 
These findings have demonstrated, in the real-world environment, many of the challenges, 
effects and outcomes of multi-agency working in the international context which were 
identified through literature and hypothesis in earlier chapters. In summary, the following key 
findings were observed.  
 
Whilst the benefit of participation was observed by members, some were not able to commit 
(fully or wholly) to the arrangement due to lack of resources. This demonstrates the need for 
organisations to fully understand the commitment they will be making when they sign up to 
an arrangement of this type. An organisations realisation that they cannot afford the 
resources is better prior to membership rather than during membership. The ability to 
commit, or sustain, level of resource and membership can adversely affect the stability of the 
multi-agency arrangement.  
 
Such a contrast between fully and partially committed members of the arrangement led to 
some members making a distinction between the ‘core group’ of fully committed and the rest 
of the membership. A fragmentation of this type has the potential to adversely affect the 
dynamics of the group and cause resentment between members. Even during the research 
phase a degree of tension could be observed between some members which, if the ICPN 
continues to follow this path, may increase with time. 
 
Identified as one of the key international factors to be studied, the role of the state and inter-
sectorial power relationships were seen to vary across the different jurisdictions. In each 
ICPN country the positioning of the different sectors produced jurisdictionally specific 
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challenges and working relationships, which led to varying degrees of panel effectiveness.  
This factor could be distilled to two main issues: the positioning of the state actors and their 
willingness to work with non-state bodies, and the ability for the different non-state sectors to 
working together. In several of the panels there was limited experience of inter-sector 
working so for many members it was a learning experience and only time will tell if it will be 
successful; indeed one of the aims of the ICPN initiative is to build trust and relationships 
between the different sectors involved in this area. 
 
Reflecting the seniority argument, several participants commented on the high ranking 
nature of those participating in the panels and because of this, the panel was better able to 
achieve its objectives; objectives which were more or less ambitious depending on what the 
membership could agree on in each panel. However, a member’s seniority was not the only 
defining factor, members had to commit to the arrangement and find a balance between the 
demands and objectives of their ‘home’ agency and the ICPN. Whilst this had an impact on 
the objectives formulated for each panel – members conscious not to conflict with the 
objectives of their ‘home’ agency – the effectiveness of the panel was influenced to a greater 
degree by the personal commitment and identification of individual members with the 
arrangement and their willingness to find solutions to the context-specific problems they 
faced. As stated previously, one of these challenges was the ability of the different sectors to 
work together. 
 
This highlighted the need for teambuilding and the establishment of a comment ‘ICPN’ 
identity as a means of overcoming protectionism and reluctance to work across sectors. 
Whilst many of the panel activities, including those presented to the public, bore the identity 
of the ICPN, it was noticeable that during the ICPN conference – a meeting of 3 out of 4 
panels – members reverted to the identity of their ‘home’ agency rather than the panel they 
were a part of. This suggested that members may have sought to use the conference to 
advance the work of their own agency through the networking opportunities the event 
presented.  
 
The ICPN conference reiterated the importance of networking and communication in multi-
agency arrangements and demonstrated, once again, that context-specific factors must be 
considered. For example, the diverse nature of the membership meant that a range of 
communication methods were used – such as fax, e-mail, telephone and face-to-face – 
depending on a member’s preference and access. The preference of Vietnamese panel 
members for face-to-face communication, in line with Vietnamese culture, also demonstrated 
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the need to consider cultural variables when designing a multi-agency arrangement; 
however, this must be weighed against practicalities – for example if members were spread 
across a large geographic area, frequent face-to-face communication may not be possible 
and therefore other methods would need to be considered to maintain involvement in the 
arrangement.     
 
Throughout the findings, it became clear that the ‘international’ variables identified during the 
literature review had an influence throughout each of the other factors; therefore it is perhaps 
inaccurate to describe the four international factors as distinct factors, but rather as 
considerations which affect every aspect of multi-agency working. 
 
These findings and observations have gone some way to demonstrating how multi-agency 
arrangements work across multiple countries and will serve as the basis of the following 
chapter which will seek to answer the research questions posed in this thesis. At the end of 
the data collection phase, a mini analysis was carried out and a series of recommendations 
were made to CEOP management, as part of the access agreement, outlining adjustments 
that could be made to the current ICPN Advisory Panels to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness. A copy of these recommendations can be found in Appendix 4. 
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Chapter 7: Analysis 
 
This chapter will consider the literature and findings of the research against the 5 key 
research questions set out earlier in the thesis.  
  
 What multi-agency approaches exist in the international law enforcement 
environment and how do they differ? 
 What are the potential benefits of multi-agency approaches in law enforcement? 
 How do organisational and cultural variations affect the formation and operation of 
multi-agency arrangements?  
 What are the challenges to multi-agency law enforcement and can they be 
overcome?  
 Are multi-agency approaches effective in different jurisdictions? 
 
Drawing on the data collected during this research, this chapter will address each research 
question in turn, in preparation for the conclusion of the thesis. 
 
Multi-agency approaches in the international law enforcement environment  
When considering multi-agency approaches in the globalised age, distinctions must be made 
between arrangements operating in a domestic environment and those with international 
dimensions. Through the data collected with reference to the ICPN and discussed in Chapter 
6, it became clear that the international factors of culture and language are not independent, 
or stand-alone, factors, as they were found to have an influence on every element and 
consideration of an international multi-agency arrangement’s design and operation. As a 
result, domestic and international multi-agency arrangements can be seen to differ to a 
greater extent than previously thought; arrangements operating in the international 
environment are compounded with the effects of the ‘international’ dimension. It is not simply 
a case of a few additional considerations when creating an international arrangement rather 
each individual factor of the multi-agency arrangement must be (re)considered from an 
international perspective. 
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 identified three general styles of operating models: multi-
agency panel, multi-agency team, and integrated service. Each of these models differs to the 
extent to which members integrate and the scale of their aims and objectives. Whilst the 
theoretical basis for these models was, according on the literature, based on single-country 
operations, this research has demonstrated that these models, with limited deviation, have 
   
110 
 
been replicated at the international level through organisations such as Interpol, Europol, 
FCACP, EFC and others. On each occasion a different model has been selected based on 
the specific context, and level of integration required, of the arrangement. 
 
In Chapter 3, a study was undertaken to examine the different international examples of 
multi-agency arrangements, and the working models that they represent; it would be 
duplication to reconsider these in this chapter however, through the case study of the ICPN 
and the data collection it is now possible to identify, with greater clarity, the underlying 
rationale for why each international organisation elected to adopt a specific working model.   
 
Interpol represented the arrangement with the largest and most diverse membership 
(Deflem, 2006: 245) at 190 member countries. As seen through the ICPN findings, a diverse 
membership has the potential to cause difficulties across a range of issues. The examination 
of the ICPN has underlined the rationale behind Interpol’s constitution and in particular 
Article 3 banning the organisation from conducting activities of a political, military, religious 
or racial nature. The requirement for an organisation to set a baseline (Scott and Meyer, 
1983: 140) or remit which is agreeable to all members has, as identified through the ICPN 
findings, its basis in ensuring the commitment and participation of the membership; if 
members do not agree with, or cannot commit to, the activities of the multi-agency 
arrangement, they may leave (Barnett and Coleman, 2005: 597) as identified under the 
factor of identification with ‘home’ agency or multi-agency arrangement. Leaving an 
arrangement for these reasons was identified in the case of the ICPN but in other cases 
members may choose to form a ‘patchwork quilt’ (Sheptycki, 1995: 629) by becoming 
members of multiple multi-agency arrangements with different aims and objectives in order 
to achieve their ultimate goals. A common example of this would be membership of both 
Interpol (with its communications focus) and Europol (with its operational focus). 
 
The issues of diversity of membership and organisational aims represent the most influential 
factors for an arrangement (Webb and Vulliamy, 2001: 330) and demonstrate the reasons 
why there are so many different multi-agency arrangements (Goris and Walters, 1999: 633); 
this is evident across the examples outlined in Chapter 3 and the ICPN. Interpol’s large and 
diverse membership has affected the scope of its aims and objectives (Harfield, 2008: 492); 
the converse is seen with Europol which possesses a more harmonised membership base 
with similar legal and policing frameworks thus allowing for more ambitious, and operational, 
aims and objectives (Gerspacher, 2005: 420). When considering other international 
organisations such as the Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography (FCACP) and the 
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European Financial Coalition (EFC), the inclusion of non-state and non-law enforcement 
actors can also have an effect on the operation of the arrangement; factors such as 
profession cultures and protectionism and relationships can play a significant role. 
Consideration must also be given, in the case of FCACP and EFC, to the financial 
motivations of certain members and whether these conflict, to a significant degree, with the 
intended aims and objectives. 
 
In the context of the ICPN, by representing the Interpol and Europol arrangements as ends 
of a scale, each panel can be plotted at various points between the two demonstrating a 
range of different memberships and subsequent remits; 
 
 
Figure 1: Demonstration of multi-agency spectrum 
 
The 4 ICPN Panels effectively demonstrate the elements which cause international multi-
agency arrangements to differ from each other and provide an effect example to conclude 
this research questions. 
 ICPN Cambodia members have chosen to exclude Cambodian Law enforcement  
from full membership thus limiting the activities of the arrangement by removing their 
ability to conduct operational activities (see Deflem, 2006: 247) 
 ICPN Vietnam has a complex relationship between State members and the rest of 
the membership. The activities of the Panel are heavily influenced by one actor (see 
Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 323) 
 ICPN Thailand has a significant British expatriate membership and an excellent 
working relationship with Royal Thai Police, enabling operational activities and 
common goals (as seen in Chapter 6) 
 ICPN Romania has a membership base from several European states which are 
signatories to common legislation of the EU and Council of Europe allowing for 
operational activity potentially across the EU (see Gerspacher, 2005: 429). 
There are extensive numbers of domestic and international multi-agency arrangements in 
existence and it would not be feasible to examine them all in this thesis. However, from 
selected examples used in this research, representing a diverse range of arrangements, 
Interpol Cambodia Vietnam Thailand Romania Europol
Hetrogenous membership / restricted remit Homogenous membership / greater remit
ICPN Panel
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differences between arrangements, and the reasons why they differ, can be seen and 
explained. Due to the many factors which must be taken into account, there is no such thing 
as a ‘one size fits all’ multi-agency arrangement.  This has led to the existence of a 
complicated ‘interconnecting mesh’ (Benyon, 1992: 32) of arrangements catering to different 
memberships and objectives resulting in Sheptycki’s (1995: 629) ‘patchwork quilt’ of 
international provision. On the basis of the data collected from ICPN members, who were 
also, to varying degrees, members of other multi-agency arrangements, it must be stated 
that the existence of a patchwork quilt of provision is not necessarily a negative feature.    
 
Potential benefits of multi-agency approaches in law enforcement 
The ultimate purpose of undertaking a multi-agency approach is to improve on the existing 
arrangements in place and increase the ability to achieve the desired outcomes (Cheminais, 
2009: 24). As discussed in Chapter 2, the formulation of a multi-agency approach may be in 
response to perceived faults or inadequacies previous informal multi-agency working 
arrangements (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998:322) or, with reference to Goris and Walter’s 
(1999: 633) notion of a ‘fluid’ process, may involve a modification to an existing arrangement 
to better reflect the current aims and objectives of the membership. The Home Office (2000: 
1) remarked there is no single or ‘one size fits all’ format for a multi-agency arrangement, as 
each approach must reflect situation factors specific to the context in which the arrangement 
is to operate. However, as previously discussed, whatever the chosen configuration, the 
same key benefits of multi-agency working are exhibited.  
 
In the end, the success of a multi-agency arrangement is largely dependent on the 
contributions of its members (Sloper, 2005: 575). However, by the fact individuals have 
expressed an interest to engage in a multi-agency approach, this can be interpreted as a 
desire to achieve the outcomes as remarked by Cheminias (2009: 24); these can be distilled 
further to specific key benefits as discussed throughout this thesis and found in the data 
collected from the ICPN. 
 
Perhaps the most evident benefits of multi-agency working are seen through the bringing 
together of different professional cultures who may have previously had limited interaction 
with each other; this action can generate numerous benefits which can significantly assist in 
the achievement of Cheminias’s stated objective of a multi-agency arrangement. These 
include providing a greater interagency understanding of the working practices of the 
constitution members of the arrangement (Watson, 2006: 20); as seen with the ICPN case 
study, governmental bodies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the private sector 
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all have different working practices, objectives and limitations, which may not be easily 
understood by those from other sectors. Different sectors may also have, or perceived to 
have, different understandings of issues such as confidentiality and security of information 
(Salmon, 2004: 157). Through the data collected from ICPN participants, we have seen that 
a multi-agency arrangement has the potential to demystify the workings and capabilities of 
agencies from multiple sectors, and this can lead to greater inter-agency communication and 
joint working; data collected from the ICPN (see Appendix 5) demonstrated that members 
reported higher and more frequent communication with other sectors following their 
involvement with the arrangement.  
 
The breaking down of institutional barriers that existed between different agencies and 
sectors (Abbott et al, 2005: 158) was reported by several members of the ICPN as a key 
benefit of participation, as discussed in the previous chapter. This produced several positive 
outcomes including the ability to increase one’s professional network, which also promoted 
new bi-lateral cooperation between members outside of the ICPN. Perhaps more crucially, 
as identified by Bassiouni, (2002: 93), this assisted in building trust between members of 
different sectors who previously may have been reluctant, for one reason or another, to work 
together. This was particularly advanced in ICPN Romania which previously had limited 
State/non-state interaction under the communist regime, but now had, at least in the context 
of Child Protection, effective inter-agency cooperation; an increased willingness to ‘trust’ 
those from different sectors could also be seen in Cambodia and Vietnam but this was at a 
less advanced stage, potentially due to the continued domination of the State and Socialist 
political system. Members of ICPN Thailand demonstrated the greatest willingness to ‘trust’ 
each other and this may be the reflective of the long established practice of inter-agency 
working in Thailand. 
 
A greater understanding of the working practices/capabilities and the building of trust 
between different agencies and sectors, fostered through participation in a multi-agency 
arrangement, also allows for the better use of specific/niche skills which are held by 
members operating in the particular field. This was specifically remarked upon by one 
member [N2] of the ICPN, as discussed in the previous chapter, who described a benefit of 
the arrangement as providing a diverse range of resources ‘around one table’ that could be 
utilised for ‘anything to do with child exploitation’. This account of the multi-agency 
arrangement as a ‘one stop shop’ and as a combination of different skill sets supports the 
points made by Barclay and Kerr (2006: 44) and Frost et al (2005: 192) in Chapter 2, which 
highlighted the benefits of specialist skills over the use of generalists. The identification of 
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specialist skills in existence within a specific field is especially beneficial, as demonstrated in 
the ICPN case, in contexts where traditional state actors are lacking skills or resources; this 
is evident in Cambodia where NGOs, such as International Justice Mission37, provide 
traditional State law enforcement bodies with the investigative skills of its volunteers and 
resources of the NGO where lacking.  
 
The previously mentioned benefits can also provide a situation which allows for the better 
coordination of efforts, and reduction of duplicated activities, of its members (Lebov, 2010: 
88; Jones et al, 2012: 9). For example, as members of a multi-agency arrangement gain a 
better understanding of the activities of other members, it may become clear to a member 
that similar initiatives are also being undertaken by another member. The identification of 
areas of duplication allows for the more effective deployment of resources; this is especially 
important in a financial climate where organisations must do more with less. This was 
demonstrated in the ICPN case study where rather than commission, at significant expense, 
an ICPN branded education and awareness program, the Advisory Panel undertook a review 
of the existing programs developed by members and opted to utilise these at no cost, this 
allowing resources to be directed to other projects38. 
 
Multi-agency arrangements can also provide other education and training benefits as 
described by Abbott et al (2005: 157); Abbott et al remarked that members from different 
agencies and sectors had, through the participation in a multi-agency arrangement, the 
potential ability to undertake training courses run by other members. This key benefit, 
identified in literature, was also identified in the ICPN case study; both in the ICPN strategic 
objectives (see Appendix 3) and data collected from individuals involved. For many 
participating members, as discussed in the previous chapter, the existence of training 
opportunities was a key motivation for joining an ICPN Advisory Panel with the majority of 
members reporting that this benefit was realised after they joined (see Appendix 5). These 
benefits were especially evident in members from agencies with limited training capabilities 
of their own. As demonstrated throughout the literature and the data collected, there are 
many benefits to multi-agency working; however the realisation of these benefits can be 
affected by many situational factors which, in addition to those points previously raised, will 
be discussed in the following section. 
 
                                                          
37
 http://www.ijm.org/our-work/what-we-do (accessed 07/04/2012) 
38
 Researcher observations, South-East Asia ICPN conference,  March 2011 
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Organisational and cultural variations and the effect on the formation and operation of 
multi-agency arrangements  
The role of professional cultures and the variations in organisational practices found across 
different sectors has been discussed throughout this research and was observed in the 
ICPN case study. The ICPN context provided an insight into what variations exist, mirroring 
those identified through the existing literature, and what actions were undertaken by those 
involved to mitigate the effects of these variations; the data collected from the case study 
also provided the rationale behind these variations and their effects.  
 
An examination of the existing literature and the data from the ICPN, the following variations 
were identified as the most significant in affecting multi-agency arrangements: 
 Capability and willingness to commit to the objectives of an arrangement  
 Previous interaction and trust between sectors 
 Nationality and Nationalism of the membership 
 Role of the State 
The capability and willingness of an actor to commit to the arrangement was identified as a 
significant organisational factor. As previously discussed, at the formation stage, it is 
essential that prospective members are both aware of the resource implications of 
participation and are able to commit to the stated objectives of the arrangement (with 
reference to Hughes (2006: 68) and the ‘home agency’ argument). This is important for the 
stability, dynamics, and effectiveness of the arrangement (Barnett and Coleman, 2005: 597). 
This issue, identified in the literature, was observed by several ICPN members during the 
data collection, with one member (referred to as P3) making reference to the disruptive 
effects that a changing membership can have on the activities of the arrangement; the ICPN 
member made specific reference to the inability of some former members to commit time 
and resources to the ICPN – as raised by Sloper (2004: 575) and discussed in Chapter 2. An 
instance like this also has the potential to affect future inter-agency relations for the 
departing agency as they may obtain a negative reputation based on their actions (Lowndes 
and Skelcher, 1998: 323); this is plausible in the case of the ICPN, as the member, from the 
law enforcement sector, spoke with great disappointment about those members who joining 
the ICPN but later quit.     
 
The ICPN case study also demonstrated how this issue is also influenced by country-specific 
factors; for example the membership, collective and individual, of some ICPN Panels had 
significantly less resources than counterparts in other panels. This was explicitly seen in the 
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membership of ICPN Cambodia, who were less resourced than those of ICPNs Romania 
and Thailand, members of ICPN Romania and Thailand did however consist of larger, 
international NGOs in comparison with the smaller NGOs and state bodies of ICPN 
Cambodia. Whilst less resourced members of the ICPN may have the same aspirations and 
level of commitment has their larger colleagues, and there is nothing to suggest they do not, 
the fact remains that those with fewer resources bring less stability to an arrangement as the 
ability for the member to commit resources may fluctuate. The organisers of the 
arrangement must carefully balance the benefits of including these actors in the 
arrangement versus the instability they may bring to it. This demonstrates also the difficulty 
in implementing a common multi-agency arrangement blueprint across multiple jurisdictions. 
 
As briefly discussed above, previous inter-agency interactions, both positive and negative, 
can affect the formation and operation of future multi-agency arrangements by effecting a 
member’s (current or prospective) reputation and creating trust issues between the other 
members (Bassiouni, 2002: 93). This may include the actions of a member whilst part of 
another multi-agency arrangement (and their performance within them) or bi-lateral relations 
(Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 323). Data collected from the ICPN suggested that 
reputations are an important factor.  
 
The reputation aside, ICPN case study data suggests a more significant, jurisdictionally-
specific, factor is the state of relations between the different sectors and the willingness for 
different sectors to engage with each other. Bassiouni identified the ability for different 
sectors to ‘trust’ each other as an important factor in multi-agency working and this issue 
was demonstrated in the responses given by, and observations of, ICPN members 
throughout this research. For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, the individual 
membership of ICPN Thailand had pre-existing positive relationships with each other on a bi-
lateral basis, including between non-state and State actors, leading to a high degree of ‘trust’ 
and willingness to engage in the arrangement. This has led to ICPN Thailand becoming a 
high-functioning Panel with positive outcomes. The membership of ICPNs Cambodia and 
Vietnam had limited legacy interactions with each other, this was especially the case 
between non-state and state actors, and led to an initial hesitancy in the members to interact 
with each other (Harfield, 2008: 487). However, through ICPN membership, the constituent 
organisations and sectors involved have improved their working relationships and 
engagement with each other. This outcome, building ‘trust’, is especially significant given the 
state-orientated nature of these countries; this has been realised in ICPN Cambodia to a 
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lesser degree to the informal ‘associate’ membership of Cambodian Law enforcement in the 
Panel.  
 
The ability of an arrangement, in the ICPN example, to build ‘trust’ and improve relationships 
between sectors is a significant benefit yet represents a catch-22 situation: how can 
members realise this benefit if they don’t ‘trust’ each other enough to join the arrangement in 
the first place? This highlights, as discussed in Chapter 2, the need for a strong chairperson 
or negotiator to encourage actors to put aside their concerns and join the arrangement (Ling, 
2002: 638). An informal discussion with ICPN management suggests this occurred during 
the foundation of some ICPN Advisory Panels. 
 
Another issue which was identified and observed in the data collection was the role of 
nationality and nationalism and was seen to vary across the different jurisdictions; an issue 
which had a direct impact of the effectiveness of building a common identity in the panels 
(Frost et al, 2005: 190) and thus affecting the ability to achieve outcomes. An arrangement 
with a largely homogenous membership, such as ICPN Thailand with predominantly British 
expatriate members, already possessed many common cultural bonds and shared 
conceptions through their pre-existing experiences. This produces an environment which is 
more conducive to building an effective arrangement and common identity as there are 
fewer barriers to overcome, excluding any inter-sector issues which may exist (Abbott et al, 
2005: 161). An arrangement with a more heterogeneous membership will have an increased 
number of barriers and cultural differences to overcome, including a greater range of 
technical vocabulary and ‘jargon’ (Barclay and Kerr, 2006: 44) leading to difficulties 
translating concepts and ideas within the arrangement (Salmon, 2004: 157) – a specific 
example identified in the ICPN was the lack of uniformity of child protection laws and what 
constituted a ‘child’ (Ivezaj, 1999: 824). The linguistic skills possessed by the membership 
may also present barriers to effective working; for example almost all members of ICPN 
Thailand had English as their mother tongue, which removed many of the challenges 
discussed in Chapter 2; this contrasted with ICPN Vietnam whose membership consisted of 
English and Vietnamese native speakers and introduced the need for translators.  
 
The case of ICPN Vietnam demonstrated the role of nationalism and, potentially, cultural 
pride within an arrangement; those members who possessed Vietnamese as a native 
language also spoke English to a working standard. Despite this, Vietnamese members, led 
by the state members, demanded that the ICPN meetings be either presented in Vietnamese 
or with real-time Vietnamese translation; this was seen as a possible expression of 
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Vietnamese cultural pride but, in doing so, this introduced additional resourcing issues, such 
as the provision of translators, and other procedural challenges to the arrangement which 
had the potential to impact on the arrangement’s effectiveness  - the extent to which these 
issues adversely affect an arrangement, reducing it to a ‘sterile environment’ (Webb and 
Vullamy, 2001: 330), is dependent on the will of the membership to participate in spite of 
these issues. 
 
The exerting of national or state power by state actors can also affect the operation of the 
arrangement. State actors were identified both in the literature and the ICPN case study as 
having a significant amount of power based on their official and legislative position within the 
jurisdiction; how state actors use their power has a direct impact on the effectiveness and 
operation of the arrangement. Some states may have no legal framework or capability to 
implement the outcomes from an arrangement (Harfield, 2008: 487); a situation observed in 
ICPN Cambodia where Cambodian law enforcement often relied on resources and funding 
from NGOs to conduct their State-mandated role. Other states may have limited experience 
of working with non-state actors and may be wary of ceding too much control to non-state 
entities; this was observed in ICPN Romania but it was noted that, through participation in 
the ICPN initiative, state and non-state interaction was improving. Similarly, arrangements 
operating in state-orientated jurisdictions may see the domination of the arrangement by 
state members, either through demonstrations of state power or submission by non-state 
actors weary of consequences of challenging the State; this was a situation observed by the 
researcher in ICPN Vietnam where, as reported in the previous chapter, NGO members 
were fearful of offending the Vietnamese state actors weary of the consequences they may 
occur outside of the arrangement.  These issues may force the arrangement to adopt 
weaker aims and objectives than anticipated (Scott and Meyer, 1983:140) in order to satisfy 
the state.  
 
Challenges to multi-agency law enforcement  
The challenges to the formation and operation of a multi-agency arrangement as a whole, 
have been discussed but there are specific challenges which affect law enforcement 
members of these arrangements. These include: 
 The ability to work with non-law enforcement as equals 
 The effects of ‘police culture’ and jargon/technical language 
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As discussed earlier, ‘trust issues’ (Bassiouni, 2002: 93) may exist between state and non-
state actors for a variety of reasons and Law enforcement members, as part of the state, are 
not immune to these issues. Law enforcement members may however have specific ‘trust 
issues’ of an operational nature rather than the ideological ‘trust issues’ present in the wider 
state sector. These operational concerns may include the confidence, and legal permission, 
to disclose intelligence to non-law enforcement bodies fearful of security and confidentiality 
risks associated with the storing of intelligence (Salmon, 2004: 157); this issue was observed 
in the ICPN case study which some law enforcement members hesitant to share information 
with other members. This is a slightly contradictory position for law enforcement members to 
take as they, in turn, expect non-law enforcement members to share intelligence with them; 
in the child protection environment, intelligence held by NGOs can be just as sensitive as 
intelligence held by law enforcement as many victims many, for numerous reasons, turn to 
NGOs rather than the police for help. This has led to many multi-agency arrangements being 
formed in this environment and served as one of the motivations for creating the ICPN.  
 
However, as demonstrated, not all jurisdictions have a history of state/non-state interaction 
and the ability to overcome these issues rests on increasing understanding of working 
practices and professional cultures of the sectors involved (Moran et al, 2007: 147). The 
case of ICPN Romania is a prime example of how law enforcement concerns of sharing 
intelligence with non-state actors can be overcome, in time, through communication and 
awareness raising with non-law enforcement counterparts. 
 
Even if these issues can be overcome, it must be noted that, in the majority of jurisdictions, 
law enforcement members, in addition to some other state actors, are the only ones who 
have a legal mandate and ability, as one ICPN member remarked, ‘to get things done’. 
There are many cases where NGOs and law enforcement may work together and share 
intelligence or resources, but it is only the law enforcement members who have the legal 
power to arrest and prosecute suspects and rescue those at risk. Whilst law enforcement 
and civilian counterparts may work together there is an obvious power imbalance in the 
relationship which may lead law enforcement members, as the more powerful actors, to 
dominate the arrangement (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 323). 
 
In a multi-agency arrangement, one of the founding principles is equality of membership 
based on the fact that each member has a specific, sometimes niche, contribution to make. 
As a result, law enforcement members must ensure that they address any notions of 
superiority and possess the ability to accept and implement ideas, measures and outcomes 
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from non-law enforcement partners. This is essential as one of law enforcement’s specific 
contributions to an arrangement is their legal mandate and ability ‘to get things done’. 
Effective working with non-law enforcement partners requires, on the part of law 
enforcement, the adaptation of new working practices (Leadbetter, 2006: 56); namely the 
toning down of police jargon and technical language which exists within their professional 
culture. Whilst it has been noted that each professional culture has its own terminology, it 
has been remarked that ‘police culture’ is especially difficult for one outside law enforcement 
to understand due to its unique position in society (Paoline, 2003:200). This is especially 
important in the international environment as there is greater scope for misunderstanding 
and miscommunication, with standard language differences also in existence. 
 
It has been noticed, in the case of the ICPN, that the child protection environment is filled 
with context-specific terminology which may be alien to those members with no previous 
child protect background. It was observed by the researcher and several members of the 
ICPN that the technical language used in the ICPN were understood by all members from 
the NGO sector and the state child protection agencies. This fact suggests that law 
enforcement members must both avail themselves of their ‘police culture’ whilst at the same 
time adopt the working jargon/terminology of the arrangement. This challenge may exist to a 
lesser degree in environments which contain less technical language. 
 
Multi-agency approaches in different jurisdictions 
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, there are several examples of multi-agency arrangements 
which operate across multiple jurisdictions with effective results; Interpol and Europol are 
prime examples. The key to their success lies in having aims and objectives which are 
supported, and resourced by their memberships. It is clear that Interpol and Europol have 
different aims and objectives but that they are accepted by their members; it is very unlikely 
that these could be juxtaposed with effective results. This demonstrates, as mirrored in the 
literature and supported by the ICPN data collection, the important role played by 
jurisdictional factors such as politics and culture and it is essential to establish aims and 
objectives which are wholly reflective of the membership of the arrangement in question. A 
larger and more diverse membership, as seen with Interpol, requires more considered aims 
and objectives and a multi-agency arrangement such as Europol which has a more 
homogenous membership with fewer political and cultural variations. Despite their 
differences, both these multi-agency arrangements could be considered effective in the 
different jurisdictions they operate; as a result of the support and acceptance given to them 
by these jurisdictions. 
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The data collected during this research and in the context of the ICPN demonstrated this 
point further; attempting to impose the same aims and objectives on multi-agency 
arrangements with different political and cultural makeups presented challenges and 
resulted in some jurisdictions being able to achieve these aims and objectives more 
effectively than others. As noted in the previous chapter, jurisdictionally-specific factors 
played a major role in influencing inter-agency cooperation and working and it was 
interesting to see how the membership of each ICPN Panel adapted themselves in order to 
best achieve effective outcomes; these adaptations were also jurisdictionally-specific and in 
response to the specific political and cultural challenges with presented themselves. 
 
Each ICPN Panel demonstrated that, after having adjustments appropriate to their context, 
there were significant benefits to participation in a multi-agency arrangement, even if the 
exact nature of these benefits varied between the Panels. The willingness to make these 
adaptations, reflective of the fluid’ process (Goris and Walter,1999: 633), rather than 
abandon the multi-agency arrangement, demonstrated how those involved supported the 
idea that an arrangement has the potential improve on existing inter-agency working 
arrangements (Cheminais, 2009: 24).   
 
The data collected from ICPN members demonstrated (see Appendix 5) the extent to which 
they found the multi-agency arrangement to be effective. ICPN members identified that level 
and frequency of communication between the agencies taking part in the ICPN, both within 
ICPN and on a bi-lateral basis, increased following participation in the arrangement. As 
identified in this research, communication is a significant issue which affects inter-agency 
cooperation and is frequently seen as a challenge; participation in a multi-agency 
arrangement is one way to improve communication and therefore potentially increase 
effectiveness of actions. This can be seen both in the single jurisdiction arrangement, for 
example CEOP (see Chapter 5) or MAPPA arrangements, and in multi-jurisdictional 
arrangements such as Interpol, Europol, and the ICPN; multi-jurisdictional arrangements, as 
discussed earlier, do, have other challenges which they must overcome, however each of 
these challenges can be overcome, in part, through increased communication and the 
benefits that it brings. 
 
Whilst this research has primary focussed on multi-jurisdictional multi-agency arrangements, 
it must be stated that single-jurisdictional arrangements also exist and exhibit many of the 
benefits and challenges of their international cousins. In Chapter 5, the Child Exploitation 
and Online Protection (CEOP) centre was discussed in detail as an example of such an 
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arrangement; this example was also selected for discussion due to its founding, and 
continued involvement, in the ICPN. The diverse multi-sector membership of CEOP has 
seen many similar benefits of participation as those members of the ICPN; as discussed in 
the chapter and from researcher observation, increased communication, information-sharing, 
and inter-agency training opportunities were all evident in CEOP. On this basis, the 
effectiveness of CEOP, like the ICPN, cannot be understated; the frequency reporting of 
CEOP’s successes against offenders in the media is testament to this.  
 
Further evidence of the positive benefits found through multi-agency arrangements can also 
been seen in the longevity of participation by members and the continued growth of a 
membership body; for example Interpol can trace its origins as far back as 192339 and 
continues to grow with a current membership of 19040. Given the amount of funding and 
resources required for participation in these arrangements, it is clear that members have 
identified some benefits to being involved. CEOP, created in 2006, represented a departure 
from previous law enforcement-led efforts against offenders and demonstrated through 
results the effectiveness of bringing together stakeholders from different sectors; this 
success has led CEOP to become one of the ‘commands’ in the proposed National Crime 
Agency (NCA) to be launched in 2013. 
 
The ability for multi-agency arrangements to be effective in different jurisdictions, whether 
single or multi-jurisdictional, has been demonstrated in this research through the 
examination of a wide range of multi-agency arrangements with different memberships and 
remits. It is clear that multi-agency arrangement can be effective and bring the benefits 
described in this research; however this is dependant of the arrangements being able to 
overcome the specific challenges they face. Through the ICPN data collection, and mirrored 
in the literature regarding other arrangements, it has been seen that the ability to overcome 
any challenges rests with the willingness of the members to do so.     
 
Concluding remarks 
Multi-agency arrangements exist in a wide variety of formats and with a range of 
participating members, reflective of the specific needs, aims, and objectives of the 
memberships. Each variation of arrangement brings its own set of unique challenges and 
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 http://www.interpol.int/about-interpol/history (accessed 28/04/2012) 
40
 http://www.interpol.int/member-countries/world (accessed 28/04/2012) 
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difficulties which must be overcome. In the majority of cases this challenges can be 
overcome through the willingness of members to work together to find suitable ways of 
overcoming them; the ICPN Advisory Panels are evidence of this.  
 
There are occasions where individual actors are unable or unwilling to adapt themselves to 
the multi-agency arrangement and they may leave or join another arrangement which 
possesses different aims and objectives. This is not necessarily a negative thing; the 
success of an arrangement relies on the support of all its members. This may create 
arrangements which, whilst supported by members, do not fulfil all an individual actor’s 
hopes and requirements. This can lead to the creation of a ‘patchwork quilt’ (Sheptyki, 1995: 
629) or ‘mesh’ (Benyon, 1992: 38) situation with individual actors being participants of 
multiple multi-agency arrangements in order to fulfil their specific aims and objectives. 
Evidence from the ICPN and the other international multi-agency arrangements described in 
this thesis suggests that participation in multiple arrangements does not have a negative 
impact on the effectiveness of individual arrangements and their ability to achieve their aims 
and objectives. On this basis, if individual actors can also fulfil their aims and objectives 
through participation in multiple arrangements, then it is win-win situation.  
 
The overarching message to be taken from this analysis is that a variety of multi-agency 
arrangements exist in the international environment and operate with a variety of 
stakeholders, both law enforcement and non-law enforcement. The success of these 
arrangements, demonstrated by their longevity and continuity of membership, is based on 
the ability of the members to adapt to the challenges posed by international factors. This 
may lead to actors becoming part of multiple organisations to achieve their aims; it is clear 
that the benefits, real or perceived, of doing so, has created an environment where actors 
are members of several multi-agency arrangements, each with a different role and remit 
which has been determined by the limits placed upon it by its membership. The wide 
practice of this suggests that actors feel the benefits of multi-agency working outweigh the 
minor challenges and inconveniences posed by international factors.       
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to examine multi-agency child protection arrangements, and their 
dynamics, in the international environment. This was achieved through the formation of 
several research questions and a wide-ranging discussion examining several key points 
beginning with the effects of globalisation which created an environment for multi-agency 
arrangements in this field to be effective. This was then supported by an examination of the 
different models of multi-agency arrangements with several examples of those in existence. 
A data collection exercise was then carried out which included a participant observation-led 
study of a domestic multi-agency arrangement (CEOP), followed by a data collection 
exercise and analysis of an international multi-agency arrangement (ICPN). In order to 
conclude this thesis, a full review of the research shall be undertaken with reference to the 
aims and objectives. The chapter will conclude with final remarks. 
 
Review 
Chapter 1 discussed the effects of globalisation, technological advancements, and rise of 
transnational crime as the catalyst for the creation of multi-agency arrangements in the 
international environment. The chapter discussed the wider effects of globalisation and 
transnational crime but focused on the effects these have on child protection issues. The 
combined effects of technology and transnationalism have presented many difficulties and 
challenges for child protection officials; offenders of this crime type, like many others, have 
benefitted from the increasingly globalised environment which is still policed by state-
oriented law enforcement. Two elements have particularly benefitted the offender, and 
challenged the abilities of the state, and these are the increased availability of the internet 
and commercial travel. 
 
Whilst society has benefited greatly from the rise of the internet availability, in the form of 
increased educational opportunities and connectivity, it has also produced new arenas for 
offenders to operate. The internet, through its chatrooms, forums, and websites, has 
provided offenders with easier access to indecent images, potential victims, and other 
likeminded individuals. It must be stated that the internet has not caused individuals to 
become offenders, but rather provided those with a deviant interest an open, and easily 
accessible, forum. Chatrooms and forums allow offenders to talk, and groom, a wider pool of 
potential victims with greater anonymity than previously available; these channels also allow 
offenders to communication with other offenders, in ways not previously seen. This is further 
compounded by the ability of these communication channels, along with websites, to provide 
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increased and easier distribution of indecent material to those who seek it. The international 
nature of the internet provides a jurisdictional challenge to state-orientated law enforcement 
(Wall, 2007) as victim and offender are increasingly in different countries and subject to 
different legal frameworks.  
 
The internet has also allowed offenders to identify those jurisdictions which may have 
weaker law enforcement capabilities and other conditions which may beneficial to their 
offending behaviour, such as poverty. These ‘hotspot’ countries are predominantly seen in 
south-east Asia. Whilst the internet has provided a virtual environment and link to these 
hotspot countries, the increased accessibility to commercial air travel as allowed offenders to 
turn their virtual activities into real-world abuse as they are able to travel with relative ease to 
these ‘hotspot’ countries to carry out their offending behaviour; thus taking on an 
international dimension and posing a challenge to law enforcement, both in the offenders 
home country and the predominantly weaker and less resourced law enforcement of the 
‘hotspot’ country. 
 
As a result, there has been rise in non-governmental organisations (NGO) operating in these 
countries in an effort to combating these offenders and abuses, with many NGOs operating 
in a semi-law enforcement role through the carrying out of prevention and intelligence-
gathering activities. In many cases, these NGOs are better resourced and experienced in 
this crime type, but lack the legal mandate of state law enforcement.  In an effort to reconcile 
these two positions, multi-agency arrangements offer a chance for NGOs and law 
enforcement to work together in a formalised framework; an example of this being the ICPN. 
 
Following the introduction of the concept, Chapter 2 examined the different models of multi-
agency arrangements through discussion of three distinct models known as multi-agency 
panel, multi-agency team, and integrated service as well as the discussion of more informal 
methods of multi-agency working. The chapter also examine a series of factors that 
constitute an arrangement and considerations that actors must take into account when 
contemplating creating, or joining, a multi-agency arrangement. A literature review was 
carried out to examine the three main models of multi-agency working and examples of their 
use. It was observed that the three models operated in a sliding scale of integration and 
remit; this ranged from the multi-agency panel approach which operated in a loose 
arrangement with a limited remit and a primary focus on an individual’s main agency, to the 
integrated service model which operated as a fully integrated team of actors, representing 
several agencies, operating under one identity and to one set of aims and objectives (for 
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example CEOP). The chapter also discussed the less formal approaches and the fluidity of 
multi-agency working, whereby a multi-agency arrangement could be modified, in terms of 
level of integration or remit, with relative ease in response to the needs of the membership. 
 
In any case of multi-agency working, irrespective of the model chosen, common factors and 
considerations were identified that each member, or prospective member, of an arrangement 
had to consider. These factors covered an actor’s commitments and responsibilities to both 
their ‘home agency’ and the multi-agency arrangement and the often difficult balancing act 
that must be conducted to satisfy the requirements of both parties; outlining the 
consequences faced by both the individual and the arrangement if these factors were not 
adequately considered. Given the international focus of this thesis, several ‘international’ 
factors were also examined in relation to the jurisdictional differences and challenged faced 
as a result of a multi-national membership, such as language, culture, politics, history, and 
previous relationships. These factors were examined independently but their impact was 
also observed in each of the ‘standard’ factors for consideration; an issue which became 
evident during the analysis of the ICPN.  
 
Following the discussion of the different models of multi-agency arrangements and the 
factors for consideration, it was clear that this was a complex matter and there was no single 
‘one size fits all’ approach to multi-agency working. The format and structure of each 
individual multi-agency arrangement was a direct response to the aims of its membership 
and the level to which they wished to integrate. As a result, no two multi-agency 
arrangements are alike. This reiterated the need for actors to fully consider their aims, 
needs, and objectives when committing to a multi-agency arrangement, as this would have 
consequences for both the individual and the rest of the membership. This chapter also 
introduced the idea that actors can participate in several multi-agency arrangements, each 
with different roles and remits, in order to fully achieve their institutional aims and objectives; 
this was referred to as a ‘patchwork quilt’ or an ‘interconnecting mesh’. 
 
In order to fully demonstrate the wide ranging forms and structures that multi-agency 
arrangements can take, Chapter 3 examined in-depth several arrangements representing a 
range of different models, remits, and levels of integration in response to the factors 
previously discussed and the requirements of their memberships. This chapter examined the 
multi-agency arrangements of Interpol, Europol, the Financial Coalition against Child 
Pornography (FCACP), the European Financial Coalition (EFC), and the Virtual Global 
Taskforce. These specific examples were chosen as a means of demonstrating the range of 
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effective multi-agency arrangements and how each of the different models, and levels of 
integration, each with their own benefits and challenges. Through the selection of a range of 
different, and relevant, examples, it was demonstrated that actors may belong to multiple 
arrangements in order to achieve their objectives, as discussed earlier.  
 
Through the examples of Interpol and Europol it was shown that the political and cultural 
backgrounds of members can vastly influence the scale and scope of an arrangements 
activity. Interpol, as the largest multi-agency arrangement in law enforcement with 190 
members, not only has to balance a high number of members, but a diverse global 
membership with conflicting social, culture, political and legal frameworks. This has led to 
the arrangement’s remit being one of prominently communication and minor analysis, rather 
than operational. Interestingly, by limiting its remit to non-political activities the diverse 
membership of Interpol is enable to transcend the difficult diplomatic and political challenges 
of international relations; for example the USA, China, and Russia are all members of 
Interpol and it could be argued that relations conducted through this arrangement are often 
more cordial than outside.  
 
The ability of a more homogenous membership to undertake a wider remit and scope of 
activities was demonstrated, as a contrast, with the example of Europol. Europol was shown 
to possess a much smaller membership body but one which shared more closely aligned 
political, cultural, and legal backgrounds. As a result, the arrangement was able to possess a 
wider scope of activity as the challenges poses by many of the ‘international’ factors were 
reduced; for example, as the members were all signatories to the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Council of Europe, they shared common human rights and ethics 
legislation and frameworks which, in turn, allowed for greater sharing of information and 
intelligence between members leading to the ability to conduct operational activity.  
 
Whilst Interpol and Europol have a predominantly law enforcement membership, they do 
possess, to a limited degree, both informal and formal relationships with the NGO and 
private sectors; however they were not members of equal standing. An examination of the 
Financial Coalition against Child Pornography, the European Financial Coalition, and the 
Virtual Global Taskforce, demonstrated examples of multi-agency arrangements where law 
enforcement and non-law enforcement members can work together on a more equal basis. 
Through these examples it was also shown that the involvement of the NGO and private 
sectors bring with them additional challenges, must notably inter-sectorial ‘trust’ issues as 
seen in Chapter 2. These final examples represented arrangements of the multi-agency 
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panel model and therefore most closely resembled the case study of this thesis, the 
International Child Protection Network (ICPN). As a result, an examination of these 
arrangements served as a good introduction to, and means of comparison for, the type of 
multi-agency arrangement selected for the case study utilised in this thesis.  
 
Having examined several different types of multi-agency arrangement and introducing the 
case study, Chapter 4 outlined the methodology of the thesis and examined, in turn, each of 
the data collection methods utilised. The chapter began with stating the aim of the thesis, 
followed by the formation for several research questions for the thesis to consider; these 
were also restated several times throughout later chapters. Following the formation of the 
research questions, the chapter explained how data would be collected in order to answer 
them. Data was to be collected to two tranches; the first took place during the South East 
Asian ICPN conference in March 2011, which gave access to representatives from 
Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. A second data collection exercise took place in Romania 
during June 2011 in order to collect data from ICPN Romania members; it was unfortunate 
that representatives from ICPN Romania were not present at the ICPN conference attended 
by the other panels, however this could not be helped and the effects of this were mitigated, 
as much as possible, through the use of standardised data collection means. 
 
The chapter then elaborated on, and justified, the mixed-method approach to data collection 
which would utilise several qualitative and quantitative data collection tools in order to 
answer the research questions; namely documentary analysis, participant observation, 
questionnaire, focus groups and interviews. This elaboration began with a technical 
assessment of the each tool, which identified the suitability and limitations of each method 
for the purposes of this thesis. Following this, it was discussed how each method would be 
implemented in order to collect the required data from members of the ICPN, ensuring that 
ethical issues, especially prominent due to the nature of the multi-agency arrangement, were 
considered. Given the potential ethical sensitivities of this thesis, sample copies of the 
information sheet and questionnaire were included in the appendices and referenced in the 
chapter (Appendix 1); a copy of the PowerPoint presentation given by the researcher to 
members prior to the distribution of the questionnaire during the ICPN conference was also 
included (Appendix 2) to provide additional context. 
 
Further on the subject of ethical considerations, the issue of insider/outsider positioning was 
discussed as this was identified as the main ethical issue for the thesis. During the data 
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collection phase, it was also noted that the researcher was employed by CEOP as the 
International Liaison Officer, which included a role in managing the ICPN initiative. As an 
insider, the researcher was able to gain access to members of the ICPN and high level 
personnel from associated law enforcement, NGOs and private sector organisations which 
would not be available to others. However, this presented a potential conflict of interest and 
needed to be dealt with appropriately through the use of several safeguards to separate the 
roles of CEOP officer and DCrimJ student. This was done through an information sheet 
distributed prior to each data collection exercise, which outlined that data collected would be 
anonymous, stored securely by the researcher and not shared, in its raw form, with CEOP 
management (an agreement had previously been reached to allow this) and that the data 
would be used largely for the DCrimJ but also, and it was important to reiterate this on 
several occasions, for an evaluation of the ICPN initiative written by the researcher for 
CEOP in order to enhance its effectiveness. A copy of this evaluation, and associated 
recommendations, can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
Finally, the chapter discussed the limitations of the study, namely that the use of a single 
case study, would not produce results which would be wholly reproducible in other multi-
agency arrangements. However, this was mitigated through the reiteration that multi-agency 
arrangements, as a whole, were subject to a high degree of customisation and design 
fragmentation and, therefore, this would be an issue experienced by other studies of this 
nature. The use of this case study, and the associated research findings, were also 
defended on the basis that they were representative of other multi-agency arrangements in 
the child protection environment, for example CEOP, and as such the results would be 
relevant. 
 
Chapter 5 utilised the participant observation method, conducted over a period of 6 months, 
to examine CEOP, as a multi-agency arrangement, against the factors identified in Chapter 
2 and using the researcher’s observations to support these selectors. Observation was 
conducted with the permission of CEOP management and the informed consent of those 
observed, as previously outlined in Chapter 4. This provided the reader with a detailed 
insight into the workings of CEOP, which itself could be considered as a stand-alone 
research paper, but also validated the factors of multi-agency working previously identified, 
through the demonstration of these literature-based factors in a real world environment.    
Having examined CEOP as a multi-agency arrangement, the chapter discussed in detail the 
International Child Protection Network (ICPN) and its origins. This demonstrated the ICPN 
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as a reproduction of the rationale and design of CEOP in an international context, providing 
the thesis with a detailed insight into how the ICPN Advisory Panels were formed and the 
rationale behind the initiative, namely as a response to many of the issues of identified in 
Chapter 1 including weak law enforcement structures and the role of NGOs. The chapter 
elaborated on the common blueprint design and code of practice of the ICPN (see Appendix 
3). This use of a common ICPN design and structure across several jurisdictions was a 
central topic for discussion in this thesis, principally for its lack of consideration for the 
‘international’ factors identified in Chapter 2. The identification of these design issues as a 
point of interest for this thesis, and a background discussion of the ICPN as a multi-agency 
arrangement, provided the thesis and the reader with an understanding of the ICPN and 
context in which it operates in order to best interpret the findings from the data collection 
exercise discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 6 reintroduced the key research questions of the thesis and demonstrated that they 
would be answered through an examination of each of the multi-agency factors using data 
collected from ICPN members, utilising the mixed method approach as discussed in the 
methodology. A key learning point in this chapter was the demonstration that ‘international’ 
factors identified in Chapter 2 were not independent variables in their own right but were 
actually a part of each factor of multi-agency working. When examining each factor in turn, it 
was evident that those identified as ‘international’ factors, which were to be examined as a 
separate factors, had an influence on the implementation and approach taken for all of the 
factors discussed in the chapter. This demonstrated the scale to which ‘domestic’ and 
‘international’ multi-agency arrangements differ and the extent of the additional 
considerations that must be undertaken in an ‘international’ multi-agency arrangement such 
as the ICPN. This point was further discussed in the analysis chapter. 
 
Throughout the chapter, several recurring themes were identified and seen to transcend the 
individual sector culture and were observed, on the basis of the data collected, by many 
ICPN participants. The first of these points reiterated the importance of ensuring that a 
prospective member of a multi-agency arrangement fully understood the commitments 
required and had the ability to maintain such a commitment. This was supported by several 
respondents who commented on the frustration they had with actors who left the ICPN 
arrangement or had an ad-hoc approach to it. This issue not only affects the workings of the 
arrangement but also the reputation of the actor in question, which could lead to 
consequences outside of the ICPN and potentially affect the actor’s bi-lateral relations with 
   
131 
 
related organisations. This issue was particularly relevant for the ICPN given the limited 
resources available to stakeholders in the ‘hot-spot’ countries 
The protectionism and relationships factor was seen as an important one for the ICPN; as it 
was identified that the role of the state and existing inter-sectorial power relationships played 
a context-specific role in the ability of the arrangement to function effectively. For example 
the relationship dynamics in ICPN Vietnam, operating in a state-orientated jurisdiction, were 
very different to those observed in ICPN Thailand. These differences may exist for a variety 
of reasons, and may be cultural, societal, or the result of previous inter-agency interactions; 
the key learning point is there is no universality and the issue of protectionism and 
relationships, and their consequences, must be examined, in detail, for each jurisdiction that 
an arrangement intends to operate. The identification that there are jurisdictional differences 
which may affect how a specific factor is implemented was also identified with reference to 
communication. It was observed that certain cultural factors, such as the preference for face-
to-face meeting over e-mail and the role of seniority/rank of the individual, played an 
important role in the effectiveness and success of communication within the multi-agency 
arrangement. These key themes, in addition to the detailed examination of each factor 
identified in Chapter 2, provided a strong basis for the analysis chapter which would examine 
these findings, and those from the previous chapters, against the research questions stated 
in this thesis.  
 
Chapter 7 consisted of the analysis of the literature and data contained within the thesis with 
a view to further pursuing the stated research questions and presenting a comprehensive 
response to them. The literature and data identified, through the variety of multi-agency 
arrangements in existence, that there is no ‘one size fits all’ model of how an arrangement 
should be structured and operate. The design of a multi-agency arrangement can be seen 
as a response to the mutually-agreed aims and objectives of its members, and as such must 
take into consideration both context specific factors, as identified in Chapter 2, and the 
needs and motivations of the individual members. This reinforces the notion that there are 
several different multi-agency approaches that can be taken, such as the multi-agency 
panel, multi-agency team, or integrated service model as well as more informal methods, 
and a selection of these different approaches were demonstrated with reference to Chapter 
3. 
 
The analysis also examined the potential benefits of multi-agency working, from a law 
enforcement viewpoint which, in addition to the general benefits as experienced by all, 
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centred on certain effects of globalisation and impact of this for state-orientated law 
enforcement. In those jurisdictions where NGOs and the private sector have emerged as a 
response to weak law enforcement and effects of transnational crime, a multi-agency 
arrangement represents a formal method for law enforcement to engage with these 
networks. The International Child Protection Network (ICPN) can be seen as a perfect 
example of this, as both a response to these issues but also as a method for UK law 
enforcement (through CEOP) to better deal with the consequences of UK offenders in these 
‘hotspot’ countries. Essentially a multi-agency arrangement allows state-orientated law 
enforcement to better engage with actors who are not constrained by geographical borders, 
such as international NGOs. 
 
In recognising the potential benefits of these approaches, it was important to consider how 
organisational and cultural variations affect the formation and operation of these multi-
agency arrangements. The analysis of this research question reiterated the importance of 
considering these variations at an early stage and ensuring that jurisdictionally-specific 
adaptations are made to any design to ensure the maximum effectiveness of the multi-
agency arrangement. Key Issues such as legacy inter-agency relations, preferred 
communication practices of members, and the role of the state, as observed in Chapter 6, 
were discussed and seen as both context-specific and as playing a major role in the 
effectiveness of the arrangement. These issues have been raised many times throughout 
this thesis and demonstrated, in a professional practice setting, in Appendix 4 which 
demonstrated how even the ICPN multi-agency arrangement did not take into account all of 
these factors at the initial design stage, but that there were means to correct these 
deficiencies.   
 
In addition to the cultural variations previously discussed, the fourth research question 
focussed on the specific challenges for law enforcement when operating a multi-agency 
environment. The key observation was that law enforcement have to additional consider the 
effects of ‘police culture’ and their ability to transcend this, rather distinct, professional 
culture in order to engage with those from outside law enforcement who may not fully 
understand the police culturally-specific operating practices and terminology. A failure to 
overcome this may lead to communication issues and reduced effectiveness within the multi-
agency arrangement. Another major challenge for law enforcement, which is linked to ‘police 
culture’, is the ability to ‘trust’ those actors outside of law enforcement and feel confident 
enough to share information, traditionally seen only by police, with those NGOs and private 
sectors actors also participating in the multi-agency arrangement. The inability to share 
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information, and in effect communicate, vastly reduces the effectiveness of the multi-agency 
arrangement in achieving its aims and objectives; the effects of this being seen most 
severely in international multi-agency arrangements, where the law enforcement actor often 
has the most to benefit for inter-sector information sharing. 
 
The final research questioned examined ‘are multi-agency approaches effective in different 
jurisdictions?’ In order to effectively answer this question, reference was made to the 
selection of arrangements discussed in Chapter 3 which demonstrated both the longevity of 
arrangements and the commitment of members to remain involved, as seen in the case of 
Interpol and Europol. It was also discussed that actors to continue to see multi-agency 
arrangements as a useful and attractive initiative, as evidenced by the formation of new 
multi-agency arrangements such as FCACP, EFC, and the ICPN in recent years. In addition 
to this, the global nature of these multi-agency arrangements suggests that multi-agency 
arrangements are effective in different jurisdictions, as long as the design and remit of the 
arrangement is acceptable to the membership. A key example of this is Interpol whose role 
and remit is much more constrained, due to the globally diverse nature of the membership, 
than Europol, as discussed in Chapter 3. Further evidence of the potential effectiveness of 
multi-agency arrangements was demonstrated with reference to the ICPN and in particular 
the interview testimony of several members which outlined the specific contribution to child 
protection made by the arrangement; a fact  which has led to a planned expansion of the 
ICPN to other jurisdictions in 2012-2013.  
 
Throughout the thesis an attempt has been made to demonstrate, in a comprehensive 
manner, examples of international multi-agency arrangements and the rationale behind 
them. This began with a discussion of the environment which led to the appeal of multi-
agency arrangements followed by a literature review of the different methods of multi-agency 
arrangements and real world examples of such models. This demonstration then moved to a 
detailed examination, utilising a mixed method data collection approach, of two multi-agency 
arrangements specific to the child protection environment: CEOP and the ICPN. On the 
basis of the literature and data collection, it was then possible to effectively conduct an 
analysis with reference to the research questions identified. 
 
Limitations of the thesis and opportunities for further research 
As outlined in the methodology, this thesis utilised a single case study for its data collection 
and this may consequently limit the ability to replicate the findings in other situations. Whist 
this may limit the relevance of the data collected from the case study in the non-child 
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protection environment, the highly specialised nature of child protection means that findings 
and analysis have, at least, sector specific relevant. It would of interest to see if the same 
results were obtained utilising this research methodology in another environment where 
multi-agency arrangements were used.  
 
It must also be considered that multi-agency arrangements are subject to a high degree of 
customisation and it would therefore be very difficult to identify another case study of a 
comparable nature. Despite this, the wider discussions on multi-agency models and factors 
for consideration, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, can, however, be utilised by the wider 
multi-agency literature and practitioners. On the basis of the findings, analysis, and 
recommendations made in this thesis, it would be interesting to revisit the ICPN in the future 
to observe if the effectiveness and dynamics found within the multi-agency arrangement had 
changed over time. Similarly, once ICPN Advisory Panels are set up in Spain and the 
Ukraine, it would be useful to reassess the findings following the inclusion of additional 
European ICPN contexts.  
 
Closing remarks 
The research carried out during the course of this thesis has sought to fulfil the aims and 
research questions, as stated in Chapter 4, with a view to making a contribution to wider 
academic and practitioner knowledge. The content of this thesis can be seen to inform many 
areas of understanding relating to the study, creation, and operation, of multi-agency 
arrangements.  
 
Through the analysis of the effects of globalisation, in the context of child protection, and the 
capability of law enforcement to respond to these challenges, this thesis has demonstrated 
the potentially positive role that multi-agency arrangements can play in response to the limits 
of state-orientated policing. Using a literature review and the researcher’s professional 
practice experience of several multi-agency arrangements, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, as 
well as the mixed method data collection and analysis of CEOP and the ICPN, a wide 
ranging study of multi-agency arrangements was carried out and outlined to the reader that 
the effectiveness of the multi-agency model was not limited to one example. 
 
The detailed participant-observation led study of CEOP and its working environment was 
unique in the fact that a study of this type had not previously been conducted. Utilising the 
benefits of insider positioning, this has contributed to wider knowledge through its detailed 
assessment and description of an otherwise closed environment. This has produced benefits 
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for both the academic study of CEOP but also for policy-makers from other jurisdictions who 
have an interest in replicating the CEOP model in their own countries. There is potential for 
this participant-observation to be extended into its own research paper or feed into other 
research projects.    
 
In addition, the detailed study of the contemporary ICPN initiative and the unique data 
collected through the mixed method approach has many benefits for wider knowledge. As 
outlined in this thesis, a subset of the data collected was used by the researcher to produce 
a separate strategic assessment of the ICPN for CEOP management. This was completed in 
early 2012 with the production of a series of recommendations aimed at increasing the 
effectiveness of the arrangement (see Appendix 4); as of June 2012, the majority of these 
recommendations had been implemented in the existing ICPN Advisory Panels and this has 
also led to the modification of the proposed ICPN Advisory Panels due to be established in 
Spain and Ukraine in 2013. It can therefore be said that this research has produced benefits 
for academics and child protection practitioners.  
 
The research has demonstrated that multi-agency arrangements with a diverse range of 
actors can operate effectively at both the intra and inter-jurisdictional level, providing that 
appropriate consideration is given to the factors outlined in Chapter 2. It was in this chapter 
that the reader was introduced to a checklist of key factors and considerations for the 
creation and operation of multi-agency arrangements in the international context; these 
factors and considerations were supported through the ICPN data collection exercise. This 
not only informs the academic knowledge on multi-agency arrangements but also serves as 
a useful guide for practitioners and professionals who are considering creating, or improving, 
a multi-agency arrangement. This is especially relevant as there is limited existing literature 
on the subject. 
 
The thesis has sought to examine the existence and effectiveness of multi-agency 
arrangements operating in, and across, different jurisdictions, and it has been observed that 
in the majority of cases these arrangements have brought significant benefits to those both 
participating in them and those who are on the receiving end of an arrangements efforts. The 
data collected during the course of this thesis, and especially the interviewee testimony, 
makes it very clear that there are benefits to be gained from multi-agency working. As a 
point for future research, it would be interesting to examine the ICPN once it has been 
expanded into additional European countries and to ascertain if the results found in the 
Romania are replicated in the wider European context. 
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Nevertheless, the findings and analysis have shown that, as previously discussed, the 
challenges of multi-agency working are compounded by the additional challenges of working 
across multiple jurisdictions. This thesis has identified that jurisdictionally-specific factors 
must be considered, not as independent variables, but as part of each factor of multi-agency 
working. In order to deploy a multi-agency arrangement across multiple jurisdictions, a 
detailed appreciation of the local environment is required. This was shown through the 
varying power dynamics and effects that the role of the state played on each of the 4 ICPN 
Panels and, as one member stated, what worked in Cambodia and Thailand didn’t work in 
Vietnam. That said, once context-specific adjustments had been implemented, through the 
ICPN has been shown that benefits for state and non-state actors can be obtained through 
the use of a multi-agency arrangement. These benefits range from improving existing 
information-sharing and inter-agency interaction to, at the most basic level, facilitating 
dialogue between agencies and sectors with limited, or no, previous interaction; in these 
situations the benefits are even more pronounced.  Where there is limited previous 
interaction, an arrangement can also provide an insight into the workings of each 
represented agency/sector. This greater understanding of different professional cultures can 
reduce inter-agency barriers and rivalry.  
 
The extent to which these benefits can be realised is largely dependent on the ability, and 
willingness, of participants to transcend their preconceptions of each other as well as the 
effects of any negative historical interactions. Before participants to realise these benefits, 
the designers of such arrangements must consider the cultural, social, and political variables 
to ensure that the multi-agency arrangement is fit for purpose and relevant to the participants 
it has been created for. Failure to account for these may lead to disillusionment and 
disengagement by the participants.  As the analysis has demonstrated, the potential benefits 
of engaging in this form of working vastly outnumber the challenges – if implemented 
correctly.  
 
Actors, if sufficiently motivated and open to change, should identify with the fact multi-
agency arrangements can provide an effective low-cost high-impact response to the 
challenges of a globalised society. The findings and recommendations of this thesis can 
contribute to ensuring the effectiveness of such arrangements, which are becoming 
increasingly relevant and utilised in response to the effects of globalisation and rise in 
transnational criminality and offending.  
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Appendix 1: International Child Protection Network Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire aims to examine your experiences of the ICPN.  
There are 35 questions examining the following areas: Communication, Knowledge, 
Education and Information-sharing. There will also be a section for general feedback. 
The questionnaire should take around 15 minutes to complete. 
 The data collected by this questionnaire will be used for two purposes: 
 To carry out a ‘status check’ on the current ICPN arrangements, identifying 
positive experiences and any challenges encountered by members. A report 
utilising the data collected will be used to present options to strengthen 
current ICPN arrangements and address any issues raised. 
 To provide data for a Doctoral university project carried out by a CEOP 
member of staff examining multi-agency arrangements in law enforcement. 
This academic thesis will seek to use data collected from CEOP staff and 
ICPN members and present these outcomes as a case study of multi-agency 
working. 
Participation in this questionnaire provides you with an opportunity to express your 
opinions on the ICPN and the current working arrangements. By providing open and 
honest answers, an effective assessment of the ICPN can be carried out to identify 
positive experiences and highlight areas which could be improved. This will have 
mutual benefit for both CEOP and ICPN members.  
No personal data will be requested during this questionnaire to ensure that all 
answers are anonymous, so please feel free to answer honestly. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Feel free to skip any questions you are not 
comfortable with or unable to answer.  
All data collected will be stored on an encrypted computer system.  
If you have any questions about this questionnaire or the use of the data collected, 
please e-mail icpn@ceop.gov.uk 
A copy of the final research thesis, when finalised in 2012, can be provided to you on 
request. If you would like a copy, please e-mail icpn@ceop.gov.uk 
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General 
1. Which ICPN are you a member of? (Please circle) 
 
o Cambodia 
o Romania 
o Thailand 
o Vietnam 
 
2. How long have you been an ICPN Member? (Please circle) 
 
o 0-2 months 
o 3-5 months 
o 6-8 months 
o 9+ months 
 
3. What were your reasons for joining the ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o Increased networking opportunities 
o Increased training opportunities 
o Increased information-sharing opportunities 
o Increased safeguarding opportunities 
o Other _________________________________________ 
 
 Comment/Further information?  
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4. What were your expectations of ICPN membership? (Please circle) 
 
o Increased networking opportunities 
o Increased training opportunities 
o Increased information-sharing opportunities 
o Increased safeguarding opportunities 
o Other _________________________________________ 
 
 Comment/Further information?  
 
 
 
 
5. What benefits has membership of the ICPN brought to your organisation? 
(Please circle) 
 
o Increased networking opportunities 
o Increased training opportunities 
o Increased information-sharing opportunities  
o Increased safeguarding opportunities 
o Other _________________________________________ 
 
 Comment/Further information?  
 
 
 
 
 
6. What challenges did you experience prior to membership of the ICPN?  
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7. What challenges have you experienced since joining the ICPN?  
 
 
 
 
 
8. To what extent have these challenges changed since membership of the 
ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o Increased a lot 
o Increased a little 
o Neither increased or decreased 
o Decreased a little 
o Decreased a lot 
 
 Comment/Further information?  
 
 
 
 
 
9. To what extent has your interaction with other Panel members outside of 
Panel meetings changed since joining the ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o Increased a lot 
o Increased a little 
o Neither increased or decreased 
o Decreased a little 
o Decreased a lot 
 
 Comment/Further information?  
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10. In what way has your interaction with other Panel members changed? 
 
 
 
 
Communication 
11. How much contact did you have with other Panel members prior to the 
creation of the ICPN?  (None 0-10 A Lot) (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
 
 Comment/Further information? 
 
 
 
 
12. How much contact do you have with other Panel members since the creation 
of the ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
 
 Comment/Further information? 
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13. In what ways did you communicate with other Panel members prior to the 
creation of the ICPN? (multiple choice) (Please circle) 
 
o Face-to-Face 
o Telephone 
o Fax 
o Letter 
o E-mail 
o Other _________________________________________ 
 
 Comment/Further information? 
 
 
 
 
14. In what ways have you communicated with other Panel members since the 
creation of the ICPN? (multiple choice) (Please circle) 
 
o Face-to-Face 
o Telephone 
o Fax 
o Letter 
o E-mail 
o Other _________________________________________ 
 
 Comment/Further information? 
o  
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15. At what organisational level did you have contact with other Panel members 
prior to the creation of the ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o Head 
o Senior-ranking 
o Middle-ranking 
o Junior- ranking 
o None 
o Don’t know 
o Other _________________________________________ 
 
16. At what organisational level do you have contact with other Panel members 
since to the creation of the ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o Head 
o Senior-ranking 
o Middle-ranking 
o Junior- ranking 
o None 
o Don’t know 
o Other _________________________________________ 
 
17. In what way has membership of the ICPN affected your communication with 
other Panel Members? (Negative impact 1 - Positive impact 10) (Please 
circle) 
 
o Negative 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Positive 
 
 Comment/Further information? 
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Knowledge 
18. How much did you know about the other Panel members prior to your 
membership of the ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
 
 Comment/Further information? 
 
 
 
 
19. How much do you know about the other Panel members since you joined the 
ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
 
 Comment/Further information? 
 
 
 
 
Education 
20. What was your level of understanding surrounding child exploitation prior to 
joining the ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
 
21. What is your level of understanding surrounding child exploitation since 
joining the ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
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22. To what extent has the ICPN met your training needs? (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
 
Information-sharing 
23. How much information did your organisation share with other Panel Members 
prior to the creation of the ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
 
24. Has this level of information-sharing changed since joining the ICPN? (Please 
circle) 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Don’t Know 
 
 Comment/Further information? 
 
 
 
 
25. How much information did your organisation share with CEOP prior to the 
creation of the ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
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26. Has this level of information-sharing changed since joining the ICPN? (Please 
circle) 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Don’t Know 
 Comment/Further information? 
 
 
 
 
27. In what way has your information-sharing practice changed since joining the 
ICPN?  
 
 
 
 
 
Safeguarding 
28. To what extent has membership of the ICPN benefitted your ability to 
safeguard children? (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
 
 Comment/Further information? 
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29. In your country, how much involvement did you have with other ICPN 
members in safeguarding prior to joining the ICPN?  (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
 
 Comment/Further information? 
  
 
 
 
30. In your country, how much involvement have you had with other ICPN 
members in safeguarding since joining the ICPN?  (Please circle) 
 
o None 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A lot 
 
 Comment/Further information?  
 
 
 
 
31. Has the level of safeguarding conducted by your organisation changed since 
joining the ICPN? (Please circle) 
 
o Increased a lot 
o Increased a little 
o Neither increased or decreased 
o Decreased a little 
o Decreased a lot 
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Feedback 
32. In what other ways could the ICPN help you/your organisation achieve its 
goals?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33. Would you recommended/suggest membership of the ICPN to colleagues? 
(Please circle) 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Don’t Know 
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34. What changes would you make to the ICPN?  
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35. Any other comments or feedback you would like to provide?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire  
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Appendix 2: ICPN Conference Presentation 
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Appendix 3: ICPN Advisory Panel Code of Practice 
 
The 2006 ‘Keeping Children Safe’ Coalition Toolkit has been drawn upon for outlining key 
standards for child protection as a basis for the ICPN network’s ‘Code of Practice’. Individual 
members of the ICPN may already have their own child protection policies, but these 
standards outline the shared principles that underpin the network. These principles and 
standards are aimed at all organisations and agencies (including Government partners) 
dedicated to working directly with children and outline the shared aims of promoting 
children’s safety and welfare. The purpose of the shared agreement to these standards is to 
ensure transparency and consistency within the network in promoting child protection policy 
and practice.  
 
This ‘code of practice’ represents the key standards that network members agree to 
work towards. These standards are based on international children’s rights 
instruments. Whilst the full delivery of all of these standards may not always be 
immediately achievable (influenced by circumstances beyond the control of individual 
organisations), network members commit to working towards them.  
 
1. A written policy on child protection.  
 
This should be clearly written, accessible and promoted within the organization. It should be 
distributed and owned by senior members of the organization. It should be regularly 
reviewed and updated (at a minimum every year) and should contain clear definitions of 
child abuse.  
 
2. Clear guidance on what to do if there are child protection concerns  
 
There should be clear procedures about what to do if there are concerns about a child’s 
safety or welfare, these should be known and understood by all those working within the 
organization and should take account of the issues that arise in different country contexts. 
There should be a clear lead person for child protection, and a process for recording 
incidents and for dealing with complaints.  
 
3. Clear processes within the organisation to minimize the possibility of children 
being abused by those in positions of trust  
 
This would include ways of recruiting and assessing suitability, vetting and barring, whistle 
blowing procedures and guidance on the appropriate use of ICT  
 
4. Written guidelines on behaviour towards children  
 
This include written guidance on appropriate behaviour towards children (especially of those 
providing residential care), and of children towards other children. This should outline that 
children must be listened to and respected and that there are ways of managing poor 
behaviour on the part of children that do not involve physical punishment or any kind of 
degrading treatment.  
 
5. Guidance on how the child protection policy will be applied in practically in local 
circumstances – in ways that are sensitive to different cultures but which do not 
condone practices which are harmful to children  
 
This includes a mapping or assessment of the local legal, welfare and child protection 
context – and the process for reporting fits this context. There should be a clear definition of 
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general and specific child protection need and the UNCRC used as a basis for child 
protection. There should be a clear dialogue and discussion about any difference between 
the child protection policy and the local practice so that this can be considered and resolved.  
 
6. Ensure that organizations uphold the rights of all children to protection from abuse  
 
This includes clarity in the policy that all children regardless of age, race, gender, age 
religion, disability etc have equal rights to protection, and that the procedures recognize the 
particular risks faced by some groups of children in accessing help. This should make clear 
that any discrimination is unacceptable and there should be a clear complaints procedure.  
 
7. There should be clear communication about the policy to protect children and keep 
them safe both within the organization and externally.  
 
Information should be clearly displayed in an accessible format and language about this 
commitment and children, and parents and carers should be aware of it. Everyone should 
know where to go to get help, and who within the agency is responsible for child protection. 
Contact details for local protective services should be available.  
 
8. There should be learning and development opportunities for staff to develop and 
train in order to retain the necessary skills to keep children safe  
 
There should be training on joining the organization on the child protection policy and 
procedures, and those staff with responsibility for safety should have regular opportunities 
for training and updating their skills and knowledge. Children should be provided with advice 
and support on how to keep themselves safe also. 
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Appendix 4: Recommendations Presented to the Child Exploitation 
and Online Protection Centre to Enhance the International Child 
Protection Network Initiative  
 
•The majority of respondents became involved with the ICPN to increase their networking 
opportunities and information-sharing. The ability to increase safeguarding capabilities was a 
strong motivation across all panels; with 90% of Cambodian delegates citing this as a reason 
for joining, this dropped to around 70% of delegates from Thailand and Vietnam. 
 
•The greatest benefits gained from membership of the ICPN, to date, have been the 
increased networking opportunities and information-sharing. The majority of Thai delegates 
also stating they had benefited from training offered by the ICPN; this dropped to around 
40% of Vietnamese and 30% of Cambodian delegates. However, it was understood that 
CEOP-led training events were resource intensive. 
 
Recommendation 1: Consider developing e-learning/web-based learning resources 
accessible via member area on ICPN website. A number of NGOs in the region have 
placed their education resource online.  
 
•All delegates reported that interaction with other organisations involved in the ICPN had 
‘increased a lot’ or ‘increased a little’ since they joined the ICPN themselves. 1 delegate from 
Thailand reported that interaction had ‘decreased a little’; no explanation was given. 
 
•Following membership of the ICPN, delegates across all countries, in addition to increasing 
their interaction, also increased their range of communication methods. Levels of Face-to-
Face meetings and e-mail communication saw the greatest increase; additional increases in 
the use of fax and postal mail were also observed but in far smaller amounts. It is believed 
this is a result of the increased networking opportunities. 
 
Recommendation 2: Produce a contact list/ database of ICPN members. This could be 
divided into ICPN Advisory Panel members and the wider ICPN ‘family’ (such as those 
who have attended training courses/events). 
 
•Through membership of the ICPN, the rank/grade at which communication was conducted 
has broadened to include communication at all staff grades. Prior to ICPN membership, the 
majority of communication was carried out at ‘Head’ or ‘Senior’ rank level. The exception 
was Vietnam, which saw little change; this may be explained through social and cultural 
factors in Vietnam which emphases a hierarchy structure.  
 
•Knowledge and understanding of other organisations operating in the region increased in all 
cases following membership of the ICPN.  This can only assist the objectives of the ICPN by 
promoting closer cooperation. 
 
Recommendation 3: Request participating organisations to provide a brief biography 
of their organisation for inclusion and distribution to members and participants at 
ICPN events. 
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•The majority of respondents stated their knowledge of child exploitation issues had 
increased following membership of the ICPN; this was particularly evident in the case of Thai 
and Vietnamese respondents. Cambodian ICPN delegates reported only a marginal 
increase in their knowledge; however this may be because they stated that they had a high 
knowledge prior to membership.   
 
Recommendation 4: Create an ICPN e-library to include previous training course 
materials for download and wider distribution. 
 
•Nearly all delegates reporting that they increased their information-sharing between other 
members after joining the ICPN. The benefit is enhanced when it is considered that 
information-sharing levels prior to membership were low. 
 
•Conducting safeguarding activities with other ICPN members also increased following 
membership; this was particularly evident in Cambodia and Vietnam.  Whilst there were only 
modest increases in cooperation in Thailand, it must be considered that the ICPN Advisory 
Panel in Thailand bought together many organisations that had pre-existing informal 
relationships with each other. Despite this, Thai respondents did state their ability to 
safeguard children has increased ‘a lot’ since membership of the ICPN; this may be as a 
result of increased training and subject knowledge rather than networking opportunities. 
 
•The majority of respondents from Cambodia and Vietnam stated the level of safeguarding 
they conduct had ‘increased a lot’ or ‘increased a little’ since joining the ICPN. This figure 
was lower in Thailand; however this may be due to factors mentioned previously. 
 
•When asked ‘to what extent has the ICPN met your training needs’, respondents from 
Cambodia and Thailand responded most favourably. Responses from Vietnamese 
respondents, whist all positive, were more spread across the spectrum. It was observed that 
the number of Vietnamese delegates with a working knowledge of English, the language of 
the ICPN, was limited. This may have led to difficulties in understanding the training 
presentations. 
 
Recommendation 5: Training materials should be translated into native language of 
members, when possible. 
 
•Nearly all respondents would recommend membership of the ICPN; 10% of Thai 
respondents stating they would not recommend membership but did not elaborate to their 
reasons. 
 
General Feedback 
•Respondents expressed a desire to improve communication both between ICPN members 
and between ICPN members and CEOP. Suggestions from delegates include a monthly/bi-
monthly ICPN e-newsletter with updates from all ICPN countries. 
 
Recommendation 6: Produce a regular ICPN e-newsletter with contributions and 
‘good news stories’. Two versions of this document could be produced; for both ICPN 
Advisory Panel members and the wider ICPN ‘family’.  
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•Respondents sought an increase in regional communication and input from CEOP; several 
expressed feeling ‘on their own’ after CEOP staff returned to London. Other respondents felt 
there would be benefit to having a CEOP member of staff based in the region. 
 
Recommendation 7: CEOP to host regular Skype or telephone conferences with ICPN 
members, including input from ICPN staff. This method is used by other international 
arrangements including the VGT. The use of Skype, where possible, could make this 
cost-neutral. 
 
Recommendation 8: Explore the possibility of a locally-engaged individual employed 
in the region to work on ICPN activities. 
 
•Continuing points previously made, several respondents stated they would find benefit from 
‘field trips’ to other organisations and to CEOP.  Due to cost implications this would be 
difficult to facilitate, however knowledge and awareness of these organisations can be 
increased through recommendations 2, 3, and 6. Organisational visits arranged between 
ICPN members themselves, rather than CEOP, may beneficial and possible.  
 
•The issue of resources and finance was a common issue faced by ICPN members. Several 
respondents enquired whether CEOP could supply funding; this would not be practical. 
Therefore additional funding streams and sources should be considered. 
 
Recommendation 9: Increase engagement with the corporate, charitable and third 
sector to increase access and provision of funding. 
 
•A high proportion of respondents suggested possible organisations as future members of 
the ICPN; expressing a desire to share the realised benefits that their organisation had 
experienced as a result of membership. Respondents also felt that these benefits could be 
increase with a wider membership; however it was accepted that a membership which was 
too large could be counterproductive. Many of these suggested organisations were 
government departments and discussions with other members suggest, given the role of the 
government and state institutions in the region, this would not be welcomed by all.  
 
Recommendation 10: Given the desire from ICPN members to expand their network, 
consideration should be given to implementing a recruitment policy and list of 
potential additional members. When considering any new members, cultural factors 
and implications of their involvement on the rest of the group must be considered. 
 
Recommendation 11: Given the unwritten nature of the wider ICPN ‘family’, 
consideration should be given to establish a formal membership and role for those 
who attend ICPN events and wish to become further involved. This would mirror many 
of the benefits of, but not all, ICPN Advisory Panel membership. This lesser form of 
membership could be titled ‘ICPN Associate’. 
 
• All delegates praised the achievements of the ICPN team and appreciated the close-knit 
and personal connects gained as a result of the small number of CEOP Officers involved in 
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the network. However, several respondents expressed concern over the resilience of the 
ICPN and the potential loss of knowledge and contacts if there were staff changes. 
 
Recommendation 12: the number of CEOP Officers involved in the running of the 
ICPN should be increased. Where direct and specific recruitment is not possible, 
consideration should be given to appropriate members of staff taking on ICPN 
responsibilities as a part-time or ‘additional role’.
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Appendix 5: Questionnaire Results – By Country 
What were your reasons for joining the ICPN? 
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What were your expectations of ICPN membership? 
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What benefits has membership of the ICPN brought to your organisation? 
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To what extent have these challenges changed since membership of the ICPN? 
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To what extent has your interaction with other Panel members outside of Panel meetings changed since joining the ICPN? 
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How much contact did you have with other Panel members prior to the creation of the ICPN?  (None 0-10 A Lot) 
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How much contact do you have with other Panel members since the creation of the ICPN? 
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In what ways did you communicate with other Panel members prior to the creation of the ICPN? (multiple choice) 
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In what ways have you communicated with other Panel members since the creation of the ICPN? (multiple choice) 
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At what organisational level did you have contact with other Panel members prior to the creation of the ICPN? 
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At what organisational level do you have contact with other Panel members since to the creation of the ICPN? 
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In what way has membership of the ICPN affected your communication with other Panel Members? (Negative impact 1 - Positive impact 10) 
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How much did you know about the other Panel members prior to your membership of the ICPN? 
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How much do you know about the other Panel members since you joined the ICPN? 
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What was your level of understanding surrounding child exploitation prior to joining the ICPN? (None 0-10 A Lot) 
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What is your level of understanding surrounding child exploitation since joining the ICPN? 
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To what extent has the ICPN met your training needs? 
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How much information did your organisation share with other Panel Members prior to the creation of the ICPN? 
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Has this level of information-sharing changed since joining the ICPN? 
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How much information did your organisation share with CEOP prior to the creation of the ICPN? (None 0-10 A Lot) 
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Has this level of information-sharing changed since joining the ICPN? 
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To what extent has membership of the ICPN benefitted your ability to safeguard children? (None 0-10 A Lot) 
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In your country, how much involvement did you have with other ICPN members in safeguarding prior to joining the ICPN? (None 0-10 A Lot) 
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In your country, how much involvement have you had with other ICPN members in safeguarding since joining the ICPN? (None 0-10 A Lot) 
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Has the level of safeguarding conducted by your organisation changed since joining the ICPN? 
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Would you recommended/suggest membership of the ICPN to colleagues? 
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